# 1NC

## File Notes

* *This is the Wave 1 / Starter Pack Fem IR K for the 2022-2023 High School Policy Topic (NATO/EMERGING TECH)*
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* *Plans for Improvement: There will be updated file and/or supplemental files released, by the “K lab,” throughout the UMICH 7 week debate camp*

### **Summary of Negative Argument**

* Meta Level: Vulnerability is inevitable & ontological
* Link: The aff tries to securitize against vulnerability in IR
* Impact: “Protection Racket”
  + The build up of offensive military strategies in the name of national defense / security…
  + Turns case b/c it makes wars more likely
  + Chivalric protectionism solidifies unethical gendered hierarchies
* Alt: To embrace vulnerability
* Alt is a prerequisite to –
  + Solving the inevitable aff impacts
  + Positive peace (Try or die for the alt)
  + Ethical modes of doing IR (Breaking down hierarchies)

## SHELLS

### 1NC Shell - Long

#### 1. The AFF attempt to securitize against geopolitical vulnerabilities produces more violence than it prevents – their politics of chivalric impact avoidance constitutes a “protection racket” that justifies the intensification of militarization

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 75-78 (SPP).

While this image of the just warrior as defender of civilization at first glance seems to favor the defensive (and, would therefore not contribute to the cult of the offensive), a closer look shows that the discourse of the protection racket is actually offensive in three distinct ways. First, it leads states to value offense in order to be the **best possible protectors**, since offense is associated with increased chance at victory and a perception of an active approach to protection. Second, it allows militaries aspiring to the idealized or hegemonic masculinity to identify those in need of protection outside of its borders, and to start aggressive wars to protect those in need. 81 Third, insomuch as protection is a performance rather than an actual service, the appearance of boldness and bravery in actions taken on behalf of this chivalrous ideal brings attention to the protecting which is being done. In these ways, the protection racket can be associated with the increased likelihood of pursuing offensive military strategies.

The chivalric codes in vogue at the turn of the century identified the vulnerable female body as the main cause for war. The enemy was cast as an inhuman, sexual predator. Propagandists described German attacks on Belgium towns in late summer, 1914 as “rape of Belgium.” The famous World War I propaganda poster illustrates this melding of race and gender: a large brown gorilla-like creature with a bloodied bat labeled “kulter” grasps a half-naked white woman who appears to have fainted. “Destroy this mad brute: Enlist,” the poster demands. Posters in Britain encouraging men to volunteer evoked women and children as defenseless targets of war and drew upon chivalric discourses of honor and protection, declaring, “Your rights of citizenship give you the privilege of joining your fellows in defence of your Honour and your Homes,” and “There are Three Types of Men: Those who hear the call and Obey, Those who Delay, and – the Others.” Discourses of chivalrous masculinity served not only to make offensive approaches to international politics in World War I possible but also to constitute a set of gendered power relations that posited white men as protectors of the nation against racialized others who threaten the purity of naïve and defenseless women.

Examples of the influence of the protection racket on perceived offensive dominance and the cult of the offensive are common in present-day politics as well. This chivalric narrative has been resurrected in the post-Cold War era, and gendered identities have not only legitimated but also promoted wars. The various humanitarian wars of the 1990s are read as a narrative in which NATO, and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic, rescuers of weak and passive victims. Farmanfarmaian describes how the reports of the Iraqi Army raping women in Kuwait were used to construct Iraq as a barbaric enemy so that war was not only thinkable, but necessitated. This new American masculinity was “tough and tender,” capable of awesome military prowess but also compassion and empathy.

The mission of “liberating” Afghan women was used to garner public support for the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to silence feminine protests against the war. Two and a half years later, this same discourse of “liberation” was used to fueled support to overturn the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, represented in racialized terms as an inhuman despot when the evidence against weapons of mass destruction turned out to be fabricated or exaggerated. This narrative of rescuing the Iraqi people (as “damsels in distress”) from the clutches of an evil man may help to explain why many people in the US and its allies came to believe, with little evidence, that the invading forces would be “greeted as liberators.” These rescue narratives demonstrate that the protection racket encourages offensive military policies even when it is couched in the language of defense and protection. The protection racket is a gendered discourse that produces the gender identities of just warriors and beautiful souls. It is also the backdrop that allows for offensive military policies to be viewed as defensive, thereby gaining traction and legitimating war by enabling offensive wars to take place under the mantle of “protection.” The existence of discourse of protection can therefore help us understand the occurrence of offensive policies in the light of an ostensible defensive dominance.

Conclusion

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war.

Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] **erases the distinction between** **security and expansion**," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes.

Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

#### 2. In proposing FIAT as a solution to vulnerability, the aff bestows authority in the USFG as the masculine protector of “its own” and “other” feminized subjects. This discourse locks gendered and racialized hierarchies into their model of IR.

Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP)

For Cohn (2014, 53) “the most important piece of the puzzle” is “the ways in which vulnerability is intensely gendered at the symbolic level”. This is particularly so in the predominant international security theory and practice, where human vulnerability is perceived as a matter of “vulnerable groups” only and thus “displaced onto a subset of humans”. Drawing on her empirical work at the UN Security Council (SC) as an observer of discussions on the SC Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security, Cohn demonstrates that vulnerability is frequently discussed at the SC, yet always with a reference to some Others. In these discussions, vulnerability is never attached to those responsible for gendered security practices. The same, of course, applies to much of liberal politics today, where decision makers and state officials are presumed to be invulnerable, rational minds. In security practices, however, the implications of such othering are far-reaching, since they fundamentally shape our gendered understandings of whose in/security is recognised and recognisable.

First, not only is the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ deeply gendered in practices of security, but it is also *heteronormatively* gendered to apply to (cis)women, who are inherently connected to the infantilised mass of womenandchildren-and-thedisabledrest. This shows in the framework of UNSCR 1325 (Cohn 2014, 61), but also in the racialised development agendas in the Global South, where campaigns to invest in a girl for women’s financial empowerment are promoted as projects of global justice, even if they may in fact commodify women’s (re)productive bodies for the expansion of neoliberal capitalism (Wilson 2011; Roberts 2015). Such limited conceptions of gendered vulnerability also direct research and activism, as politically motivated funding instruments often require that researchers and NGOs focus their activities on ‘vulnerable groups’ that are explicitly defined as womenandchildren (and the disabled rest).

Furthermore, when vulnerability is allowed for some but not others, only certain kinds of bodies’ vulnerability *makes sense*. Consequently, those who *cannot* – because of their sexed and racialised bodies for instance – appear as vulnerable in the predominant security discourses, seem suspicious and emerge as a threat. The wrong kind of vulnerable bodies appear as incomprehensible, and the ethical responsibility to secure needs of these “other others” becomes blurred and denied (Ahmed 2010; see also Ahmed 2004). Here, the recent European political representations of young refugee men make a conspicuous example. Especially in the social media, but often also in the yellow press, male refugees are recurrently portrayed as terrorists’ and lazy aliens, who forge asylum claims and come after a better social security instead of staying in the conflict-zones to defend ‘their’ womenandchildren at home. Simultaneously, they are represented as sexual predators and pathological rapists, and hence a threat to ‘our’ womenandgirls (Rettberg and Gajjala 2015). In security politics throughout Europe, such portrayals have been indirectly and post-factually used as justifications to curb migration and increase security measures at the borders and in public spaces – which further adds to the embodied *in*security of those identified as racial Others.

#### 3. The Protection Racket produces hierarchies and savior narratives that make structural violence and flashpoints for war inevitable

Peet and Sjoberg, 2020 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida; the Late Jessica Peet taught IR at the University of Florida and USC. Introduction to *Gender and Civilian Victimization in War* (Print Book), SPP)

As scholars, the "lenses" we use "foreground some things, and background others" in our research (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999). Our research questions start with the ideas, concepts, and variables we see as most important in global politics. For example, the scholars who have written on intentional civilian victimization have started with the ideas, concepts, and variables they see as most important in global politics, including regime type, international law, strategy, and culture. Like other scholars in IR, feminist work uses "lenses" to foreground variables of particular interest, specifically sex, gender, and sexuality; gender identity; and gender hierarchy, using "gender lenses" to view global politics (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999: 2). Looking through gender lenses is a way "to focus on gender as a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes" (Steans 1998: 5).

While women's oppression is a primary concern for feminists, "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women .... [T]he concept, nature and practice of gender are key" (Zalewski 1995). Feminists, then, "ask what assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality) are necessary to make particular statements, policies, and actions meaningful" (Wilcox 2009). In our analysis of civilian victimization, we focus on how the concept, nature, and practice of gender influences states' and other war-fighting parties' decisions to target civilians and ask what assumptions about gender are necessary to make intentional civilian victimization appealing, despite the non-combatant immunity norm. With this focus, we also look at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism in constituting both the idea of the civilian and her vulnerability.

In order to fully grasp why those are important questions, we need to spend a little time understanding what feminists mean by 'sex' and by 'gender' in this context. Many people see sex as biology - male and fem ale sex organs make people men or women. 4 In the conventional wisdom, then, gender is directly related to, and maps onto, sex - men are masculine and women are feminine. However, feminist scholarship has "questioned the conventional assumption that gender differences (and subordination) are rooted in biological differences between women and men" (Scott 1987; Sjoberg 2006a: 32). Instead, feminist scholars suggest that the relation between sex and gender is presumed rather than natural, where masculinity and femininity are separable from maleness and femaleness. Masculine characteristics, like strength, protectiveness, rationality, aggressiveness, presence in public life, domination, and leadership, then, are perceived as related to maleness, while in reality they are not reserved for men. Conversely, traits associated with femininity, like weakness, vulnerability, emotion, passivity, privacy, submission, and care, are assumed to be the domain of women, while that is not always or even normally the case. Genderings can be read into and back onto sex, which is malleable rather than set, and co-constituted with gender (e.g., Butler 1990, 1993).

Applying this understanding, gender cannot be operationalized as a 'yes' or 'no' (or 'male' or 'female' question), or as a matter of degree. It also cannot be accounted for by asking questions about 'what women do' differently than 'what men do' in global politics.5 Instead, it is more of a constellation of significations, where masculinities and femininities are mutually constituted (along with race, class, sexuality, etc.) in specific, hierarchical relation to one another - where ( often) masculinities are prized and powerful, while femininities are seen as undesirable and therefore subordinated. In this context, we can talk not just about men and women and masculinities and femininities but of masculinism and feminization. Masculinism is the prizing of masculinities and the exclusion and/ or devaluing of femininities in social and/ or political contexts. Masculinism leads to feminization - the devaluing of femininities by putting down or putting aside people, groups, or ideas associated with femininities and by associating devalued or marginalized people, groups, or ideas with femininities (V. Peterson 2010; see also V. Peterson and Runyan 2010). 6 V. Spike Peterson describes feminization as devalorization:

Not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing" ... can be feminized - with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic) .... This devalorization normalizes - with the effect of "legitimating" - the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons ... the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for -granted "givens" of social life (V. Peterson 2010).

In this vein, a key tenet of feminist theorizing about the global political arena is that it is gender -hierarchical (Sjoberg 2009). Though masculinities and femininities are detectable across known human history, they are not static, temporally, geographically, or culturally. Quite the opposite, the dominant 'masculinity' or 'femininity' is different at different times, and in different places and cultures. While "the exact content of genders varies with various and shifting socio-political contexts, ... gender subordination (defined as the subordination of femininities to masculinities) remains a constant feature of social and political life across time and space" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 9). Feminist research in IR, then, asks how these complex notions of gender constitute and influence the realities of everyday life in global politics . In this book, we are particularly interested in how gender influences belligerents' (especially states') decisions to attack civilians in war in conjunction with other parts of the 'puzzle' of intentional civilian victimization.

Thinking about gender and intentional civilian victimization

Revisiting the narratives that began this introduction, it is possible to see gender influencing intentional civilian victimization in what happened to Hassan and Benedicte and their contemporaries. Referencing experiences like Benedicte's, Judith Gardam has explained that rape is never truly aimed at or affecting just one person (1993: 363). Instead, "rape functions as a strategy to deliver a blow against a collective energy by striking at a group of high symbolic value" (Pettman 1996: 190). By raping Benedicte, government forces were attacking non -lvoirians by attacking "their" women, as "xenophobic speech [was] aimed specifically at women from the 'enemy' community," encouraging rape and sexual violence (Amnesty International 2007). As a result, sexual violence became "an intentional strategy to terrorise, demean, and defeat an entire population, as well as a way of engendering hate and destruction" between the rebels and the government in Cote d'Ivoire (Amnesty International 2004). In the 1990s war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, women suffered the brunt of civilian victimization, as a result both of apparently gender -neutral tactics and of a systematic campaign of genocidal rape. Reports of mass rape began appearing in newspaper headlines in August of 1992 (Hansen 2001: 55). Women were raped, both individually and as proxy for the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also being 'raped.' The rape of civilian women was also the rape of ('their') nation, an idea that was reiterated by Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations addressing the Security Council in 1993: Excellencies, Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang-raped ... I do not lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know, systematic rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women in particular. (Metrovic 1994: xii)

In this statement the rape of Bosnian women is metaphor for the destruction and 'rape' of a nation, literally and figuratively. This sort of "rape happens, not as a consequence of thoughtless, provocative, or unfortunate behavior, but as a question of national warfare" (Hansen 2001: 59). Lene Hansen explains that, in Bosnia, [r ]aping "the nation's women" is not only an act of violence against individual women; it also works to install a disempowered masculinity as constitutive of the identities of the nation's men. The interconnection between individual/ collective and national/ gendered might also be illustrated by the way that a woman impregnated by rape can be represented as a passive "national" container of a child imagined to be the future bearer of the rapist's nationality. In this way, an individual rape can be read for its collective, national significance through the complex sign of the child's imagined future identity as an embodiment of the enemy state. (Hansen 2001: 60)

Women were also targeted for violence that was not explicitly sexual. Some Serb policy statements emphasized depriving individual households of nutritional and medical resources necessary for reproduction as a way to target the opponent ethnicities. Even the targeting of men had gendered connotations and implications. Planning for the Srebrenica massacre (where an estimated 8,000 men were killed, selected as men for victimization), the killing was discussed as a strategy for reducing the availability of men, who were characterized as fertilizers and protectors for women. Planners referred to their strategies as "cleaning houses" such that women would pose "less resistance to repopulation" (referring to forced impregnation) without 'their' men. 7 Narratives like this could be and have been told of many wars, genocides, conflicts, and terrorist attacks around the world. In this book, we present evidence that when belligerents intentionally victimize civilians, they are actually attacking women because of women's actual and symbolic position in the life, livelihood, and nationalist narratives of the opponent's state and/ or nation. While most people who read Benedicte and Hasan's stories assume that Benedicte's experience was a gendered form of civilian victimization and Hasan's experience was tragic but a case of 'normal' or ungendered civilian victimization, we argue that it is not just in sexual violence against civilians that civilian victimization is gendered. Instead, when civilians are attacked in war, often 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women, not as female bodies but for how they are positioned in and symbolic of nation and state. Wartime sexual violence is {like other civilian victimization tactics) a way to get to the 'heart' of the opponent by destroying both crucial resources and the very parts of their society which legitimate the fighting of the war in the first place - pure, innocent women that good men fight just wars to protect (see, e.g., Elshtain 1987).

Along these lines, we theorize intentional civilian victimization through gender lenses. Expanding on feminist work about nationalism and war generally, and the noncombatant immunity principle specifically, we contend that the very same logic that makes belligerents so eager to 'protect' their innocent women from wars also encourages them to attack the women who are seen as belonging to their enemies. In war stories, just warriors fight the good fight to protect their innocent women and children from those foreign or outside men who would attack them (Huston 1983). Just warriors, then, legitimate not only wars generally but also their masculinities specifically by protecting women back home (Sjoberg 2006b). Attacking the women that motivate the opponent to fight - the women that symbolize his state and/ or nation and whose protection legitimates his war - attacks both the will to fight a particular war and the logic of war-fighting. In these terms, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, intentional civilian victimization can be seen as a product of the gendered narratives that legitimate and sustain nationhood and the practices of the making and fighting of wars.

We are, of course, not arguing that women and only women are killed in the victimization of civilians. Such an argument would be both inaccurate and oversimplified. We are instead arguing that 'civilian victimization' is, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, an attack on women, where 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women. But this proxy is not a simple, one-to-one mapping where belligerents think 'civilian' but mean 'women' (as women), even to the extent that belligerents are willing to admit attacking civilians. Rather the proxy is a complex indicator of state/nation, based on actual and perceived strength. Belligerents attack (women) civilians for the same reason they claim protection for their own - because the 'protection racket' is an underlying justification for states, governments, and their wars (see, e.g., S. Peterson 1977). Insomuch as women are indicators, signifiers, and reproducers of state and nation, belligerents attack women to attack the state and nation. We contend that such an explanation, when compared to the others that have been presented up to this point, provides both greater theoretical leverage towards understanding the problem of civilian targeting and greater empirical explanatory power for the particulars of cases of civilian victimization in war. In the remainder of this introduction, we outline how this book makes that argument and presents both quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence to support it.

#### 4. Our alternative is to embrace vulnerability. Only a recognition and embodiment of vulnerability can reshape foreign policy in a manner that does not replicate the hierarchical logic of the AFF’s protection racket

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” *Peacebuilding*, 7:2, 146-159, SPP)

As outlined above, early feminist peace and conflict researchers, such as Elise Boulding and Sara Ruddick, insisted on the importance of the relational body when studying peace. I also argued above that local turn scholarship is limited in its understanding of the everyday and mundane practices of peace. In my view, both the relational body and mundane practices require a more nuanced reading of power, governance and the vulnerabilities that practices of power produce, since the body is always both ‘active and acted upon’.35 In short, practices of governance that are targeted at the body also produce the body.36 Yet the fleshy living body also has agency, which makes it an ‘engaged body-subject’.37 In other words, the body is never a passive target of practices of governance: it also has a capacity to escape these practices.38 Eighty-year-old Kaisu told her story in a Finnish documentary film in 2010.39 She was among the Finnish women accused of having fraternised with German soldiers during the Second World War. She moved to Germany with the withdrawing German troops and was repatriated to Finland after the war. The following is my description of Kaisu’s narrative:

VIGNETTE 2 Kaisu was among the women whose bodies were securitised and transferred to the camp immediately on their arrival on the Finnish soil. She calls it the ‘quarantine camp’ as if there had been something contagious in her body that needed purification. Hence medicalisation also takes hold of her body even in her most intimate memories. Her young body had been securitised and medicalised as it was seen to constitute the contagious risk of knowing too much. In the documentary, her body is stiff, but strong when she sits on the porch of the barracks, in which she thinks she was incarcerated sixty years ago. She is smoking a cigarette with a firm hand. Her body and her solemn voice convey her strength. Kaisu recalls how the Security Police had suspected her of being a German mole. She is very proud of the fact that she did not cry during the interrogations: ‘In front of Hautojärvi [the interrogation officer] I did not cry’. In the narrative, her resistance is not just geared towards the interrogation officer, but also towards the Finnish state, whose security apparatus suspected and humiliated her. In her upright body, she resists the forces that sought to silence her.40

When considering mundane peace, Judith Butler’s observation that one way of managing populations is to distribute vulnerability among people unequally is crucial.41 Biopower – power that is about managing the births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of a population and which is ultimately utilised by the state ostensibly in the protection of life – establishes a norm that allows for measurement, evaluation and hierarchical ranking. As such, it constitutes a mechanism of control and distributes vulnerability and invulnerability among the population.42 In Kaisu’s case, her body was rendered vulnerable – shaped as that of an outcast – through the mechanisms of governance in the post-war Finnish national order. The vignette demonstrates that power is multiple and relational, as it establishes socio-historical relationships that render some bodies more vulnerable than others. Biopower increases efficiency and capacity at the level of individual bodies and whole populations, yet it also distributes vulnerability and invulnerability. This is particularly acute during times of economic, social and political transformation, such as peacebuilding and reconstruction, when social relations must be re-imagined and re-structured.

Butler theorises peace and argues that peace is a way of indicating one’s dependency on others and being acknowledged. She not only theorises peace as individual vulnerability but says that it needs to be institutionalised:

I think that peace is the active and difficult resistance to the temptation of war; it is the prerogative and the obligation of the injured. Peace is something that has to be vigilantly maintained; it is a vigilance, and it involves temptation, and it does not mean we as human beings are not aggressive. It does not mean that we do not have murderous impulses. This is a mistaken way of understanding non-violence. . . . Peace is a certain resistance to the terrible satisfactions of war. It’s a commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others and susceptibility to being wounded that actually gives our individual lives meaning. . . I think it needs to be institutionalised. It needs to be part of a community ethos. I think in fact it needs to be part of an entire foreign policy.43

For Butler, therefore, the recognition of vulnerability can lead to more adequate, peaceful responses to different forms of violence and can counter the tendency to react to violence with more violence.44 Alyson Cole has noted that Butler’s view on vulnerability paves the way to ‘nonviolent interaffectivity’.45 Vulnerability does not, in this view, imply weakness or inferiority; rather, it is a human condition, ‘a basic kind of openness to being affected and affecting in both positive and negative ways, which can take diverse forms in different social situations (for example, bodily, psychological, economic, emotional, and legal vulnerabilities)’, as Erin Gilson summarises Butler’s views.46 Understanding oneself as vulnerable involves an understanding of the self as shaped by its relationships to others, the world, power and its environs. This has, in my view, implications for the everyday, as our embodiment and vulnerability are embedded in the everyday – in its historicity, forms of power, materiality and concreteness.

Vulnerability is not just a way of referring to the capacity to be wounded, however. It is also a ‘way of indicating one’s dependency on another, a set of institutions, or a circumambient world to be well, to be safe, to be acknowledged’, argues Butler, in the spirit of early feminist peace and conflict researchers’ work.47 While the vulnerable body is often thought to be private and non-political, when in contact with other bodies, the politics of vulnerability comes to the fore – firstly, in the form of the unequal distribution of vulnerabilities, and secondly, in the form of accountability, recognition and acknowledgement. In other words, the way in which vulnerability is recognised, accounted for, acknowledged and responded to is at the core of the political. ‘The political’ is hence an existential relation that we all live out, on a daily basis, in ways that create, re-produce, transcend and challenge differences, hierarchies, discriminations and vulnerabilities between subjectivities and political positions. Furthermore, vulnerable bodies are agentic, as receptivity, accountability and vulnerability are actually the presuppositions of agency, not its opposites.48 In short, vulnerability is enabling for our being in the world; that is, vulnerability is a ‘condition of potential that makes possible other conditions’, including peace. It can be argued that Kaisu’s bold appearance in the documentary film was a political event of claiming back her silenced body and evoking recognition of the existence of the bodies of her kind. Her vulnerable body thereby carried an agentic capacity capable of challenging the existing hierarchies, discriminations and differences.

Although vulnerability can be seen as a shared human condition, it is lived and experienced in different ways, as well as distributed unequally, as argued above. The ways in which we live and are affected can be understood only in light of the particularity of embodied, social and mundane experiences. It is in this way that feminist and critical theorising of the body, the everyday and vulnerability open up new pathways to re-theorise peace. Peace is something that becomes expressed and takes place through acts and points of everyday contact between variously situated and variously vulnerable bodies – namely, in corporeal events where accountability, response-ability, recognition and acknowledgement emerge. The pluralistic and critical approaches indicated in my agenda are more sensitive to the changing patterns and dynamics of peace than many abstract, ontologically solid or violence-dependent approaches.

#### 5. Our method of embodied politics is both mutually exclusive with, and a more ethical alternative to, the liberal security paradigm in which the AFF is embedded

Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP)

In (neo)liberal political discourses, the ideal subject is an independent *homo oeconomicus,* that is, a masculine, disembodied being, who is self-sufficient and self-caring, while knowingly making rational, utilitarian, and abstracted ethical choices for the common good of all. The liberal subject is an invulnerable individual, or at least well secured against any risks in life. He is never ill; he does not leak of bodily fluids (because he seems not to have a body); and he never ages. Or, in case he does age, he does so actively and “successfully”, in ways that his body’s care needs would never gain control of *his* life: the life of a subjective, rational Self. Feminist social and political theory argues that these conceptions of political subjectivity are non-realistic: Such disembodied subjects simply do not exist (cf. Bacchi and Beasley 2002; Beattie and Schick 2013; Cohn 2014; Fineman 2008; Grosz 1994; Hoppania and Vaittinen 2015; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990; Shildrick 2002; 2012; Tronto 1993; Vaittinen 2015; forthcoming)

While vulnerable embodiment is discursively associated merely with women, children, and the weak, the truth is that as human beings we all *are* bodies, and as such vulnerable, relational and dependent. As political subjects we are perhaps meant to “own” our bodies, to be in control of them and our lives. Yet, the bodies that our subjectivity inhabits may in fact both pre-exist and outlive the subjective “I”. We are intercorporeal: conceived, born, raised, and sustained by other bodies. We live \_and die \_in concrete relations with others. Thus, as opposed to being the self-caring ideal subjects of (neo)liberal politics, as bodies we are dependent, fleshy, and irrational. We are vulnerable, sometimes sick and dis/abled, every day in contact with our own bodily fluids  \_and frequently also with those of others. We are made of and sometimes governed by the fluids, bacteria and hormones that move within, without, and between our bodies (cf. Fishel 2015; Irni 2013; Preciado 2013). Our lives are inherently frail. We start ageing and decaying the moment we are born.

In other words, the fact of embodiment makes the liberal understanding of subjectivity ultimately an illusion. Nevertheless, global politics and its security policies and practices continue to build on the liberal conceptions of life. In other words, the contemporary security policies and practices tend to build on an illusion. In this chapter, I challenge these illusionary yet prevailing understandings of security through different accounts of embodied in/security. I begin the chapter with a discussion of feminist analysis of vulnerability. Here, I rely on accounts that emerge from the feminist ethics of care tradition (e.g. Robinson 1999; 2011), as well as Carol Cohn’s (2014) recent interrogation of vulnerability in international security discourses.

Feminist conceptions of vulnerability and care challenge conventional security practices, and reveal them as unrealistic, by foregrounding the human beings’ existential dependency on each other for survival (e.g. Robinson 2011; Beattie and Schick 2013; Butler 2004). Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Vaittinen 2015), they also rarely explicitly engage with the body organism and its materiality, which need be recognised if embodied in/security is to be taken seriously. In this chapter, I interrogate the body in more concrete terms. Here, I first show how embodied realities of human life have always been central in feminist security studies, albeit usually in contexts of direct violence and hence in/securities external to the body. I then introduce the concept of the lowest common denominator of embodiment, which emphasises the body’s need of care from other bodies and, while defying essentialism, is applicable to all living bodies at all times (Vaittinen, forthcoming). Unlike in the usual security frames that begin with direct violence, in this conception, embodied in/security becomes defined through to the body’s most basic needs, which necessitate care relations with other bodies at times when we are corporeally incapable of being the liberal individual subjects that we are meant to be.

In the concluding section, I juxtapose my conception of embodied in/security with the conceptions that seem to predominate security discourses more generally. I argue that, sometimes also in feminist security studies, the empirical contexts of direct violence, war, and militarism easily (re)produce perceptions of embodied in/security that begin with the threats that bodies pose to other bodies. Here, in/secure bodies are primarily present as subjects and objects of violence, rather than as caring and in need of care. Consequently, the threats that the body, as an organism, poses to itself remain unaddressed. I argue that ultimately at stake here are two contending gendered ontologies of human relatedness through which security policies can be shaped: feminised dependency on other bodies’ care against masculine perceptions of the bodies of others as primarily threatening. Both the conceptions of embodied in/vulnerability are profoundly relational, yet the security practices that they (re)produce are fundamentally different.

Existential vulnerability and the ethics of care

Feminist literature (e.g. Fineman 2008; Beattie and Schick 2013) has emphasised the necessity to put vulnerability instead of liberal individualism at the centre of political discourses and practices, since vulnerability describes the condition of human life much more realistically than individual, rational autonomy does. This way of thinking is particularly present in the feminist ethics of care tradition, which provides a powerful alternative to liberal individualistic thinking about ethics, morality, and politics. Foregrounding the existential dependency of every human being on each other’s care for survival, feminist accounts of care can also forcefully challenge the conventional security thinking, by presenting the lack of care as a threat to human security (Robinson 2011).

Feminist ethics of care argues that practices of care give rise to an alternative moral thinking, which is capable of realistically accounting for the situatedness of the moral subject (see, for example, Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990). Feminist care ethicists show how moral decisions are never made in a political void or behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, as in the Kantian tradition, but in concrete relations with particular others. Importantly, emphasising practices of care as a source of moral and political relatedness, feminist ethics of care demonstrates how human existential vulnerability - that is, our dependency on care as well as our capacity to respond caringly - is a powerful site and source of politics rather than a realm external to it (Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Vaittinen 2015).

### 1NC Shell - Short

#### LINK: The AFF attempt to securitize against geopolitical vulnerabilities produces more violence than it prevents – their politics of chivalric impact avoidance constitutes a “protection racket” that justifies the intensification of militarization

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 75-78 (SPP).

While this image of the just warrior as defender of civilization at first glance seems to favor the defensive (and, would therefore not contribute to the cult of the offensive), a closer look shows that the discourse of the protection racket is actually offensive in three distinct ways. First, it leads states to value offense in order to be the **best possible protectors**, since offense is associated with increased chance at victory and a perception of an active approach to protection. Second, it allows militaries aspiring to the idealized or hegemonic masculinity to identify those in need of protection outside of its borders, and to start aggressive wars to protect those in need. 81 Third, insomuch as protection is a performance rather than an actual service, the appearance of boldness and bravery in actions taken on behalf of this chivalrous ideal brings attention to the protecting which is being done. In these ways, the protection racket can be associated with the increased likelihood of pursuing offensive military strategies.

The chivalric codes in vogue at the turn of the century identified the vulnerable female body as the main cause for war. The enemy was cast as an inhuman, sexual predator. Propagandists described German attacks on Belgium towns in late summer, 1914 as “rape of Belgium.” The famous World War I propaganda poster illustrates this melding of race and gender: a large brown gorilla-like creature with a bloodied bat labeled “kulter” grasps a half-naked white woman who appears to have fainted. “Destroy this mad brute: Enlist,” the poster demands. Posters in Britain encouraging men to volunteer evoked women and children as defenseless targets of war and drew upon chivalric discourses of honor and protection, declaring, “Your rights of citizenship give you the privilege of joining your fellows in defence of your Honour and your Homes,” and “There are Three Types of Men: Those who hear the call and Obey, Those who Delay, and – the Others.” Discourses of chivalrous masculinity served not only to make offensive approaches to international politics in World War I possible but also to constitute a set of gendered power relations that posited white men as protectors of the nation against racialized others who threaten the purity of naïve and defenseless women.

Examples of the influence of the protection racket on perceived offensive dominance and the cult of the offensive are common in present-day politics as well. This chivalric narrative has been resurrected in the post-Cold War era, and gendered identities have not only legitimated but also promoted wars. The various humanitarian wars of the 1990s are read as a narrative in which NATO, and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic, rescuers of weak and passive victims. Farmanfarmaian describes how the reports of the Iraqi Army raping women in Kuwait were used to construct Iraq as a barbaric enemy so that war was not only thinkable, but necessitated. This new American masculinity was “tough and tender,” capable of awesome military prowess but also compassion and empathy.

The mission of “liberating” Afghan women was used to garner public support for the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to silence feminine protests against the war. Two and a half years later, this same discourse of “liberation” was used to fueled support to overturn the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, represented in racialized terms as an inhuman despot when the evidence against weapons of mass destruction turned out to be fabricated or exaggerated. This narrative of rescuing the Iraqi people (as “damsels in distress”) from the clutches of an evil man may help to explain why many people in the US and its allies came to believe, with little evidence, that the invading forces would be “greeted as liberators.” These rescue narratives demonstrate that the protection racket encourages offensive military policies even when it is couched in the language of defense and protection. The protection racket is a gendered discourse that produces the gender identities of just warriors and beautiful souls. It is also the backdrop that allows for offensive military policies to be viewed as defensive, thereby gaining traction and legitimating war by enabling offensive wars to take place under the mantle of “protection.” The existence of discourse of protection can therefore help us understand the occurrence of offensive policies in the light of an ostensible defensive dominance.

Conclusion

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war.

Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] **erases the distinction between** **security and expansion**," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes.

Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

#### IMPACT: The Protection Racket produces hierarchies and savior narratives that make structural violence and flashpoints for war inevitable

Peet and Sjoberg, 2020 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida; the Late Jessica Peet taught IR at the University of Florida and USC. Introduction to *Gender and Civilian Victimization in War* (Print Book), SPP)

As scholars, the "lenses" we use "foreground some things, and background others" in our research (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999). Our research questions start with the ideas, concepts, and variables we see as most important in global politics. For example, the scholars who have written on intentional civilian victimization have started with the ideas, concepts, and variables they see as most important in global politics, including regime type, international law, strategy, and culture. Like other scholars in IR, feminist work uses "lenses" to foreground variables of particular interest, specifically sex, gender, and sexuality; gender identity; and gender hierarchy, using "gender lenses" to view global politics (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999: 2). Looking through gender lenses is a way "to focus on gender as a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes" (Steans 1998: 5).

While women's oppression is a primary concern for feminists, "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women .... [T]he concept, nature and practice of gender are key" (Zalewski 1995). Feminists, then, "ask what assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality) are necessary to make particular statements, policies, and actions meaningful" (Wilcox 2009). In our analysis of civilian victimization, we focus on how the concept, nature, and practice of gender influences states' and other war-fighting parties' decisions to target civilians and ask what assumptions about gender are necessary to make intentional civilian victimization appealing, despite the non-combatant immunity norm. With this focus, we also look at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism in constituting both the idea of the civilian and her vulnerability.

In order to fully grasp why those are important questions, we need to spend a little time understanding what feminists mean by 'sex' and by 'gender' in this context. Many people see sex as biology - male and fem ale sex organs make people men or women. 4 In the conventional wisdom, then, gender is directly related to, and maps onto, sex - men are masculine and women are feminine. However, feminist scholarship has "questioned the conventional assumption that gender differences (and subordination) are rooted in biological differences between women and men" (Scott 1987; Sjoberg 2006a: 32). Instead, feminist scholars suggest that the relation between sex and gender is presumed rather than natural, where masculinity and femininity are separable from maleness and femaleness. Masculine characteristics, like strength, protectiveness, rationality, aggressiveness, presence in public life, domination, and leadership, then, are perceived as related to maleness, while in reality they are not reserved for men. Conversely, traits associated with femininity, like weakness, vulnerability, emotion, passivity, privacy, submission, and care, are assumed to be the domain of women, while that is not always or even normally the case. Genderings can be read into and back onto sex, which is malleable rather than set, and co-constituted with gender (e.g., Butler 1990, 1993).

Applying this understanding, gender cannot be operationalized as a 'yes' or 'no' (or 'male' or 'female' question), or as a matter of degree. It also cannot be accounted for by asking questions about 'what women do' differently than 'what men do' in global politics.5 Instead, it is more of a constellation of significations, where masculinities and femininities are mutually constituted (along with race, class, sexuality, etc.) in specific, hierarchical relation to one another - where ( often) masculinities are prized and powerful, while femininities are seen as undesirable and therefore subordinated. In this context, we can talk not just about men and women and masculinities and femininities but of masculinism and feminization. Masculinism is the prizing of masculinities and the exclusion and/ or devaluing of femininities in social and/ or political contexts. Masculinism leads to feminization - the devaluing of femininities by putting down or putting aside people, groups, or ideas associated with femininities and by associating devalued or marginalized people, groups, or ideas with femininities (V. Peterson 2010; see also V. Peterson and Runyan 2010). 6 V. Spike Peterson describes feminization as devalorization:

Not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing" ... can be feminized - with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic) .... This devalorization normalizes - with the effect of "legitimating" - the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons ... the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for -granted "givens" of social life (V. Peterson 2010).

In this vein, a key tenet of feminist theorizing about the global political arena is that it is gender -hierarchical (Sjoberg 2009). Though masculinities and femininities are detectable across known human history, they are not static, temporally, geographically, or culturally. Quite the opposite, the dominant 'masculinity' or 'femininity' is different at different times, and in different places and cultures. While "the exact content of genders varies with various and shifting socio-political contexts, ... gender subordination (defined as the subordination of femininities to masculinities) remains a constant feature of social and political life across time and space" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 9). Feminist research in IR, then, asks how these complex notions of gender constitute and influence the realities of everyday life in global politics . In this book, we are particularly interested in how gender influences belligerents' (especially states') decisions to attack civilians in war in conjunction with other parts of the 'puzzle' of intentional civilian victimization.

Thinking about gender and intentional civilian victimization

Revisiting the narratives that began this introduction, it is possible to see gender influencing intentional civilian victimization in what happened to Hassan and Benedicte and their contemporaries. Referencing experiences like Benedicte's, Judith Gardam has explained that rape is never truly aimed at or affecting just one person (1993: 363). Instead, "rape functions as a strategy to deliver a blow against a collective energy by striking at a group of high symbolic value" (Pettman 1996: 190). By raping Benedicte, government forces were attacking non -lvoirians by attacking "their" women, as "xenophobic speech [was] aimed specifically at women from the 'enemy' community," encouraging rape and sexual violence (Amnesty International 2007). As a result, sexual violence became "an intentional strategy to terrorise, demean, and defeat an entire population, as well as a way of engendering hate and destruction" between the rebels and the government in Cote d'Ivoire (Amnesty International 2004). In the 1990s war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, women suffered the brunt of civilian victimization, as a result both of apparently gender -neutral tactics and of a systematic campaign of genocidal rape. Reports of mass rape began appearing in newspaper headlines in August of 1992 (Hansen 2001: 55). Women were raped, both individually and as proxy for the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also being 'raped.' The rape of civilian women was also the rape of ('their') nation, an idea that was reiterated by Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations addressing the Security Council in 1993: Excellencies, Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang-raped ... I do not lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know, systematic rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women in particular. (Metrovic 1994: xii)

In this statement the rape of Bosnian women is metaphor for the destruction and 'rape' of a nation, literally and figuratively. This sort of "rape happens, not as a consequence of thoughtless, provocative, or unfortunate behavior, but as a question of national warfare" (Hansen 2001: 59). Lene Hansen explains that, in Bosnia, [r ]aping "the nation's women" is not only an act of violence against individual women; it also works to install a disempowered masculinity as constitutive of the identities of the nation's men. The interconnection between individual/ collective and national/ gendered might also be illustrated by the way that a woman impregnated by rape can be represented as a passive "national" container of a child imagined to be the future bearer of the rapist's nationality. In this way, an individual rape can be read for its collective, national significance through the complex sign of the child's imagined future identity as an embodiment of the enemy state. (Hansen 2001: 60)

Women were also targeted for violence that was not explicitly sexual. Some Serb policy statements emphasized depriving individual households of nutritional and medical resources necessary for reproduction as a way to target the opponent ethnicities. Even the targeting of men had gendered connotations and implications. Planning for the Srebrenica massacre (where an estimated 8,000 men were killed, selected as men for victimization), the killing was discussed as a strategy for reducing the availability of men, who were characterized as fertilizers and protectors for women. Planners referred to their strategies as "cleaning houses" such that women would pose "less resistance to repopulation" (referring to forced impregnation) without 'their' men. 7 Narratives like this could be and have been told of many wars, genocides, conflicts, and terrorist attacks around the world. In this book, we present evidence that when belligerents intentionally victimize civilians, they are actually attacking women because of women's actual and symbolic position in the life, livelihood, and nationalist narratives of the opponent's state and/ or nation. While most people who read Benedicte and Hasan's stories assume that Benedicte's experience was a gendered form of civilian victimization and Hasan's experience was tragic but a case of 'normal' or ungendered civilian victimization, we argue that it is not just in sexual violence against civilians that civilian victimization is gendered. Instead, when civilians are attacked in war, often 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women, not as female bodies but for how they are positioned in and symbolic of nation and state. Wartime sexual violence is {like other civilian victimization tactics) a way to get to the 'heart' of the opponent by destroying both crucial resources and the very parts of their society which legitimate the fighting of the war in the first place - pure, innocent women that good men fight just wars to protect (see, e.g., Elshtain 1987).

Along these lines, we theorize intentional civilian victimization through gender lenses. Expanding on feminist work about nationalism and war generally, and the noncombatant immunity principle specifically, we contend that the very same logic that makes belligerents so eager to 'protect' their innocent women from wars also encourages them to attack the women who are seen as belonging to their enemies. In war stories, just warriors fight the good fight to protect their innocent women and children from those foreign or outside men who would attack them (Huston 1983). Just warriors, then, legitimate not only wars generally but also their masculinities specifically by protecting women back home (Sjoberg 2006b). Attacking the women that motivate the opponent to fight - the women that symbolize his state and/ or nation and whose protection legitimates his war - attacks both the will to fight a particular war and the logic of war-fighting. In these terms, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, intentional civilian victimization can be seen as a product of the gendered narratives that legitimate and sustain nationhood and the practices of the making and fighting of wars.

We are, of course, not arguing that women and only women are killed in the victimization of civilians. Such an argument would be both inaccurate and oversimplified. We are instead arguing that 'civilian victimization' is, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, an attack on women, where 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women. But this proxy is not a simple, one-to-one mapping where belligerents think 'civilian' but mean 'women' (as women), even to the extent that belligerents are willing to admit attacking civilians. Rather the proxy is a complex indicator of state/nation, based on actual and perceived strength. Belligerents attack (women) civilians for the same reason they claim protection for their own - because the 'protection racket' is an underlying justification for states, governments, and their wars (see, e.g., S. Peterson 1977). Insomuch as women are indicators, signifiers, and reproducers of state and nation, belligerents attack women to attack the state and nation. We contend that such an explanation, when compared to the others that have been presented up to this point, provides both greater theoretical leverage towards understanding the problem of civilian targeting and greater empirical explanatory power for the particulars of cases of civilian victimization in war. In the remainder of this introduction, we outline how this book makes that argument and presents both quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence to support it.

#### ALTERNATIVE: Vote NEG to embrace vulnerability. Only a recognition and embodiment of vulnerability can reshape foreign policy in a manner that does not replicate the hierarchical logic of the AFF’s protection racket

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” *Peacebuilding*, 7:2, 146-159, SPP)

As outlined above, early feminist peace and conflict researchers, such as Elise Boulding and Sara Ruddick, insisted on the importance of the relational body when studying peace. I also argued above that local turn scholarship is limited in its understanding of the everyday and mundane practices of peace. In my view, both the relational body and mundane practices require a more nuanced reading of power, governance and the vulnerabilities that practices of power produce, since the body is always both ‘active and acted upon’.35 In short, practices of governance that are targeted at the body also produce the body.36 Yet the fleshy living body also has agency, which makes it an ‘engaged body-subject’.37 In other words, the body is never a passive target of practices of governance: it also has a capacity to escape these practices.38 Eighty-year-old Kaisu told her story in a Finnish documentary film in 2010.39 She was among the Finnish women accused of having fraternised with German soldiers during the Second World War. She moved to Germany with the withdrawing German troops and was repatriated to Finland after the war. The following is my description of Kaisu’s narrative:

VIGNETTE 2 Kaisu was among the women whose bodies were securitised and transferred to the camp immediately on their arrival on the Finnish soil. She calls it the ‘quarantine camp’ as if there had been something contagious in her body that needed purification. Hence medicalisation also takes hold of her body even in her most intimate memories. Her young body had been securitised and medicalised as it was seen to constitute the contagious risk of knowing too much. In the documentary, her body is stiff, but strong when she sits on the porch of the barracks, in which she thinks she was incarcerated sixty years ago. She is smoking a cigarette with a firm hand. Her body and her solemn voice convey her strength. Kaisu recalls how the Security Police had suspected her of being a German mole. She is very proud of the fact that she did not cry during the interrogations: ‘In front of Hautojärvi [the interrogation officer] I did not cry’. In the narrative, her resistance is not just geared towards the interrogation officer, but also towards the Finnish state, whose security apparatus suspected and humiliated her. In her upright body, she resists the forces that sought to silence her.40

When considering mundane peace, Judith Butler’s observation that one way of managing populations is to distribute vulnerability among people unequally is crucial.41 Biopower – power that is about managing the births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of a population and which is ultimately utilised by the state ostensibly in the protection of life – establishes a norm that allows for measurement, evaluation and hierarchical ranking. As such, it constitutes a mechanism of control and distributes vulnerability and invulnerability among the population.42 In Kaisu’s case, her body was rendered vulnerable – shaped as that of an outcast – through the mechanisms of governance in the post-war Finnish national order. The vignette demonstrates that power is multiple and relational, as it establishes socio-historical relationships that render some bodies more vulnerable than others. Biopower increases efficiency and capacity at the level of individual bodies and whole populations, yet it also distributes vulnerability and invulnerability. This is particularly acute during times of economic, social and political transformation, such as peacebuilding and reconstruction, when social relations must be re-imagined and re-structured.

Butler theorises peace and argues that peace is a way of indicating one’s dependency on others and being acknowledged. She not only theorises peace as individual vulnerability but says that it needs to be institutionalised:

I think that peace is the active and difficult resistance to the temptation of war; it is the prerogative and the obligation of the injured. Peace is something that has to be vigilantly maintained; it is a vigilance, and it involves temptation, and it does not mean we as human beings are not aggressive. It does not mean that we do not have murderous impulses. This is a mistaken way of understanding non-violence. . . . Peace is a certain resistance to the terrible satisfactions of war. It’s a commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others and susceptibility to being wounded that actually gives our individual lives meaning. . . I think it needs to be institutionalised. It needs to be part of a community ethos. I think in fact it needs to be part of an entire foreign policy.43

For Butler, therefore, the recognition of vulnerability can lead to more adequate, peaceful responses to different forms of violence and can counter the tendency to react to violence with more violence.44 Alyson Cole has noted that Butler’s view on vulnerability paves the way to ‘nonviolent interaffectivity’.45 Vulnerability does not, in this view, imply weakness or inferiority; rather, it is a human condition, ‘a basic kind of openness to being affected and affecting in both positive and negative ways, which can take diverse forms in different social situations (for example, bodily, psychological, economic, emotional, and legal vulnerabilities)’, as Erin Gilson summarises Butler’s views.46 Understanding oneself as vulnerable involves an understanding of the self as shaped by its relationships to others, the world, power and its environs. This has, in my view, implications for the everyday, as our embodiment and vulnerability are embedded in the everyday – in its historicity, forms of power, materiality and concreteness.

Vulnerability is not just a way of referring to the capacity to be wounded, however. It is also a ‘way of indicating one’s dependency on another, a set of institutions, or a circumambient world to be well, to be safe, to be acknowledged’, argues Butler, in the spirit of early feminist peace and conflict researchers’ work.47 While the vulnerable body is often thought to be private and non-political, when in contact with other bodies, the politics of vulnerability comes to the fore – firstly, in the form of the unequal distribution of vulnerabilities, and secondly, in the form of accountability, recognition and acknowledgement. In other words, the way in which vulnerability is recognised, accounted for, acknowledged and responded to is at the core of the political. ‘The political’ is hence an existential relation that we all live out, on a daily basis, in ways that create, re-produce, transcend and challenge differences, hierarchies, discriminations and vulnerabilities between subjectivities and political positions. Furthermore, vulnerable bodies are agentic, as receptivity, accountability and vulnerability are actually the presuppositions of agency, not its opposites.48 In short, vulnerability is enabling for our being in the world; that is, vulnerability is a ‘condition of potential that makes possible other conditions’, including peace. It can be argued that Kaisu’s bold appearance in the documentary film was a political event of claiming back her silenced body and evoking recognition of the existence of the bodies of her kind. Her vulnerable body thereby carried an agentic capacity capable of challenging the existing hierarchies, discriminations and differences.

Although vulnerability can be seen as a shared human condition, it is lived and experienced in different ways, as well as distributed unequally, as argued above. The ways in which we live and are affected can be understood only in light of the particularity of embodied, social and mundane experiences. It is in this way that feminist and critical theorising of the body, the everyday and vulnerability open up new pathways to re-theorise peace. Peace is something that becomes expressed and takes place through acts and points of everyday contact between variously situated and variously vulnerable bodies – namely, in corporeal events where accountability, response-ability, recognition and acknowledgement emerge. The pluralistic and critical approaches indicated in my agenda are more sensitive to the changing patterns and dynamics of peace than many abstract, ontologically solid or violence-dependent approaches.

# LINKS

### 2NC/1NR Link Ext – Chivalric Masculinity

#### The AFF is a rhetoric and politics of Protection, that attempts to secure against vulnerability by building apparatus of power to control risk. The AFF is a form of paternalism, relying on the metaphoric Father Nation State protect is weaker, feminized peoples under its domain and abroad. This “protection racket” passes itself as defensive posturing, but justifies military adventurism and competition – IE “offense” in the name of “defense” – extend Wilcox 10

And, the AFF evokes NATO as an international savior that will garner the strength of allied paternal fathers to protect against global vulnerabilities

Padmi, 2021 (Made Fitri Maya Padmi, IR Scholar, Lecturer at University Jakarta, Master of Science focused in International Security Studies from University of Bristol. “Redifining Gender Role During Wartime: Power Relations, Disparities and Impacts,” *Global Insight Journal* v. 6 no. 1, <http://journal.uta45jakarta.ac.id/index.php/GIJ/article/view/4438>; spp)

In the traditional perspective of international relations, especially the realist one, human behaviour is seen as a reflection of the state’s behaviour. To cope with the anarchic world where competition is the main characteristic, the state has to act rationally and aggressively, and possess great economic and military power in order to survive. While the realists argue that the state is free from gender attributes, feminists challenge this idea by arguing if the state was a human, gender attributes are attached to it. In the realist view of the state’s behaviour, the state represents the value of masculinity. Hobbes’s description in Leviathan emphasises conflict: ‘so that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory’ (Tuck, 1996 cited in Nabulsi, 1999, p.85).

In the realist view, the state possesses threats to other state, and to overcome the threats, the state should act rationally in taking action or use aggression if necessary. The state seems to be playing the role of the man in a patriarchal culture by taking up a position as protector from foreign dangers. The state’s performance can be a reflection of the masculine model. Stiehm (1982 cited in Wadley, 2010, p.51) argues that ‘An exposition of the gendered logic of masculine role of protector in relation to women and children illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home. In this patriarchal logic, the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’. Using militarisation as a means to protect state survival, the state comes up with a rational, defence-offence strategy, one in which war is a legitimate instrument of this strategy.

Feminists argue that war and militarisation are products of the masculine and, at the same time, means of masculinizing people. In her book, J. Ann Tickner (2001, cited in Wadley, 2010, p.44) stated that through war, “power is valorised and identified with heroic kind of masculinity”. Agressive character attached to men made them more involve in war, and through their position in politics and military to declare war (Wilcox, 2010). During wartime, men carry the moral responsibilities of nationalism and protection of the country, both of which are portrayals of masculine traits. In the name of protection, using offensive action is often justifiable to be conducted.

During World War I and World War II, states were reacting to dangers that were often coming from outside sources. Sjoberg (2006, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.74) argued that chivalric masculinity is not solely about men; the just narrative involves ‘good guys’ or ‘just warriors’ who fight against ‘bad guys’ for just and valorous reasons. Elshtain (1995, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.74) added that in order to produce the chivalric masculinity of the ‘just warriors’, a ‘beautiful soul’ and a malevolent other are needed. During World War I the British military engaged in offensive strategies and the cult of offensive to defend civilisation or impose civilising values on the barbarity of Germany (Wilcox, 2010).

The notion of protection has become a moral obligation to provide security in domestic environment and international communities. Globalisation has introduced human security as a new agenda for international security. Protecting human rights is a responsibility shared by international communities. When states are unable or unwilling to protect their own citizens, the responsibilities will be shifted to the broader international community. In September 2005, all United Nations member states agreed to accept the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’. In some cases the responsibility to protect has triggered new wars called humanitarian wars. Feminists view this as an attempt to expand the scope of masculine protection. Anne Orford (1999, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.76) stated that the various humanitarian wars of the 1990s can be read as a narrative in which NATO and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic rescuers of weak and passive victims.

After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, a series of United States invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq had more of an agenda than simply being a ‘War on Terror’. Invasion also served the image of United States as ‘liberator’ for the weak. The mission of ‘liberating’ Afghan women was used to stoke public opinions to support the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to reduce feminist protest against the war (Wilcox, 2010; Eisenstein, 2002; Charlesworth and Chinki, 2002). Highlighting the Taliban discrimination of women in Afghanistan has become the justification of the invasion. The mission of ‘liberating’ people also showed up in United States invasion of Iraq. The story of rescuing a defenceless Iraqi people from the evil tyranny and oppression of Saddam Hussein underpinned the heroic quest for protection.

Identity, boundaries, ideology, and nationalism are all reasons for men to go for war. For a long time, serving one’s country was seen as a chivalric way to gain honour. Society has an important role in shaping what a man should be and must do. By joining the army and fighting on the battlefield, a man has been understood to be defending his honour and his home. Wilcox (2010) said that the military serves as an important site for the creation and maintenance of gender identity in society. Military training emphasises physical exercise to build up strength, offensive and aggressive techniques, and an ability to cope under stressful conditions on the battlefield. During wartime, the state becomes a citizen-warrior that endorses the value of the warrior’s masculinity. Military training has the aim to create or build the individual characteristics of men. And indeed the military is an institution in which masculine characteristics are the basic requirements, and individuals who want to enter this institution must adjust to its prerequisites. Barry Posen (1984, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.70) described the attractiveness of offensive doctrines to militaries as resulting from the military as an organisation driven to increase its own autonomy and self-image. Similarly, David Englander (1997, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.70) argued that the offensive spirit in the British military leading up to World War I expressed the military’s position as the vanguard of a virile, manly nation.

Military power has been examined as gender symbolic to show the manliness of a state or decision-makers. A military parade, usually performed during a state’s Independence Day, is an opportunity to exhibit the masculinity of the state. In wartime the construction of a hyper-masculine of state is a necessity to undermine the enemy and characterise them as effeminate objects. As Cohn, Hill and Ruddick (2005) wrote, the using of masculine propaganda, such as ‘We had to prove that we are not eunuchs’ and ‘Made with Viagra’, are frequently used when India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998. Maruska (2010) stated that the U.S.–led ‘war on terror’ after the 9/11 bombing, was a desire to establish a hyper-masculine image of George H. Bush and the United States.

#### Chivalric masculinity employs crisis narratives (like the 1AC) to pivot from defensive posturing it into offensive violence, and war gets redeployed against marginalized bodies.

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in *Gender and International Security* edited by Laura Sjoberg, 2010, pp. 73-75 (SPP))

As gender is a relational concept, hegemonic definitions of masculinity necessarily entail hegemonic definitions of femininity. Nira Yuval-Davis has categorized several ways in which women function in nationalist ideologies, symbolically or in their actions. Women are constructed as the biological reproducers of the nation, as well as the cultural reproducers. After all, “group reproduction – both biological and social- is fundamental to nationalist practice, process, and politics.” Under nationalist regimes, woman are often expected to bear and raise young men who will fight on behalf of the nation. The national is therefore dependent upon women in traditional roles as mothers and caretakers to reproduce itself. The entire nation may be symbolized by a women who must be fought and died for. Indeed, nationalist discourses often present the nation as a woman, a guardian and symbol of the nation’s values, such as Germania, Britannia, or France’s Marianne, or the cult of Queen Louise of Prussia. These symbolic women were Madonna-like in their image as chaste mothers of the nation. Rape, then, becomes a metaphor for national humiliation, as in “the rape of Belgium” or “the rape of Kuwait” as well as a tactic of war used to symbolically prove the superiority of one’s national group. Not only do nationalist projects construct gender identities that prescribe different spheres for men and women, but this production of gender identities has been a necessary condition of nationalism as women have symbolically figured as the markers of the nation who must be protected by the men who run the state (or are trying to create one). Nationalism is naturalized, or legitimated, through gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine and the constitution of separate and unequal spheres for men and women. Gender is constitutive of nationalism, which is a factor in the promotion of offensive military doctrines and the cult of the offensive. Nationalism in terms of the assertion of the superiority of our men over their men often legitimates war in terms of a “protection racket,” in which offensive wars are fought in order to defend “women and children” from potential or actual threats. This “protection racket” extends the logic of nationalism to allow for offensive policies to be legitimated as defensive. Protection as offensive military doctrine: Rather than a unified, aggressive and warlike nature that gender essentialists like Fukuyama imagine, the hegemonic masculinity of World War I calls upon men to be courageous protectors of those less strong and capable: a chivalrous version of masculinity that has more frequently accompanied “offensive warfare” than a dominating, conquering bloodlust (although the former may resemble the latter from certain vantage pints). These gendered constructions of identity can make offensive military strategies appear to be defensive, enabling wars to take place. Often, the gendered ideologies that constitute nationalism contribute to forming offensive doctrines. “Chivalric” masculinity is not solely about men, but rather gendered relations of power. In particular, the just war narrative involve “good guys” or “just warriors” who fight against “bad guys” for just and valorous reasons. In order to produce the chivalric masculinity of the “just warrior, a ‘beautiful soul” and a malevolent other are needed. As Iris Marion Young explains, The gallantly masculine man faces the world’s difficulties and dangers in order to shield women from harm… Good men can only appear in the goodness if we assume that lurking outside the warm familial walls are aggressor, the “bad men, who wish to attack them. Not only does this “protection racket” legitimate war, but it may be said to legitimate the constitution of the state as the provider of security of outside threats as well. Feminist scholarship in International Relations has described the various ways in which this ideal of chivalric masculinity has formed the basis of the national security state as well the principles behind just war theory. For example, Jean Bethke Elshtain has described “just warriors” and “beautiful souls” as gender identities that legitimate war. Masculine “just warriors” are only reluctantly violent, but violent nonetheless as they wage war on behalf of the pure and feminine “beautiful souls” who are “too good for this world yet absolutely necessary to it.” While seemingly benign, such chivalric discourses require helpless, feminized victims: not full and equal citizens capable of defending themselves. The protector and the protected cannot be equal to one other. “the male protector confronts evil aggressor in the name of the the right and the good, while those under his protection submit to his order and serve as handmaids to his efforts.” Without this discourse of “protection,” many of the offensive military doctrines that resulted in war would not have been possible, as this discourse enables men to take violent action with the narrative that makes their actions seem moral, even commendable. Even so, specifics of time and place shape the specific forms this form of hegemonic masculinity takes.

### **Geopolitics / Cartography Link**

#### The drawing of boundaries creates feminized subjects between those with control over a domain and those without

Deerfield, 2016. (Kat, PhD in Critical and Cultural Theory, Cardiff University UK, “Heavenly Bodies: Gender and Sexuality in Extra-Terrestrial Culture,” Dissertation, <http://orca.cf.ac.uk/93157/>, SPP)

The relationship between cartographic borders and bodily-spatial borders is a key focus of Kirby’s work on exploration and mapping discourse. In ‘Re:Mapping Subjectivity: Cartographic vision and the limits of politics’, Kirby argues that ‘cartography selectively emphasizes boundaries over sites’: both the boundaries between delineated spaces and the boundaries between body and space.23 Cartography, as Kirby illustrates, intrinsically privileges the boundaries between spaces over the spaces themselves, as this is how spaces become representations on a map. Kirby further argues that carography’s emphasis on boundaries/borders extends beyond the material constraints of mapping. The emphasis on boundaries also applies to the construction of what Kirby identifies as the Enlightenment or Cartesian subject, the subject of the early exploratory ventures that gave Western spatial discourse its origins. Kirby explains: The similarity of mapped space and the mapping subject stems from the way the boundary between them is patterned as a constant barricade enforcing the difference between the two sites, preventing admixture and the diffusion of either entity. Cartography institutes a particular kind of boundary between the subject and space, but is also itself a site of interface, mediating the relationship between space and the subject and constructing each in its own particularly ossified way.24 In cartography, Kirby argues, the exploratory subject’s body is defined by its remaining bounded from exterior space. This ultimate construction of boundedness is threatened by what is traditionally understood as the feminine attribute of bodily permeability.25 This strictly bordered subjectivity is additionally threatened by the risk of the subject getting lost within the landscape. In this way, Kirby argues, cartography as a way for the subject to not be lost relies on two different kinds of borders – the borders drawn on a map, and the borders separating the body of the subject from its exterior.26 In Kirby’s discussion of the Western subject ‘being lost’, she explains that it is necessary for the Western explorer to conceive of himself as separate from the landscape, in a 'position of mastery' above and outside of the territory itself.27 This, Kirby argues, is one of the primary functions of cartography: ...to ensure that the relationship between knower and known remains unidirectional. The mapper should be able to 'master' his environment, occupy a secure and superior position in relation to it, without it affecting him in return. This stance of superiority crumbles when the explorers' cartographic aptitude deteriorates. To actually be *in* the surroundings, incapable of separating one's self from them in a larger objective representation, is to be lost.28 This has a particularly masculine association, illustrated by considering again Rose’s argument about the ‘master subject’ and this subjectivity’s need to deny its own corporeality. Without a pre-existing map, Kirby argues, the Western exploratory subject in a foreign land is always lost, because his perception of space requires that he be safely bounded from it. A female subject, Kirby goes on to argue, cannot occupy this subjectivity, because of the associations of femininity not only with the body but with a body that is not able to divest itself of spatial awareness.29

### Great Power Politics Link

#### The AFF narrative positions the “great powers” as a genderless agents, obfuscating the state as a site of gendered performativity

Wadley, 2010. (Jonathan, PhD in IR from Florida and currently professor of IR and sexual politics at San Diego. “Gendering the State: Performativity and Protection in International Security,” in *Gender and International Security* edited by Laura Sjoberg, pp. 40-41 - spp)

The analysis presented here challenges the discipline’s tendency to treat states as genderless persons by exploring the role of gender in the security performances of states. In doing so, it draws upon the concept of performativity – the idea that, in the words of Judith Butler, “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expression’ that are said to be its results.” It argues that performances within the field of security, much like performances within the daily lives of people, carry no intrinsic meaning, but must be made sense of through “a system of symbolic meaning” that cannot be but gendered. Through such performances, identities become salient, and masculine and feminine subjects are created. While this process is less palpable for states than it is for humans, it is nonetheless observable in broad patterns. States can be observed reifying themselves through performances of security, particularly through those which establish them as stable and masculine protectors. Recent work on the politics of protection, particularly that done by Didier Bigo, suggests the constitutive effects that protection has upon both providers and recipients. It stops short, however, of recognizing that these effects may be enabled by the gendered meaning that different forms of protection carry. When such meanings are considered, it becomes evident that by “being” masculine protectors, states can position themselves favorably in relation to other international actors and gain legitimacy from their domestic audiences. This means that states are gendered, and are gendered in much the same way as people are: through repeated performances. When state identity is viewed in this light, the anthropomorphic assumption, as it is commonly used, appears woefully inadequate. To be clear, it is not being suggested that drawing parallels between human subjects and state subjects is bad in-and-of-itself. Indeed, useful parallels can be drawn, despite (or, perhaps, because of) the notion that “both states and persons are fuzzy sets.” The trouble lies in assuming that states, or people, are constituted outside processes of interaction, and that either can be made sense of without considering the relational identities they take on through the systems of symbolic meaning through which they operate. Anthropomorphic assumptions tend to treat the state as a genderless, unitary actor – often, one that is ontologically primitive to its interactions – while neglecting the ways that the “actor-ness” and “unity” of the state are an effect of iterated, gendered performances, particularly in the realm of security. By viewing security performances with an eye toward their constitutive effects, and by moving gender to the center of that analysis, one gains not only a richer understanding of how states reproduce themselves (i.e. where their person-like “identities” come from), but a clearer picture of the hierarchical relations that exist among states and between states and domestic populations. This chapter begins with a consideration of how the state has been conceived of a person throughout the discipline, arguing that such practices almost always import an inadequate understanding of how people are constituted. In both cases, conceptualizing states and conceptualizing humans – this is a result, largely, of substance-oriented, as opposed to process-oriented, approaches. It argues that by making processes, rather than substances, the core of research, scholars will be able to more fully explain how states reproduce themselves as actors in world politics, how they garner power for themselves (in relation to other international actors, particularly states), and how they gain legitimacy from their subjects. Following that, the chapter argues that a theory of performativity can fill this need, especially in the realm of Security Studies. Moreover, such a theory would facilitate the study of gender within these processes and shed light on the incentives states have to behave as masculine actors. The final section of the chapter offers, tentatively, a way for empirical research to bear on the theoretical sketches presented here. It submits that “the rational protector model” may be examined as a type of dominant masculinity for states, one which allows them to “do” security ways that cast them as unitary, masculine actors.

### China Link

#### In attempting to find one nation dominating and one lacking, at its root is still a masculine form of politics that ignores violence across the globe because great powers are at peace.

Sjoberg, 2010. (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 90-93 - spp)

Feminist evaluations of power transition hypotheses A feminist analysis of PTT needs to reformulate the PTT hypotheses. This section applies the feminist critiques of the mechanism (power), the object (great states), and the variables (power parity and dissatisfaction) that PTT uses to explain international conflict to the reformulation of the major PTT hypotheses. It posits alternative explanations and alternative possible solutions and futures (Table 5.1). Relative position, state hegemonic masculinity, and bellicosity: Power transition theorists found that "occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position. "88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars, 89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state's hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state's hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse's study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man . . . , not only did he embody the older aristocratic vlues of bravery, courage, and chivarly, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained ... The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity "increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism."92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as "the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior ... jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and ... ugly-nearly deformed."93 In the 1930s, "German fascists ... took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme."94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains' that while “Western stereotypes of the 'real man' have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, ... in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male."95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity, since, while "the core meaning of wen-wu still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour ... [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] ... has generated idealized images of workers and peasants" rather than soldiers98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R 1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany's level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states.\ Hegemony and Peace: PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PIT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict between great powers. As such, the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers." The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that PTT ignores all but the most powerful states. Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), feminists pay attention to the entire global political community. The PTT understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena. Feminist work has consistently shown that, as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence. Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of war between great states does not automatically create peace within them, and that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers." Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges. A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge. An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics. These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear war, their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US government’s decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes. Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease. Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world. In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.109 Because of the these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

### China or Russia Link

#### Aff is a Western Savior narrative that positions China/Russia as the dangerous Oriental threat that is a risk to “ours” and “their” women

Teresa **Heffernan**, Professor Saint Mary’s University, Canada. “Feminism Against the East/West Divide: Lady Mary's Turkish Embassy Letters” Eighteenth-Century Studies Volume 33, Number 2, Winter **2000**

In an episode of Cervantes's Don Quixote (1604) entitled "The Captive's Tale," a Moorish woman and a Spaniard arrive at an inn where Don Quixote and various guests are lodged. After reassuring the guests, who are disturbed by the presence of the veiled woman, that although his companion is "Moorish...in body and dress," she is "in her soul...a very good Christian," the Spaniard begins to tell of his adventures and she is persuaded to remove her veil. 10 While fighting for "his God and king" against the Turks at the battle of Lepanto (1571), the Spaniard recounts, he was captured and imprisoned in Algeria. Coming to his rescue, a wealthy Moorish woman promised to free and marry him in return for taking her to Christian lands. This woman, his traveling companion, "the most beautiful princess in the whole kingdom," according to the Spaniard, betrayed her father, denounced her people, and changed her name from Zoraida to Maria, warning her Spanish savior "'Do not trust [End Page 203] any Moor; they are all deceitful.'" 11 The Christian victory at the battle of Lepanto, was, according to the Spaniard, the moment "when the insolent pride of the Ottoman's was broken for ever," proving to "all the nations" that the Ottoman empire was penetrable; his story of this veiled woman's unveiling seems to support this claim.¶ As the balance of power shifts and Islam begins to lose ground, the West asserts its dominance by speaking for and producing a silenced Orient, much as the Spaniard speaks for his silent Moorish companion. Moreover, this tale of conquest and domination, which involves the emasculation of the Eastern father and the "rescue" of the daughter, underscores a seminal change in the relations of East and West. No longer is this story just about the Christians against the infidels, as in the Crusades. Rather, Zoraida's father, on discovering his daughter's complicity in the betrayal, accuses her of joining the captive not for reasons of faith, but in order to indulge in the "immorality" of the West and to satiate "her wicked desires": "Do not imagine that she has been moved to change her faith out of a belief that your religion is better than ours. No, it is because she knows that immorality is more freely practised in your country than in ours." 12 Caught between the captive's reading of her in terms of a sexual conquest and her father's reading of her in terms of sexual perversion, Zoraida as the (un)veiled woman is doubly silenced. This tale, ostensibly about religious difference (the daughter wants to convert to Christianity), undergoes an important shift in this scene as the religious tension between West and East is recast into its modern form. In this East/West divide, depending on which side articulates the dispute, the West's moral decay is pitted against the East's spirituality or, alternately, Western freedom and reason are pitted against Eastern fundamentalism.¶ Despite the commercial and diplomatic alliance between Britain and Turkey (which encouraged Queen Elizabeth to solicit the help of the Sultan against the idol-worshipping Spanish), like the captive's tale, many of the earliest travel narratives about the Orient written by the merchants of the Levant Company, established in 1581, stressed the cultural divide between East and West, keeping "intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness." 13 Looking back over the life of the Company in 1893 and paying homage to its "heroic" colonial past, Theodore Bent writes in his introduction to an edition of the diaries of two early merchants (Dallam and Covel), The Levant Company, "besides the amount of wealth it accumulated for this country, did infinite service in the development of art and research, geography and travel, the suppression of slavery, and the spread of civilization in countries which would still have been unapproachable, had not the continued efforts of the 244 years [the life of the Company] been towards civilization and humanity." 14 As a burgeoning publishing industry begins to develop around these tales of the "exotic" east in the late seventeenth century, in these narratives, like in the "Captive's Tale," the construction of the (un)veiled woman is central to the depiction of the East as barbaric. These colonial narratives thus justified the economic domination and exploitation of foreign markets with scandalous stories that testified to the essentially uncivilized behavior of distant neighbors. In his diary that details his travels in the Levant (1599), Thomas Dallam mentions catching a glimpse of the Signor's concubines through a grate in a "very thick wall" surrounded by "very strong iron"; he lingers, on pain of death, over the spectacle of these bejeweled captive women, perversely commenting that the sight "did please me wondrous well." 15 In an entry of his diary dated 23 May 1676, John Covel tells a sordid tale about a slave of great beauty, [End Page 204] who is ravished by an admirer. The Sultan, overcome "with madnesse that he lost one so sweet," beheads the man and takes the girl for his harem. 16 Bon Ottaviano writes of the eleven or twelve hundred virgins that make up the Sultan's harem in his 1625 account of the Ottoman Court. He further gives details of the brutality these women faced at the hands of the Grand Seignior, claiming that in some cases the punishment involved them being bound hand and foot, put into a sack, and thrown into the sea in the dark of night. Furthermore, he tells us that these "young, lusty, lascivious wenches" are allowed radishes, cucumbers, and gourds only in slices to prevent them from engaging in any unnatural or unclean acts. 17 Robert Withers, who claimed Ottaviano's 1625 account as his own, embellished this already exaggerated and inaccurate narrative with more lurid details about life in the harem, rashly claiming to have penetrated it. Finally, Jean Dumont comments in A New Voyage to the Levant (1696) on the Sultan's wives who, he reports, are guarded by white and black eunuchs "who never permit'em to enjoy the least Shadow of liberty." 18¶ These largely fictitious (given the fact that male travelers had no access to women's quarters) and, at the very least, grossly distorted accounts of the abusive treatment of the veiled woman are standard tropes of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century travel narratives to the Levant. At once voyeuristic and indignant, these travel narratives distracted attention from the gender inequities at home, presented the Orient as a place in need of rescue, and secured the idea of Europe as free, fair, and civilized. These narratives also allowed the male reader to experience vicariously the role of hero or savior, in the colonial vein of "white men saving brown women from brown men," while satisfying fantasies of penetration and domination of the East. 19 Furthermore, despite the similarities in the subordinate positions of women in the East and West, the veiled woman, as portrayed in these narratives, becomes one of the most powerful symbols of the "irrationality" and "backwardness" of Islam. Jean Dumont, claiming there is "no slavery equal to that of the Turkish Woman," suggests that these customs are the result of a mind that "is at the bottom nothing else but a pure Insensibility and a Weakness that is altogether inexcusable in any reasonable creature." 20¶ This seventeenth- and eighteenth-century orientalist literature that foregrounds the trials of the (un)veiled woman is already part of the story of the West's shift to modernity. While the West was preoccupied with the struggle of liberating itself from the tyranny of the father and articulating itself as secular, a story in which paternal rule is replaced by a fraternal order and reason displaces faith, Islam was perceived as arrested, irrational, and backward, still enslaved by despots. The modern understanding of the opposition between a traditional, religious, and conservative Islam that values community, faith, and spirituality and a modern, secular, and progressive society, which is founded on liberty, reason, and materialism, in short, the contemporary East/West divide, is already evident in these tales. Like Zoraida, the (un)veiled woman, captive in this narrative, can only be "saved" from her culture or "submit" to it.

### Accidents Link

#### **The aff’s securitization against accidents is a paradigm that enables a constant state of exception that enables a war against difference**

Karatzogianni and Robinson, 13 (Athina Karatzogianni - Senior Lecturer in Media and Communication at the University of Leicester, UK. Dr. Andrew Robinson is a political theorist and activist based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ). July 2013, “Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: A Deleuzo- Nietzschean Perspective on State, Security, and Active/Reactive Networks,” pp. 8-11, <https://www.academia.edu/8115284/Schizorevolutions_vs._Microfascisms_A_Deleuzo-Nietzschean_Perspective_on_State_Security_and_Active_Reactive_Networks> Date Accessed: 6/27/18)//GraRev

Thesis 2: The threatened state transmutes into the terror state.

The return of state violence from the kernel of state exceptionalism is a growing problem. It is grounded on a reaction of the terrified state by conceiving the entire situation as it is formerly conceived specific sites of exception and emergency (c.f. Agamben, 1998, 2005). New forms of social control directed against minor deviance or uncontrolled flows are expanding into a war against difference and a systematic denial of the ‘right to have rights ‘ (Robinson, 2007). The project is not simply an extension of liberal-democratic models ofsocial control, but breaks with such models in directly criminalizing nonconformity from a prescribed way of life and attempting to extensively regulate everyday life through repression. This new repressive model, expressing a kind of neo-totalitarianism, should be taken to include such measures and structures as the rise of gated communities, CCTV, RFID, ID cards, ASBOs, dispersal zones, paramilitary policing methods, the ‘social cleansing ‘ of groups such as homeless people and street drinkers from public spaces, increasing restrictions on protests and attacks on ‘extremist ‘ groups, the use of extreme sentencing against minor deviance, and of course the swathe of “anti-terrorism” laws which provide a pretext for expanded repression. This increasingly vicious state response leads to extremely intrusive state measures. The magazine Datacide analyses the wave of repression as ‘the real subsumption of every singularity in the domain of the State. From now on if your attributes don't quite extend to crime, a judge's word suffices to ensure that crime will reach out and embrace your attributes ‘ (Hyland n.d.). To decompose networks, the state seeks to shadow them ever more closely. The closure of space is an inherent aspect of this project of control. While open space is a necessary enabling good from the standpoint of active desire, it is perceived as a threat by the terrified state, because it is space in which demonised Others can gather and recompose networks outside state control. Hence, for the threatened state, open space is space for the enemy, space of risk. Given that open space is in contrast necessary for difference to function (since otherwise it is excluded as unrepresentable or excessive), the attempts to render all space closed and governable involve a constant war on difference which expands ever more deeply into everyday life. As Guattari aptly argues, neoliberal capitalism tends to construe difference as unwanted ‘noise ‘ (1996: 137). Society thus becomes a hothouse of constant crackdowns and surveillance, which at best simulates, and at worst creates, a situation where horizontal connections either cannot emerge or are constantly persecuted. Theories such as those of Agamben and Kropotkin show the predisposition of the state to pursue total control. But why is the state pursuing this project now? To understand this, one must recognise the multiple ways in which capitalism can handle difference. Hence, there are two poles the state can pursue, social-democratic (adding axioms) or totalitarian (subtracting axioms), which have the same function in relation to capitalism, but are quite different in other regards. State terror involves the replacement of addition of axioms (inclusion through representation) with subtraction of axioms (repression of difference). This parallels the distinction between ‘hard ‘ and ‘soft ‘ power in international relations. Crucially, ‘hard ‘ power is deflationary (Mann 2005: 83-4). While ideological integration can be increased by intensified command, ‘soft ‘ power over anyone who remains outside the dominant frame is dissipated. Everyday deviance becomes resistance because of the project of control which attacks it. It also becomes necessarily more insurrectionary, in direct response to the cumulative attempts to stamp it out through micro-regulation. What the state gains in coercive power, it loses in its ability to influence or engage with its other. But the state, operating under intense uncertainty and fear, is giving up trying to seem legitimate across a field of difference. A recent example of this concerns the treatment of whistleblowers: Bradley Manning and by extent the publisher Julian Assange in the WikiLeaks case (for a discussion of affect see Karatzogianni, 2012) and Edward Snowden in relation to the recent revelations about NSA surveillance program PRISM (Poitras and Greenwald ‘s video Interview with Edward Snowden, 9 June 2013). This is not to say that it dispenses with articulation. It simply restricts it tautologically to its own ideological space (Negri 2003: 27). Legitimation is replaced by information, technocracy and a simulation of participation (Negri 2003: 90, 111.). There is a peculiarly  close relationship between the state logic of command and the field of what is variously termed ‘ideology ‘ (in Althusser), ‘mythology ‘ (in Barthes) and ‘fantasy ‘ (in Lacan): second-order significations embedded in everyday representations, through which a simulated lifeworld is created, in which people live in passivity, creating their real performative connection to their conditions of existence and bringing them into psychological complicity in their own repression. Such phenomena are crucial to the construction of demonised Others which provides the discursive basis for projects of state control. ‘[Conflict is] deflected… through the automatic micro-functioning of ideology through information systems. This is the normal, ‘everyday ‘ fascism, whose most noticeable feature is how unnoticeable it is ‘ (Negri 1998a: 190). In denial of generalisable rights, the in-group defines social space for itself and itself alone. The result is a denial of basic dignity and rights to those who fall outside "society", who, in line with their metaphysical status, are to be cast out, locked away, or put beyond a society defined as being for "us and us only" (the mythical division between social and anti-social). The neo-totalitarian state resurrects the tendency to build a state ideology, but this ideology is now disguised as a shared referent of polyarchic parties and nominally free media. Failing to think in statist terms is no longer any different from criminal intent. Romantically crossing an airport barrier for a goodbye kiss is taken as a major crime, for the state, being terrified, responds disproportionately; the romantic is blamed for producing this response (Baker and Robins, 2010). He should have thought like the state to begin with, and not corrupted its functioning with trivialities such as love. Such is the core of the terror-state: constant exertion of energy to ward off constant anxiety, at the cost of a war on difference.

### Heg/Hardpower Link

#### Heg increases the likelihood of conflict, and justifies sustained structural violence that outweighs the small risk of great power war

Sjoberg, 2010 (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 90-93 - spp)

Feminist evaluations of power transition hypotheses A feminist analysis of PTT needs to reformulate the PTT hypotheses. This section applies the feminist critiques of the mechanism (power), the object (great states), and the variables (power parity and dissatisfaction) that PTT uses to explain international conflict to the reformulation of the major PTT hypotheses. It posits alternative explanations and alternative possible solutions and futures (Table 5.1). Relative position, state hegemonic masculinity, and bellicosity: Power transition theorists found that "occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position. "88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars, 89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state's hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state's hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse's study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man . . . , not only did he embody the older aristocratic vlues of bravery, courage, and chivarly, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained ... The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity "increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism."92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as "the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior ... jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and ... ugly-nearly deformed."93 In the 1930s, "German fascists ... took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme."94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains' that while “Western stereotypes of the 'real man' have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, ... in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male."95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity, since, while "the core meaning of wen-wu still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour ... [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] ... has generated idealized images of workers and peasants" rather than soldiers98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R 1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany's level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states.\ Hegemony and Peace: PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PIT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict between great powers. As such, the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers." The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that PTT ignores all but the most powerful states. Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), feminists pay attention to the entire global political community. The PTT understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena. Feminist work has consistently shown that, as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence. Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of war between great states does not automatically create peace within them, and that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers." Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges. A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge. An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics. These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear war, their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US government’s decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes. Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease. Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world. In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.109 Because of the these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

### Soft Power Link

#### Attempts to sustain soft power are paternalistic and maintain hegemonic masculinity in IR

Claire Duncanson & Catherine Eschle (2008), University of Edinburgh and University of Strathclyde, “Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident , New Political Science, 30:4, 545-563, DOI: 10.1080/07393140802518120

Instead, we want to close with two points. Firstly, although hegemonic masculine forms may shift over time and place, such shifts are not necessarily progressive. Indeed, Charlotte Hooper suggests that the apparent softening of hegemonic masculinity characteristic of Western states in the era of globalisation is not a sign of the imminent demise of male power but rather part and parcel of the adjustment process necessary to maintain power and status.106 More precisely, she argues that changes in “masculinist practices” work to ensure both that hegemonic masculinity remains hegemonic and that it continues to meet the requirements of its elite masculine-identified members (usually white, middle or upper class, heterosexual men).107 If this is indeed how hegemonic masculinity operates, what we are perhaps observing in the White Paper is a shift in the self- image of the British state, but one that enables it to avoid relinquishing the masculine ideal of power and status as measured in nuclear weapons. The construction of the “responsible steward” identity is thus a smokescreen, diverting attention from the lack of substantive change in policy. Having said this, shifts in the masculine identity of the British state remain significant because any disruptions to traditional definitions of masculinity demonstrate the arbitrariness of gendered dichotomies and open up potential for change.108 This leads us onto our second point, that the construction of the “responsible steward” identity remains far from complete. Indeed, as we indicated at several points above, there are several instabilities and tensions in the way in which masculine codes and images are mobilised in the White Paper. Most notably, it appears that the British nuclear state remains attracted to the status and privilege which it believes goes with possession of nuclear weapons, yet it also wants to develop a leadership role based on ethics rather than fear. Further, the role of the British nuclear state as protector of its citizens proves rather difficult to establish in the absence of an obvious enemy Other, and instead we find a problematic reliance on a fear of “weak states” and a contestable characterisation of all states, even current allies, as potential deadly enemies. Finally, we see both an emphasis on the independence of the UK’s nuclear deterrence and a recognition of the importance of interdependence and multilateralism—as well as an effort to avoid drawing attention to the dependent relationship on the United States in nuclear procurement, which means full independence simply cannot be achieved. Such tensions in the UK government’s position are indicative, perhaps, that its masculine underpinnings are less stable than is often assumed. We note that both Hooper109 and R. W. Connell110 suggest that feminists can exploit the contradictions between “softer” and “harder” forms of masculinity, opening up space for alternative identity constructions. The tensions we have exposed in the White Paper should thus give those engaged in the continuing struggle against Trident renewal further fuel for their arguments. It seems to us that exposure and exacerbation of internal instabilities in the gendered discourse of nuclear weapons states remains an important feminist contribution to the struggle for a nuclear-free world.

### Terrorism Link

#### The discourse of anti-terrorism portrays women as victims, needing heroic men to save them

Johnstone 2009 (Rachael, Law @ U of Akureyri Iceland, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 44, www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu)

Finally, the discourse of the “War on Terror” itself revealed a perceived need for the state to define its masculinity in the aftermath of attack. This required painting men as heroes and women as victims.211 Chinkin and Charlesworth described the media responses in the immediate aftermath in which women were featured as heavenly rewards for terrorists or as victims of the attack, preferably widows of murdered men, rather than the women who themselves worked daily in the twin towers or in the rescue services.212 Women in the armed services and firefighting teams were conspicuous by their invisibility.213 Women in Afghanistan are depicted as victims of a brutal Taliban, requiring rescue by heroic (Western) men – though not political participation.214 The suffering women endure under the airpower of those same Western forces and the hardship encountered as essential services are put beyond their use are unfortunate “collateral damage” — a sacrifice for their greater long-term good.215 Susan Faludi’s 2007 investigative retrospect of the media in the aftermath of 9/11 provides thorough confirmation of the Australians’ early impressions.216 In such times, a feminist perspective of the state that seeks women’s empowerment and equal participation in the public sphere is unlikely to find favor.

### Middle East Conflict Link

#### Muslims are constructed as feminine and hyper-sexual, justifying the colonial legacy of penetration and domination of the Middle East

Zine, 2008. (Jasmine Zine, “Between orientalism and fundamentalism” Hunt, Krista, and Rygiel, Kim, eds. (En)Gendering the War on Terror : War Stories and Camouflage Politics. Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008. ProQuest ebrary (Rishi).

Increasingly since the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, Muslims have been positioned on the geo-political stage as anti-democratic, anti-liberal and living in societies located outside the western narratives of progress and modernity. The global fault lines of North-South are underscored by the complex fissures that occur as a result of social, economic and political disparities and ideological upheavals, yet the over-riding discourses being purveyed have reduced the dynamics of neo-imperial globalization to the essentialized notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’. Huntington (1993) warned that ‘the fault lines between civilizations will become the battle lines of the future**’** (p. 22). This fatalistic prophecy inscribes present global conflicts and insurgencies with a Manichean dualism carving the world into rigid and culturally irreconcilable enclaves. Through this binary formulation of the ‘West and the rest’, Islam and Muslims have become the foils for modernity, freedom and the civilized world.The discursive arena of the ‘war on terror’ has re-inscribed the ideological rhetoric of the Crusades. The Bush doctrine used religious rhetoric to describe the early US campaigns against Muslims in Afghanistan, dubbing this military engagement ‘Operation Infinite Justice’, 2 thereby invoking attributes of God to justify their retributive incursions. Other ways of inscribing the ensuing military campaigns with theological purpose and justification came through Bush’s use of religious sanctions such as the need to rid the world of ‘evil doers’. According to Rosemary Ruether, a professor of theology at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, Bush and many of his supporters on the Christian right speak of his administration as ‘messianic agents chosen by God to combat evil and to establish good’ (Lattin, 2004, p. A16). These pronouncements became similar in ideological nature to the ‘fatwas’ issued by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda cohorts who characteristically invoked religious legitimacy in their campaigns of violence and ‘jihad’ against the ‘infidel’ West. Whether it is the jingoistic chauvinism of Bush’s ‘American messianic nationalism’ (Lattin, 2004) or bin Laden’s Islamist extremism, both views engage violent forms of religious rhetoric and fundamentalist notions of the enemy ‘Other’ in a theocratic Manichean divide. Along with religious rhetoric, the war on terror, like previous imperialist campaigns, is inscribed with the politics of race and gender. Whether we examine the historical relations of colonialism, or the neo-imperialist relations of current global politics, military violence is rooted in the complex inequalities of race, gender, class and ethnicity. The resurgence of racialized discourses is reminiscent of those predicated on early modernist tropes of social evolutionism and serve to cast Muslims in the global South as ‘uncivilized and barbaric**’.** Recall Bush’s dictum proclaiming the ‘we (read: civilized West) will bring progress and prosperity to Iraq’. This proclamation locates Iraq and Arab Muslim society in what McClintock (1995) has referred to as ‘anachronistic space: prehistoric, atavistic and irrational, inherently out of place in the historical time of modernity’ (p. 40). The narrative of ‘progress’ therefore creates a rationale for the occupation of Iraq as a benevolent gesture of humanitarianism masking the self-serving neo-liberal economic enterprise at the heart of its imperial design. Racialized knowledge production also acts in collusion with campaigns of power and domination. As Foucault (1982) noted, power and knowledge directly imply one another and it is through sets of discursive practices that particular kinds of subjects are produced (p. 27). Through the discourses of Orientalism, the late Edward Said (1979) described how particular kinds of Arab and Muslim subjects were constructed through literary practices as ‘demonic hordes of hated barbarians’ (p. 59)’, ‘inveterate liars … lethargic and suspicious’, who ‘in everything oppose the clarity, directness and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race’ (p. 39), or as the archetypal Oriental woman; the Egyptian courtesan who never spoke of herself or represented her emotions, presence or history, but relied on the European man to render and inscribe meanings for her (p. 6). Veiled Muslim women were constructed in the Western literary imagination as objects of desire, sensual, elusive harem girls and yet they were disavowed in the same breath as backward victims of their heathen and misogynistic cultures (Zine, 2002; Kahf, 1999). These history lessons exemplify Said’s warning that ‘too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent’ (p. 27). Such presumed innocence, masks the machinations of power that operate through discursive practices. The war on terror reinvents these existing tropes and discourses in new ways that produce Muslims as dangerous foreigners, terrorists, and threats to public safety and render Muslim women as victims of their anachronistic faith, lacking agency and voice. Neo-Orientalist writing has gained increasing currency since the 9/11 attacks and ranges from the sensationalist tell-all journalism of dissident Muslim journalist Irshad Manji (2003), marketing her pulp fiction ‘rufusenik’ angst in The Trouble with Islam to even more virulent racist and Islamophobic diatribes such as Italian journalist Orianna Fallaci’s (2002) The Rage and the Pride. Fallaci’s avowed antifascism rings hollow against her bitter racist manifesto. Consider this passage from her seething narrative exalting the ‘progress’ of the West and vilifying the ‘backwardness’ of Islamic society and culture: The motor, the telegraph, the light bulb, I mean the use of electricity, the photograph, the telephone, the radio, the television, have not been invented by some mullahs or some ayatollahs…And let us not forget the standard of life that Western culture has achieved at every level of society. In the West we no longer die of starvation and curable diseases as they do in the Moslem countries. Right or wrong? But even if these were all unimportant achievements, (which I doubt), tell me: what are the conquests of the other culture of the bigots with the beard and the chador and the burqa (p. 92)? She goes on to tirade against the undesirable Muslim foreigners ‘loafing around our cities with their “merchandise”, their prostitutes, their drugs…’ and defiling their cities with ‘the yellow streaks of urine, the stench of excrement blocked the main entrance of the San Salvatore al Vescovo: the exquisite Romanic church…that the sons of Allah transformed into a latrine…’ (pp. 129– 130). Muslim women are cast as ‘idiotic’ ‘uneducated’ and guilty of ‘marrying pricks who want to marry four wives’ (p. 95**).** Ordinarily such blatant xenophobic, neo-fascist, Islamophobic vitriol would be written off as a racist fiction: the baseless rambling of an acrid mind, however in the post 9/11 era, despite the protests of European anti-racist groups seeking its ban as hate literature, the book can be found easily in some prominent bookstores in the ‘international relations’ section, having garnered mass appeal and sales. 3 Such anti-Islamic and racialized motifs are activated in new ways to justify the current neo-colonial military campaigns in the Middle East by influencing popular consciousness and manufacturing the public consent required for these practices of war and domination to take place. Thobani (2003) aptly points out that the current discourse in the war on terror has an unsettling resonance with earlier colonial constructions of the enemy ‘other’: The language used in the construction of the ‘enemy’ is very familiar to peoples who have been colonized by Europe. It echoes colonial constructs of the native as barbaric and dangerous, whose colonization was not only justifiable but also welcome, bringing them into civilization and democracy. The use of this highly charged colonial discourse at that particular moment of crisis revealed the nature of the absolutist racialized Western ideology being mobilized to rally the troops and to build a national and international consensus in defense of the ‘West’ and its civilization (p. 402). Through the pervasive forces of the media, these ideas are easily and uncritically absorbed by the masses as a means to legitimate the right to power and the right to rule over others in an almost benevolent and paternal gesture of bringing modernity, democracy and liberalism to those Fanon (1963) poignantly described as ‘the wretched of the earth’. This new hegemony operates as a form of ‘camouflaged politics’ masking the self-serving economic and political rationale behind the global dynamics of power. The current rise of militarism is also galvanized by a globalizing patriarchy that purveys a conquest-driven masculinist stance. According to Okazawa-Rey (2001): Patriarchal values are promoted by militarism, particularly the social construction of masculinities that revere the (false) notion of invincibility, relationships of domination and subordination, the eroticization of domination, emotional detachment, and the dehumanization of ‘others’ into enemies, like Arab ‘terrorists’ and Columbian ‘drug lords’. Misogyny is also at the core of militarism **(**p. 21). As part of the ‘eroticization of domination’ the use of sex and sexual metaphors has long been associated with colonization as well as the current military industrial complex. For example, the feminization of land becomes a prevalent motif in colonial consciousness metaphorically tying the conquest of the female ‘other’ to the conquest of indigenous land. McClintock (1995) describes how geographic space became feminized in the narratives of exploration and conquest. From the time of Columbus, who described the world as the shape of a woman’s breast to the Enlightenment, McClintock describes the metaphysics of colonial fantasies that inscribed gendered notions of conquest and subjugation: Knowledge of the unknown world was mapped as a metaphysics of gender violence – not as the expanded recognition of cultural difference – and was validated by the new Enlightenment logic of private property and possessive individualism. In these fantasies the world is feminized and spatially spread for male exploration, then reassembled and deployed in the interests of massive imperial power(p. 23). Bullock **(2002)** describes how the colonial Orient was feminized and depicted in the travel writing of Flaubert who described swimming in the Red Sea as ‘lying on a thousand liquid breasts’ **(p. 8**). The male imperial gaze therefore allowed for the metaphorical conquest over feminized land to work hand in hand with concurrent physical conquest taking place. Veiled Muslim women, however, inhibited the imperialist masculinist gaze by covering their bodies and producing an effect whereby they inverted the gaze and could see but not be seen (see Bullock, 2000). Pornographic images of unveiled Muslim women were circulated in the form of postcards during the European colonization of the Middle East and North Africa in the nineteenth century, rendering the bodies of these women, otherwise covered and obscured from view by their veils, open to the imperial male gaze (see Alloula, 1986). Muslim women who were cloistered in the inaccessible inner sanctums of the eroticized ‘harem’ were now laid bare and open to the otherwise forbidden visual access of European men. Ella Shohat writes that ‘it is this process of exposing the female Other, literally denuding her, which comes to allegorize the western masculinist power of possession, that she as a metaphor for her land, becomes available for Western penetration and knowledge’ (1993, p. 53). During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the feminization of land and masculinization of conquest was reinvented by invoking metaphors of sexual violence in the representation of the US military campaign. Analyzing the sexual politics embedded in the media representation of the Persian Gulf war, Kari Points (1991) observes how sexual violence was invoked in military euphemisms: ‘Listening to US military talk about the conflict, I began to realize, that the United States was being portrayed as the masculine conqueror and Iraq as the feminine victim. An air force pilot at the start of the war predicted ‘it’ll just be slam bam thank-you Saddam**!**’ (p. 1). Further, in response to Saddam Hussein’s famous dictum of fighting the ‘Mother of All Battles’, a US air force officer responded with the challenge ‘Tell him dad’s coming to kick mom’s butt’**.** One of the most chilling examples Points **cites** was reported by the Washington Post and describes how fighter pilots aboard the USS John F. Kennedy watched porno movies before their bombing missions **(p. 2).** This revelation allegorizes disturbing images of cascading bombs as the brutal ejaculate of US military imperialism being released upon the subdued feminized Iraqi nation. Sexual bravado and the emasculation of the enemy ‘other’ are legacies that have carried over to the current ‘war on terror’ with Iraq as the continuing theater of combat. New forms of violence and degradation now occupy the notorious torture chambers of Saddam Hussein’s Abu Ghraib prison. According to Burnham, ‘the Abu Ghraib portraits of sexual humiliation and submission have exposed the unbelievably tangled strands of racism, misogyny, homophobia, national arrogance and hypermasculinity that characterize the US military’ (2004, p. 3). She goes on to note that the demoralizing images of Iraqi prisoners forced to wear women’s underwear are a sign that ‘degradation and weakness are still equated with the female in this man’s army’ (p. 3). In this way, the sexualized narratives in the war on terror continue the discursive practices of European colonialism where according to McClintock (1995) ‘…the rhetoric of gender was used to make increasingly refined distinctions among the different races. The white race was figured as the male of the species and the black race as the female (p. 55)’. Therefore the grotesque feminization of Arab men through the degrading and sexually humiliating acts performed at Abu Ghraib recasts the earlier script of imperial domination in new yet equally demeaning way**s.** That Arab men are made to perform a debased and conquered feminized role in this new colonial narrative of occupation is as much a vulgar expression of the US military’s enforcement of their perceived racial and civilizational superiority as it is of their thinly guised misogyny and homophobia (see Brittain, Ch. 4). Speculation has arisen that this new form of sexual humiliation as a tool of military subjugation was inspired by the book The Arab Mind by anthropologist Rapheal Patai (1973/2002). 4 This book, detailing a litany of Orientalist claims about a singular ‘Arab Mind’ not only essentializes a presumed collective psyche but graphically depicts the perceived sexual proclivities of Arabs, such as the idea that masturbation was seen as more morally shameful than visiting prostitutes. Whitaker (2004) questions whether it was this ‘fact’ that lead to Iraqi prisoners being forced to masturbate in front of cameras. He goes on to argue that Patai’s book, dubbed as the ‘bible of the neo-cons on Arab behaviour’, provided the US military with the psychological ammunition to add this new form of sexual violence to their arsenal of racialized psychological subjugation. Whitaker notes that *the Arab Mind* is likely the single most popular and widely read book on the Arabs in the US military and while discredited as Orientalist fiction in credible academic circles, was used as a textbook for officers at the JFK special warfare school in Fort Bragg. This neo-Orientalist genre of literature has therefore had a powerful affect on shaping essentialized notions of Arab otherness based on presumed narratives of sexuality and deviance that has scripted the demoralizing role-play of Abu Ghraib. The role of Orientalist knowledge production therefore continues to play a powerful ideological role in the continuing imperial contest and enactment of violence against the body of the racialized Arab Other.

#### Orientalism relies on the feminization of a racialized “other”

Said, 1979 (Edward Said was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual. *Orientalism:* 25th Anniversary Edition, Vintage Books 2004 [1979], pp. 207-209 (SPP).

But there were other uses for latent Orientalism. If that group of ideas allowed one to separate Orientals from advanced, civilizing powers, and if the "classical" Orient served to justify both the Orientalist and his disregard of modern Orientals, latent Orientalism also encouraged a peculiarly (not to say invidiously) male conception of the world. I have already referred to this in passing during my discussion of Renan. The Oriental male was considered in isolation from the total community in which he lived and which many Orientalists, following Lane, have viewed with something resembling contempt and fear. Orientalism itself, furthermore, was an exclusively male province; like so many professional guilds during the modern period, it viewed itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders. This is especially evident in the writing of travelers and novelists: women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing. Flaubert's Kuchuk Hanem is the prototype of such caricatures, which were common enough in pornographic novels (e.g., Pierre Louys's Aphrodite) whose novelty draws on the Orient for their interest. Moreover the male conception of the world, in its effect upon the practicing Orientalist, tends to be static, frozen, fixed eternally. The very possibility of development, transformation, human movement - in the deepest sense of the word - is denied the Orient and the Oriental. As a known and ultimately an immobilized or unproductive quality, they come to be identified with a bad sort of eternality: hence, when the Orient is being approved, such phrases as "the wisdom of the East." Transferred from an implicit social evaluation to a grandly cultural one, this static male Orientalism took on a variety of forms in the late nineteenth century, especially when Islam was being discussed. General cultural historians as respected as Leopold von Ranke and Jacob Burckhardt assailed Islam as if they were dealing not so much with an anthropomorphic abstraction as with a religio-political culture about which deep generalizations were possible and warranted: in his Weltgeschichte (1881-1888) Ranke spoke of Islam as defeated by the Germanic-Romanic peoples, and in his "Historische Fragmente" (unpublished notes, 1893) Burckhardt spoke of Islam as wretched, bare, and trivial.' Such intellectual operations were carried out with considerably more flair and enthusiasm by Oswald Spengler, whose ideas about a Magian personality (typified by the Muslim Oriental) infuse Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918-1922) and the "morphology" of cultures it advocates. What these widely diffused notions of the Orient depended on was the almost total absence in contemporary Western culture of the Orient as a genuinely felt and experienced force.' For a number of evident reasons the Orient was always in the position both of outsider and of incorporated weak partner for the West. To the extent that Western scholars were aware of contemporary Orientals or Oriental movements of thought and culture, these were perceived either as silent shadows to be animated by the Orientalist, brought into reality by him, or as a kind of cultural and intellectual proletariat useful for the Orientalist's grander interpretative activity, necessary for his performance as superior judge, learned man, powerful cultural will. I mean to say that in discussions of the Orient, the Orient is all absence, whereas one feels the Orientalist and what he says as presence; yet we must not forget that the Orientalist's presence is enabled by the Orient's effective absence.

### Arms Control Link

#### Arms control is used to dominate other nations and encourages WMD build-up in the name of protection

Wright, 2010. (Susan, Research scientist in history of science and IR in the Institute for research on Women and Gender at the University of Michigan, former research fellow at the UN institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva, “Feminist theory and arms control,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 205-209 - spp)

A feminist deconstruction of arms control: In the second section of this chapter, I argued that despite differences in their conceptual frameworks, arms control played a similar role in Schelling’s and Bull’s theories of International Relations. For Bull, arms control, like war, was a means for “preserv[ing] and buttres[ing] the balance of power” and “it could not be shaped by any such principle as the indiscriminate reduction of armaments.” For Schelling, arms control was an integral part of strategy, another tool in strategic bargaining, like limited war. For both, arms control was “war by other means.” In this section, I use feminist theory to analyze major dimensions of the Bull-Schelling conception of arms control and its application by the British government. At the fundamental epistemological level, Bull and Schellng wrote in an Olympian voice that assumes absolute and universal standards of truth and objectivity, and that claims to rise above the chaos of International Relations (even while being obviously rooted in it). That Olympian voice was pervasive in academic work in the 1960s, even though change was in the air. Peter Novick has described the voices of the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the feminist movement, and the labor movement that were being raised in the 1960s and the challenges to dominant empiricist and rationalist epistemology that would eventually deeply affect academic fields of all kinds. The Olympian epistemology was directly associated with the ontologies of the Bull and Schelling models of the international system. Schelling’s model of the state system was almost Newtonian in conception: states were like mass points that interacted by exerting forces on each other. In this case, the forces were those of military power and the ideal state of the system was “stability” achieved through deterrence and arms control to avoid an “imbalance” that would result in nuclear war. For Bull, similarly, the state was taken as an entity that required no further deconstruction and the goal was order in the state system achieved through “balance of power” exerted through diplomacy and arms control or if necessary through war. In each framework, arms control was depicted merely as an adjunct to the military machinery of deterrence and war. A further fundamental concept used by Bull and Schelling is that of power in the voluntarist sense of “power over,” achieved primarily by force or through threat of force. The basic assumption in both views of arms control is that military power can be used to force another state – usually one seen as hostile-to do something it might not otherwise do. Military power vested in nuclear weapons was used by the United States and its nuclear-armed allies to deter the Soviet Union from contemplating any kind of attack on or incursion into the capitalist world. After the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, the power game shifted to ensuring that neither state would attack the other, through each assuring the other of nuclear destruction. This was a stereotypically masculine form of power-power exerted over the behavior of the Other, linked in this case to an extreme form of violence in the form of a nuclear wrestling match. "Power over" can also be expressed in 'Foucauldian terms. According to Foucault, power is expressed in the discursive practices of social institutions from the prison to the clinic to the school-and he could easily have added military and foreign policy institutions to that list. Foucault saw power as a "productive network which runs through the whole social body." No doubt in the present context, he would have argued that the state exerts its power through the practices and specific discourses that are linked to those practices. In Foucault's words: Truth isn't outside power or lacking in power ... truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world. It is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. In Foucauldian terms, Bull and Schelling produced forms of "truth" that were readily incorporated by the "great powers" into the twin aspects of military strategy: weaponry and military training to use weapons on the one hand and arms control on the other. In their strategic discourses, the full complexity of the state with its factions, interests, processes, traditions, ethnicities, genders, and linkages across the world is reduced to a point source moved, primarily, by threats and coercion. Human beings appear in this picture as a passive, nameless mass protected by the armory of the state. Bull and Schelling justify the use of "power over" states that are treated as adversaries, or potential adversaries, in several ways. First, violence in the state system, and therefore the need to defend against it, are taken as given. As Bull wrote: It is time that strategists take the fact of military force as their starting point ... The capacity for organized violence between states is inherent in the nature of man and the environment. The most that can be expected from a total disarmament agreement is that it might make armaments and armed forces fewer-and more primitive. This claim of the inevitability of violence and the consequent need for military protection have been extensively analyzed by feminist theorists. If violence is inevitable, then someone or something is required to defend against it. Jean Elshtain, Laura Sjoberg, and other feminist theorists have demonstrated that the pervasive tradition of western political thought that claims that the inevitability of violence calls for the services of a Just Warrior (representing variously the state military apparatus or the soldier) who is "engaged in the regrettable but sometimes necessary task of collective violence in order to prevent some greater wrong" to the Beautiful Soul, representing variously patria or the homeland or innocent civilians. Bull’s political philosophy falls completely within this tradition. A second feature that legitimates a state's exercise of "power over" another is the focus in both strategy and arms control on ends rather than means. Schelling and Bull are silent about the nature of the means used to exercise power over other states. The horrific effects of nuclear, chemical, biological, or of war **in any form** receive no attention except to dismiss those who focus on them. The ends, on the other hand-the security and survival of the state - are all important. As Bull commented: There is a sense in which strategic thinking does and should leave morality out of the account ... if what is being said is that strategic judgments should be coloured by moral considerations or that strategic inquiry should be restricted by moral taboos, this is something that the strategist is bound to reject. This moral silence is related to a further major feature of Bull and Schelling's work: the "psychic numbing" concealing the weapons assumed to guarantee the state's security. As Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk argue, human beings develop powerful psychic walls to protect them from contemplating the effects of extreme violence. 78 "Psychic numbing" is a defense mechanism that represses, denies and excludes contemplation of massive death and destruction. In their analysis of nuclear strategy and arms control, Bull and Schelling enlist this psychological mechanism by focusing on reassuring ends rather than on the weapons providing the means to get there. As Lifton, Falk and Carol Cohn have described in detail, the nuclear strategists' locus on ends is powerfully reinforced by their "domestication" of the weaponry through the use of abstract, familial, religious, or sexual language-radically different metaphors that have a single function: distracting the user and the listener from the reality of the subject matter. Bull used this type of legitimation in his Foreign Office report through an exclusive focus on the strategic features of chemical and biological weapons and complete silence on their effects. A third feature of Bull and Schelling's view of arms control is the distancing of states from each other, with the primary relationship being an adversarial one. Schelling might have argued that his model of strategy in International Relations was politically neutral, that he was concerned only with achieving strategic balance. Bull, on the other hand, explicitly identified with "strategists' greater sense of the moral stature of American and Western political objectives for which war and the risk of war must be undertaken."

#### Arms control justification is not distinct from militarizing logic and alliance maintenance which only increases war fighting capability

Krause, PhD, 12 (Keith, IR@Geneva, Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

So what remains is a set of formal arms control agreements, mostly bilateral, but also a few that were multilateral, designed to manage the potentially most dangerous and destabilizing aspects of inter-state conflict dynamics. They channeled the confrontation between the superpowers into a technical and problem-solving logic that would facilitate decision making about what kinds of weapons to produce and deploy, and under what circumstances to use them. In addition, after some of the conceptual confusions of early nuclear strategy (such as Massive Retaliation), arms control became part of the logic by which decisions over appropriate (rational) strategies could be designed. In the 1960s and 1970s, in context of the East-West conflict and nuclear proliferation, maintaining the conditions of stable deterrence and reducing the risk of war was perhaps a politically and normatively laudable goal. But arms control was thus also linked to deterrence theory and practice, and to the entire functioning of the so-called military-industrial complex, and not something distinct and in opposition to it. This vision would not necessarily be accepted by those – such as researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and other think-tanks – who saw themselves as growing out of the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements, but I think the policy acceptability of SIPRI’s work (for example) came precisely from its progressive acceptance of the underlying rules of the game.19 What were these rules of the game? There are four elements of the Cold War practice of arms control that warrant a deeper exploration in order to illustrate the normalizing and sovereign logic of arms control. The first element was the attempt by proponents of arms control to distinguish it from advocacy of disarmament in any form. Disarmament was associated with the failed attempts to negotiate reductions in armaments during the interwar period. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was associated with the peace and anti-nuclear movements, and was seen as the preserve of impractical idealist efforts – at best politically naïve; at worst politically suspect. As Jeffrey Larsen notes, ‘in the early 1960s international security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the term disarmament, which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal books on arms control published in that era all referred to this semantic problem’.20 So arms control was presented by its practitioners as directed towards controlling or regulating the numbers, types, deployment or use of certain types or quantities of arms, and disarmament was defined as involving the reduction or the elimination of particular weapons and weapons systems, and/or foreswearing of acquisition of new weapons.21 Although occasionally agreements were signed that did eliminate weapons systems or particular classes of weapons, most notably the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, when seen **as part of the broader spectrum** of nuclear capabilities, **such restrictions were tilted more towards the control side of the equation**.22 Overall, arms control reinforced, not undermined, sovereign state power. The second, related, element was the technocratic or problem-solving orientation of arms control practices. Its political acceptability came from its claim to operate within the same policy frame as other forms of military-strategic thinking, including of course deterrence theory and strategy, alliance-building, and the entire military-industrial logic that shaped Western (and arguably Eastern) security policy. More importantly, however, it provided legitimacy to a counter-intuitive set of policy prescriptions (such as leaving your own civilian population vulnerable to nuclear attack, or revealing the equivalent of state secrets as part of confidence-building measures). And finally, the technocratic approach also was, in its strongest version, opposed to the irrational and uncontrollable prescriptions of what, as early as President Eisenhower, was called the military-industrial complex. High level proponents **of arms control** (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for example, as well perhaps as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger), regarded the defence establishment as unable to set limits on its threat assessment and concomitant arms acquisitions. They wished to subject security policy to rational managerial techniques, including such ideas as diminishing marginal returns to investments in new weapons, cost-benefit analysis for weapons systems, and trade offs between competing goals (the guns-versus-butter debate).23 As Henry Kissinger is once purported to have said, ‘What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?’ thus expressing his frustration with the inability of the nuclear defense establishment to provide a rationale for its weapons acquisition plans.24 Even more hawkish arms controllers subscribed to the rational calculus, with, for example, Paul Nitze arguing, with respect to ballistic missile defense (Star Wars), that it had to be cost effective on the margin in order to make strategic sense.25 Arms control was thus more rational – and promised to achieve the same national security goals (including war-fighting dominance) at lower cost. But the actual achievements of arms control negotiations, treaties and agreements are difficult to assess, even if we use some counter-factual analysis. As noted above, arms control failed to stem the technological arms race, failed to reduce spending on weapons, and perhaps played only a marginal role in preventing a violent superpower confrontation. In all of its forms, arms control was not a transformative paradigm – but a techno-managerial project. The transformation of inter-state relations via either nuclear disarmament or nuclear holocaust was to be avoided at all costs, and the management of the superpower arms race was a sort of via media between these two Manichean visions. Parenthetically, some prominent advocates, such as Robert McNamara, or President Barack Obama, who have argued prominently for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, claim implicitly or explicitly that there is a seamless conceptual thread that goes from arms control to nuclear disarmament, and that all that distinguishes one from the other is the relative time horizon or degree of pragmatism of the advocates.26 But this is both conceptually and practically unlikely – if arms control is a set of techno-managerial practices fully integrated into the Cold War logic of national security strategy, then it is unable to make the leap to disarmament – which involves an entirely different idea about the place of violence in social and political life. Recent debates around the ratification of the New START treaty in late 2010 illustrated how it hardly represented a step towards deeper nuclear reductions. The third core element of the arms control paradigm was that the Weberian state’s monopoly over the use of lethal force could not only be used to impose order domestically and to create social peace but that it could also be projected outwards to create a form of international order that reduced the risk of violence. Just as the domestic form of the Weberian monopoly renders the population vulnerable to the predatory state (so much so that scholars such as Rudolph Rummel could argue that democide – state-sanctioned killing of citizens – was a greater risk than war);27 the international form also involved rendering entire populations totally vulnerable to nuclear holocaust. In the name of national security the very survival of the entire population could be put at risk, through policies such as Mutual Assured Destruction or treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. It is difficult to find a better example of techno-managerial logic, instrumental rationality and the assertion of sovereign power at work. Although perhaps an extreme example, this faith in the ability of states to exercise restraint over the use of force, also underlay the entire edifice of nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. The final element was that the arms control paradigm, like the much older balance of power system, was not a mechanism for maintaining order that eliminated war or the use of force from the international system. It assumed that the main risk to be prevented was that of large-scale inter-state war between great powers or the superpowers, and that a trade-off between this risk, and the risk of (or fact of) small and large wars, especially in the postcolonial world, was an acceptable one. The use of violence was either to be part of the logic of so-called limited (nuclear) war or to be confined to the periphery, to such places as Indochina, Angola, and Afghanistan (although this was hardly peripheral to the Soviet Union). This was analogous to the operation of the 19th century balance of power system, which sanctioned the partitions of Poland, the Crimean War, and so forth in the name of maintaining systemic stability. Similarly, the logic of limited nuclear war, as presented by scholars such as Henry Kissinger, rested upon the assumption that the use of force could be carefully calibrated and controlled.28 The neo-colonialist and political implications of pushing the problem of war to the periphery are of course clear, and one could argue that the arms control paradigm sketched above, especially the treaties that stabilized the nuclear confrontation between East and West (SALT I and II), made certain kinds of proxy wars more possible or acceptable by creating escalatory fire-breaks that facilitated the relatively risk-free provision of military assistance to client states and movements. These fire breaks were easier to create in the global South, where American and Russian troops managed to avoid confronting each other directly, but less easy to create in Europe. The history of attempts to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions (the 1975 name for what in the late 1980s became the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), and of debates over the necessity for intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and the problem of extended deterrence (or the nuclear umbrella) all point towards a set of tensions or contradictions within the logic of arms control. (23-6)

### **Prolif Link**

#### Anti-prolif discourse makes proliferation more likely – creates excitement and identification with the weapons and dominant regime while masking the deadly risks of militarism

Claire Duncanson & Catherine Eschle (2008), University of Edinburgh and University of Strathclyde, “Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident , New Political Science, 30:4, 545-563, DOI: 10.1080/07393140802518120

We begin by looking at the way the White Paper talks about nuclear weapons¶ technology. There are three strands to the feminist critique of the way in which¶ states in general talk about nuclear weapons technology: first, the deployment of¶ sexualised, phallic imagery; second, a tendency to abstraction; and, third, a¶ reliance on gendered axioms. On the first point, feminists have long highlighted¶ that the political and military power associated with nuclear weapons is linked¶ metaphorically with sexual potency and masculinity. This linkage is neither¶ arbitrary nor trivial: sexual metaphors are a way of mobilising gendered¶ associations in order to create excitement about, support for and identification¶ with both the weapons and the political regime possessing them.15 Thus feminist¶ histories of the development of the nuclear arms race in the decades after World¶ War Two demonstrate the extent to which it was a race to prove masculine¶ prowess, fuelled by “missile” envy,16 with the nuclear weapons of the Cold War¶ superpowers “wheeled out like monumental phalluses” on parade.17 Such¶ imagery has proved seductive to many governments across time and space. Thus¶ when India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist leader¶ Balashaheb Thakeray argued that “[w]e have to prove that we are not eunuchs”¶ and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was portrayed in a newspaper cartoon as¶ propping up his coalition with a nuclear bomb, captioned “Made with Viagra.”18¶ Indeed, as Indian novelist Arundhati Roy has commented:¶ Reading the papers, it was often hard to tell when people were referring to Viagra¶ (which was competing for second place on the front pages) and when they were¶ talking about the bomb—“We have superior strength and potency.”19¶ Similar language has permeated the nuclear discourse of the military and¶ defence industry. In her ground-breaking study of the discourse of American¶ defence intellectuals who formulated nuclear weapons policy during the Cold¶ War, Cohn noted that sexualised metaphors, phallic imagery and the promise of¶ sexual domination thrived.20 Lectures were dominated by discussion of:¶ vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration,¶ and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks—or what one¶ military adviser to the National Security Council has called “releasing 70 to 80¶ percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump.”21¶ Cohn suggests that such sexual imagery serves not only to underline the¶ connections between masculine sexuality and nuclear weapons but also to¶ minimise the seriousness of militarist endeavours.22 It makes the nuclear arms¶ race seem the stuff of jocular locker-room rivalry, denying its deadly¶ consequences. Perhaps most importantly, sexualised metaphors are one of the¶ reasons that talk of nuclear disarmament is so readily dismissed: “If disarmament¶ is emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?”23

### Space Policy/Coop Link

#### International Space Coop hinges upon the presumption of US paternalism – the aff relies on heteronormative and hierarchical tropes of masculinization and feminization

Griffin, 2009 (Penny, PhD and professor in the dept of politics and IR, Univ New South Wales, “The spaces between us: the gendered politics of outer space,” in *Securing Outer Space,* Routledge, p. 67-68, SPP)

The US is, of course, heavily reliant on its satellite-based systems, and to this end works (to a certain extent) within a regime framework of international space ‘law’ (Brearly 2005: 14). This is not to suggest that US discourse in not constructed around the imbedded belief that the US itself represents the global hegemon, and the only viable, indeed legitimate keeper of global ‘order’. The US may be challenged ‘regionally’, but considers itself ‘unlikely to be challenged by a global peer competitor’ (US Space Command, ‘Vision for 2020’), control of space assures the US ‘access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required’, with the US casting itself in a classic ‘warfighter role’. Sexing US Outer Space Discourse[:] The gendered assumptions that underlie this rhetoric are tacit but striking, and depend on two distinct, heteronormative, tropes of masculinization and feminization. First, the US’s ability to control ‘space capabilities’ depends upon assumptions of dominance and inherent superiority that revolve around the (gendered) signifier of the US’s role as ‘classic’ or ‘active warfighter’: assumptions including the need for speed and watchfulness (‘real time space surveillance’), agility and technical superiority (‘timely and responsive spacelift’), ‘enhanced protection’ (of ‘military and commercial systems’), robustness and efficient repelling capabilities (‘robust negation systems’), ‘precision force’ and ‘enhanced “sensor-to-shooter” capabilities. Just as Presidents Kennedy and Johnson summoned the spectre of an active, robust, potent American with the ‘Pilgrim and Pioneer spirit of initiative and independence’ (Kennedy, quoted in Dean 2001: 180), so George W. Bush calls to those able to show ‘daring, discipline, ingenuity, and unity in the pursuit of great goals’, the ‘risk takers’ and ‘visionaries’ of who America is so ‘proud’ (Bush 2004). Second, in establishing its (heterosexually masculine) credentials, the US’s techno-strategic discourse reconfigures all other space-able nations as subordinate, constructing a binary, heterosexual relationship of masculine hegemony/feminine subordination. Tellingly, **US Space Command cites the forging of ‘global partnerships’ as essential to protecting US national interests and investments, where such partnerships are at the behest of the US, with those that partner the US ‘warfighter’ little more than passive conduits for US ‘opportunity’ and ‘commerce’** (‘Joint Vision 2020’).

#### **Space Programs are masculine projects that normalize male and masculine bodies – women’s bodies are considered deviant and excluded**

Casper and Moore, 1995. (Monica J Caspar and Lisa Jean Moore, PhDs in Sociology from UC Berkeley. “Inscribing Bodies, Inscribing the Future: Gender, Sex, and Reproduction in Outer Space,” *Sociological Perspectives,* v 38, no 2, SPP)

Feminist studies of science and technology include theoretical and substantive work on the construction of gendered difference(s), including sexed and gendered bodies (Laqueur 1990; Terry 1990), reproductive theories (Tuana 1989), skeletons (Schiebinger 1987), sex hormones(Oudshoorn and Van Den Wijngaard 1991), and a range of other sites. In all of these examples, differences become reified through scientific representations and practices and are subsequently linked to gender(ed) inequities. We suggest that gender differences are also constructed assiduously across multiple sites in the space domain. This occurs through a process of inscription, in which genders and gendered sexualities are constructed through material and symbolic practices centered on women's bodies. Female bodies are constructed against a backdrop in which male bodies are accepted as the norm, an inscription process shaped by the masculine context of space travel. More explicitly, space travel can be interpreted as a historically masculine project in that rocket design has in some ways modeled male anatomy. Space flight, in our reading, becomes the realization of penetration and colonization fantasies about the future. This spirit of masculinity permeates almost all aspects of the space program including long-term political goals, engineering designs, assumptions about crew behavior, and life-sciences research protocols. The masculine "nature" of space flight creates an institutional and ideological framework within which women not only are excluded but also are configured as highly problematic by virtue of their gender, bodies, sexualities, and reproductive capacities. Female bodies thus become the target of a range of practices within NASA aimed at reconfiguring women to fit into the space program. Below, we point to some specific ways in which women's bodies are inscribed through discourses of sexual difference.

### Environment Link

#### Crisis-based environmental threat construction is incompatible with the alternative

Detraz, 2010. (Nicole, Assistant Professor in political science at U Memphis, “the genders of environmental security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 104-106; spp)

The environmental conflict perspective is the approach that most clearly links traditional -security concerns to the environment. Most authors who examine environmental conflict focus on the possibility that groups within society will engage in violent conflict as natural resource stocks diminish due to environmental degradation. These conflicts are understood to threaten the stability of the state. There are several broad trends that are identified as increasing the likelihood of environmentally induced conflicts, "including: expanding and migrating human populations; water, arable land and other resource and environmental scarcities; ... globalisation which brings people (and disease) into closer proximity; and increasing recognition of the injustice of Northern-induced underdevelopment of the South."6 Central to these discussions is the concept of scarcity. Thomas Homer-Dixon identifies resource scarcities as being potentially so severe that they can seriously undermine human well-being. He identifies three types of scarcities: supply-induced scarcity, demand-induced scarcity, and structural scarcity. 7 The main argument is that some types of scarcity, coupled with other factors, can contribute to violent conflict. 8 Given the similarities between the environmental conflict approach and "mainstream" security, a number of feminist criticisms of the environmental conflict approach can be read into the core feminist work in Security Studies. Specifically, feminist theories would criticize the environmental conflict approach's narrow definition of security, its state-centrism, its focus on scarcity, and its neglect of gender as a possible cause for environmental conflict. First, feminists argue that the environmental conflict approach holds an inadequate understanding of what security is. Environmental conflict scholars are focused on the potential for environmental degradation and scarcity to cause violent conflict, rather than looking at what happens to people and their environment during wars. To term something a "security" issue and then to leave important elements of insecurity untouched is problematic. Including gender means including the assessment of potential insecurities during wartime as well, given that women often face particular security risks during times of conflict. A second problematic element of the environmental conflict literature from a gendered perspective is its state-centrism. Feminists often engage in a multilevel analysis, with particular attention paid to individuals and groups within societies. Environmental conflict scholars typically restrict their attention to the level of the state, again demonstrating the close links between this approach and traditional Security Studies. 11 Feminists contend that it is necessary to pay attention to security at levels above and below the state in order to understand how women participate in and are affected by international security issues. Third, ecofeminists will take issue with the assertion of a link between environmental conflict and scarcity because they see that treatments of scarcity in this literature are largely anthropocentric, suggesting that the environment is made up of resources for human consumption. Authors like Carolyn Merchant call for the acknowledgement of a dynamic relationship between human and nonhuman nature, with each having a, degree of power over the other. 12 To use terms like "scarcity" implies that the environment is something of a stockroom of resources for humans that may become depleted, which disregards the deeper relationship between the two entities. Finally, feminists, in their concern for the gender-differential impacts of proposed cases of conflict are themselves gendered. The factors often put forward as potentially contributing to resource scarcity and conflict in environmental conflict literatures include population growth, human migration, globalization, and unequal resource distribution. Each of these topics has particular implications for gender analysis that are largely unaddressed within this literature. For example, environmental conflict scholars argue that increases in human populations can directly contribute to both supply-induced and demand-induced scarcities, which could result in violent conflict. This tells us very little if we do not consider where these populations are located and who they are made up of. Also, the issue of population has specific gendered implications. Impacts may be different if populations have “youth bulges” typically made up of young males. This group disproportionately engages in crime, commits suicide, or join militias, all of which are important security concerns. Additionally, by identifying populations increase as a contributor to environment conflict, these authors are automatically making women the potential target of “solutions” because of their role as child bearers. When issues are securitized, certain actions are seen as justifiable – and it is likely that men and women will experience these actions differently. Similar arguments can be made for a number of the other causal factors privileged in the environmental conflict approach. These instances of male/female differential impacts have implications for the security of particular individuals.

#### Environmental security fails – only the alt can solve the impacts

Detraz, 2010 (Nicole, Assistant Professor in political science at U Memphis, “the genders of environmental security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 106-107; spp)

The environmental security approach is concerned with the negative impacts of environmental degradation for human beings. While environmental conflict can still directly be linked to military security, environmental security is much more closely linked to notions of “human security.” In other words, environmental security is a broader notion than environmental conflict, because it is concerned not only with those directly susceptible to environmental conflict, but instead with all of humanity. In environmental security, the security referent is people and threat is located in negative consequences of environmental damage. Some of the main themes in this body of work include the environmental impact of accelerating globalization, concerns over population increases, the spread of disease, and the potentials for sustainable development. There is much more conceptual affinity between feminist approaches to security and the environmental security approach. Like feminist approaches, it argues for a much broader definition of security. Still, while the environmental security approach takes account of many of the complexities of the relationship between humans and their environment, it omits both the gendered nature of making that dichotomy to begin with and many of the gendered impacts of its key constitutive factors. First, the environmental security approach fails to take note of gendered content of human/nature dichotomy. A caution from ecofeminists would be the potential to de-link humans and the nonhuman environment in this approach. Merchant recognizes that humans have a degree of control over nature through human behaviors; however, nature also has the power to destroy and evolve with or without humans in many cases. She therefore calls for "an earthcare ethic, which is premised on this dynamic relationship, [and] is generated by humans, but is enacted by listening to, hearing, and responding to the voice of nature." Second, environmental security authors typically fail to recognize the gender dynamics that would transform their analyses. For example, environmental security scholars pay substantial attention to sustainable development as a way to combat environmental degradation and human insecurity simultaneously. Feminists have pointed out that many sustainable development programs have not been gender-sensitive. Since different paths to development often have survival implications for its population, a gender-sensitive approach to sustainable development that takes into account the needs of women, the ecosystem, and future generations within a particular setting appears necessary to ensure security. This means that if sustainable development or sustainability are advocated as providing security, then the specific needs of women also need to be addressed within that framework. Feminist have also expressed concern that advocates of sustainable development remain entrenched in current (gender-subordinating) social and political structures. Feminists have expressed concern that a sustainable development approach to environmental security maintains the state-centric and top-down foci of the environmental conflict approach, masking it under a broader definition of who merits security.

### Climate Tech Link

#### **The solution is the problem – deploying tech to solve a problem rooted in the unsustainability of tech is symptomatic of phallic humanism**

Jenner, 2019 (Joseph, Lecturer in Film Studies, PhD (ABD) at King’s College in London. “Gendering the Anthropocene: Female Astronauts, Failed Motherhood and the Overview Effect,” *Science Fiction Film and Television* 12.1 (2019), 103–25, spp)

*Geostorm* is a narrative of *homo faber* – man the maker. The white, male astronaut Lawson looking back at Earth from his satellite wields control over the nonhuman through his technological mastery. It is through the human’s use of tools that Anthropocene phenomena will be overcome. Theoretical innovations in geoengineering, for example, represent one strain of scientific discourse that illustrates how technology is projected to overcome these inimical Anthropocene effects. The use of solar shields to deflect heat away from the Earth’s surface, the sequestration of CO2 in underground storage containers, or the fertilisation of the ocean by scattering iron powder throughout the world’s seas represent technological solutions to global warming (Anon. n.p.). Through the technological apparatus of, for example, the industrial revolution and mass migration humans have caused the problem called the Anthropocene, and through technology these problems will be solved. Others, though, have pointed out the gendered implications of a techno- normative Anthropocene. In her 2016 book *Staying with the Trouble*, Donna J. Haraway draws attention to the patriarchal inflection of the term. For Haraway, proclamations of the Anthropocene within the scientific community, and the resolutions suggested by, for example, geoengineering, have led to efforts not to rethink politics but if anything to speed up the ‘Big thing called Globalization’ (45). The inability or unwillingness to think outside the fossil burning necessities of capitalism leads Anthropocene discourse towards ‘cynicism, defeatism, and self-certain and self-fulfilling predictions’ (56). Haraway, ultimately, sees the negative turn of the Anthropocene aligned with the patriarchal discourse of *homo faber*, ‘the story of Species Man as the agent of the Anthropocene’ as a ‘rerun of the great phallic humanizing and modernizing Adventure’ (47).

### Econ/Competitiveness Link

#### **Economic preservation strategies rely on gendered hierarchies**

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in *feminist review* 109: 49-72, spp)

This paper draws upon, and seeks to extend, existing feminist analyses of the causes, constitution and effects of financial crisis to argue that crisis, governance and austerity are best understood by interpreting the discursive reproduction of crisis governance discourses and their feminist Frankenstein creation, what this paper refers to as ‘crisis governance feminism’. Existing feminist scholarship has, at length, detailed how capitalism, in all its forms and at macro, micro, local, regional and global levels, is gendered. Feminists have contested the seductively clean and unified agenda of ‘one world’ future prosperity lovingly perpetuated by neo-liberalism and its advocates and have highlighted instead ‘the messy, contradictory and disjointed processes of global restructuring that have monopolised the politics of development in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries’ (Griffin, 2010a: 91). Feminists have analysed and campaigned on economic crises extensively, interrogating the gendered impacts of the 1980s debt crisis (see, e.g., Sen and Grown, 1987; Benería, 2003), the East Asian crisis (Truong, 1999; Ling, 2004; Floro et al., 2009; Seguino, 2009) and the Argentine crisis (Chrabolowsky, 2003; De Cicco, 2011). Feminist discussions of global finance and crisis have displayed in stark relief the gendered injustices and inequalities created and sustained by various crises, the ‘retrogression of individual capabilities’ (Fukuda- Parr et al., 2013: 24), particularly those of women, created by financial crises, the social costs to women of austerity and the organisational manipulations of gender rhetoric that reaffirm existent and unequal economic policies and power relations (see, e.g., Montgomerie and Young, 2010; Roberts and Soederberg, 2012; Fukuda- Parr et al., 2013). As feminist analyses have so convincingly argued, ignorance of the local and social constitution of global processes leads only to flawed scholarship and ignorant policy-making that further exacerbate, or even create, hierarchies and inequalities of labour, class, gender and sexual relations. For feminists, regimes of capitalist production and consumption are always gendered. The reproduction of assumptions of individualism, market economics and democracy, perpetuated by neo-liberal governance mechanisms as pre-given and beyond question, mean, in particular, that neo-liberalism and its advocates have often failed to recognise that ‘the commercialisation of everyday life and of all sectors of the economy generates social dynamics that many individuals and cultures across the globe might find repulsive’ (Benería, 2003: 73).

#### Economic competition is based in hegemonic masculinity

Elias and Beasley 09 [Elias, Juanita *associate professor in international political economy* and Beasley, Christine *professor of politics at University of Adelaide*. “Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization: “Transnational Business Masculinities” and Beyond”. *Globalizations, 6(2)*. **2009**.]

For key critical masculinity scholars **it is globalization—specifically a multinational-led neoliberal globalization—that is recognised as ‘the most obviously important’ issue in the future of the field researching masculinity.** Specifically, **this is understood in terms of ‘the relation of masculinities to those emerging dominant powers in the global capitalist economy, the transnational corporations’** (Connell et al., 2005, p. 9). Connell’s particular contribution to this field is that **globalization, in creating what has been termed a ‘world’ or ‘global gender order’, involves the re-articulation of national hegemonic masculinities into the global arena. Specifically he refers here to ‘transnational business masculinity’, which he describes as definitively taking the leading role as the emergent gendered world order,** an order **associated with the dominant institutions of the world economy and the globalization of the neo-liberal market agenda.** **The leading role of transnational business masculinity re-articulates older and more locally based bourgeois managerial hegemonic masculinities** (Connell, 2005b, pp. 84, 76-7; Connell, 2005a, p. 263; Connell and Wood, 2005). In this account **transnational business masculinity is seen to occupy the position of hegemonic masculinity on a world scale**—that is to say, a dominant form of masculinity that embodies, organizes, and legitimates men’s domination in the world gender order as a whole (Connell, 2000, p. 46). This notion of hegemonic masculinity is, however, understood as embodying more that just a Gramscian-style mechanism for gaining consent. Rather, the political legitimating meaning of hegemonic masculinity quickly slides towards its meaning as the ‘dominant’ masculinity and how an actual group of men ‘embodies’ this dominant positioning, including how this group exhibits particular personality traits. Connell asserts that ‘**world politics is now more and more organized around the needs of transnational capital’, placing ‘strategic power in the hands of particular groups of men—managers and entrepreneurs’—who self-consciously manage their bodies and emotions as well as money, and are increasingly detached from older loyalties to nation, business organisation, family and marital partners** (Connell, 2005a, p. xxiii; Connell and Wood, 2005, p. 359). Drawing upon Connell’s work the sociologist **Joan Acker endorses this view that hegemonic masculinities are embodied in the specific characteristics of multinational business-men suggesting that we think of ‘Rupert Murdoch, Phil Knight or Bill Gates’. Adding ‘[t]his masculinity is supported and reinforced by the ethos of the free-market, competition and a “win or die” environment. This is the masculine image of those who organize and lead the drive to global control and the opening of markets to international competition’** (Acker 2004, p. 29). **These men are**, in Connell’s account, **dispositionally highly atomistic—competitive and largely distanced from social or personal commitments. They embody a neo-liberal version of an emphasized traditional masculinity, without any requirement to direct bodily strength** (Connell, 2005a, pp. xxiii, 255-6; Connell, 2005b, p. 77).

## AT --

### AT: Link of Omission

#### **The body is not passively omitted in IR, it’s a structural disavowal that is a necessary precondition for neo-imperial control**

Wilcox 15 – (Lauren, prof of gender studies @ Cambridge, *Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations*, pp. 41)

Some of the most profound contributions to interrogating bodies as an absent presence in IR have come from feminists who perceive the lack of attention to bodies and embodiment as a sign of the devaluing of the feminine: while IR attempts to provide abstract forms of knowledge in order to provide a measure of control or management of international violence, it disengages with the bodily nature of war. Feminists have tried to correct theories of violence and war that work to obscure the reality of bodily violence while focusing on political, strategic, and tactical maneuverings. No one has demonstrated how strategic thought in IR ignores and, in fact, necessarily obscures the gruesome realities of war and its impact on the human body more powerfully than Carol Cohn.¶ Cohn’s work is a valuable deconstruction of the abstract discourses of war and violence that are so prevalent in IR. In her landmark essay, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals” (1987), Carol (p.41) Cohn insists that this neglect of bodily harm is not an oversight, but rather is a pre-condition for the existence of the theory and the strategic apparatus underpinning it. The language of the nuclear defense specialists in her participant-observation not only euphemized the violent potential of nuclear weapons in terms of “collateral damage,” “clean bombs,” and assorted acronyms, but served to limit what could be thought and said. In the discourse of nuclear strategists, human suffering and death were invisible; rather, the survival of the weapons themselves was the focus. “Technostrategic” discourse has no room for imagining oneself as vulnerable to violence. Cohn’s work is an example of feminist theorizing about violence: violence in its bodily, all-too-real manifestation cannot be seen in certain types of theorizing about international war and security. Not only is bodily violence invisible, but it is necessarily invisible if such theorizing is to proceed. Cohn does more than expose the erasure of injured and destroyed bodies in discourses of nuclear strategy. Her work is a powerful explanation of how such bodies come to be erased in the practices of nuclear strategy, and how this erasure makes it possible for the field of nuclear strategy to function as it does.¶

### AT: Link Turn

#### **The AFF’s pragmatic reform cannot disrupt the structural patriarchal ordering – the link outweighs the turn**

Howell, 2018 (Alison, PhD in PoliSci@YorkUniversity, AsstProfPoliSci@Rutgers, Forget “militarization”: race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Volume 20, Issue 2) BW

Feminist praxis can benefit from questioning the concept of “militarization” so as to more fully excavate the violence of liberal order. In particular, the methodological primacy of examining “women’s lives” (or militarized masculinities) risks subsuming analyses of race, Indigeneity, disability and coloniality under gender. The result is an incomplete accounting of the ways in which war-like relations and systems that are “of war” are symbiotically and thoroughly part of liberal order, and not an exceptional aberration from it. To capture these dynamics, I have proposed an alternate concept, “martial politics,” which seeks to illuminate the histories of our present imbrication with war – a move made possible by shifting to an analysis that foregrounds historical relations of race, Indigeneity and disability alongside sexuality and gender. Yet what is at stake here is not only feminist methodology and theory, but also our activism. So, what of expediency? Do we lose too much if we can no longer demand demilitarization? In the 1980s when sex-negative radical feminists engaged in anti-porn activism, they found themselves with strange bed- fellows in the Christian right. This should have served as ample evidence that it was time to reconsider their perspective, and it is a lesson for the present day. Feminist scholars and activists should be similarly concerned that the concept of “militarization” is popular amongst small-state, right-wing libertarians associated, for example, with the Cato Institute (see Balko 2013). With this lesson in mind, I argue the concept of (de)militarization guides us in asking for too little of the wrong things. From the perspective of “demilitarization,” Obama’s 2015 cancellation of the federal government program of granting local police forces military equipment seems like a significant victory, but to be satisfied with this fails to address how policing imposes order through laws that criminalize Blackness, Indigeneity, disability and gender deviance or queerness. We must demand more. By recognizing that we are steeped in martial forms of politics, feminist anti-war praxis could work not (just) towards demilitarization; it could also more consistently align with anti-racist and disability organizing for prison abolition and deinstitutionalization by recognizing these institutions as central to “martial politics” – that is, because they are war-like and “of war.” This kind of resistance is already robust, not only in Black Lives Matter and prison abolition activism in relation to policing, but also in relation to the colonial foundations of universities. Recent student movements from South Africa to the UK, from India to the US and beyond, have been calling into question the Whiteness of universities and their founding in, and continuing celebration of, (settler) colonialism. For instance, students have contested the continued celebration of brutal colonist Cecil Rhodes on the University of Cape Town and Oxford University’s campuses, and slave owner Isaac Royall Jr.’s family crest at Harvard, tying these histories into contemporary racial inequalities in admissions and campus life. They have demonstrated that diversity is insufficient, and that the university must be decolonized. Similarly, disability and anti-racist student activists have drawn attention to the continued legacies of eugenics in universities. If we are to understand the martial politics of the university, the police, or of any other institution, we would do well to pay attention to this activism. The concept of “militarization” is, at this point, an easy out. In a time when academics are under increasing pressure to produce articles and books at breakneck speed, it may seem expedient to apply the framework of “militarization,” especially when the concept is reduced to the surface analysis of military aesthetics in so-called civilian life. The careful historical work for which I am calling in order to specify expressions of “martial politics” is not fast or easy, but what is at stake is too important. If we are to grapple with the violence of liberal orders in a more robust way, if we are to attend not only to the gendered dynamics of military power but also to race, ableism, (settler) colonialism and other forms of injustice, we need to do better and do more.

#### **Short-term solutions to avoid war foreclose critical analysis of underlying systemic causes.**

Pankhurst 3 (Donna-, May 1, Development in Practice, “The 'sex war' and other wars: towards a feminist approach to peace building”, Vol. 13 # 2&3, Infomaworld)

Turning to the meanings of the term ‘peace’, Galtung’s (1985) conception of negative peace has come into widespread use, and is probably the most common meaning given to the word, i.e. the end or absence of widespread violent conflict associated with war. A ‘peaceful’ society in this sense may therefore include a society in which social violence (against women, for instance) and/or structural violence (in situations of extreme inequality, for example) are prevalent. Moreover, this limited ‘peace goal’, of an absence of specific forms of violence associated with war, can and often does lead to a strategy in which all other goals become secondary. The absence of analysis of the deeper (social) causes of violence also paves the way for peace agreements that leave major causes of violent conflict completely unresolved. Negative peace may therefore be achieved by accepting a worse state of affairs than that which motivated the outburst of violence in the first place, for the sake of (perhaps short-term) ending organised violence. Galtung’s alternative vision, that of positive peace, requires not only that all types of violence be minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. In other words, major conflicts of interest, as well as their violent manifestation, need to be resolved. Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how society should be, but the details of such a vision often remain implicit, and are rarely discussed. Some ideal characteristics of a society experiencing positive peace would include: an active and egalitarian civil society; inclusive democratic political structures and processes; and open and accountable government. Working towards these objectives opens up the field of peace building far more widely, to include the promotion and encouragement of new forms of citizenship and political participation to develop active democracies. It also opens up the fundamental question of how an economy is to be managed, with what kind of state intervention, and in whose interests. But more often than not discussion of these important issues tends to be closed off, for the sake of ‘ending the violence’, **leaving major causes of violence and war unresolved—including not only economic inequalities, but also major social divisions and the social celebration of violent masculinities.**

#### Turn - Hegemonic masculinity discourages defensive strategies – the plan begets new offensive strategies to protect against new potentialities for war

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 70-71- spp).

Conceptions of gender that are concerned with symbolic structure of gender, rather than the appropriate roles of men and women, argue that ‘offense’ has been gendered masculine, while ''defense" has been gendered feminine. This is due to the associations of "the offensive" with activity, aggression, strength, and boldness (concepts considered masculine in Western culture) as well as the association of "defensive" with passivity, weakness, and victimhood (considered feminine). "Offensive" strategies are preferred because of the association with positive, masculine attributes, while defensive strategies are considered "wimpy" and unmanly. Carol Cohn describes the importance of "the wimp factor" in her experiences at working with defense intellectuals in the 1980s. When certain strategic actions such as withdrawal from territory, are interpreted as "wimpy," no matter how' "rational," they are delegitimized. Playing a simulated war game with a group of defense intellectuals, Cohn's team "lost" by withdrawing troops from some areas and refusing to retaliate from a nuclear strike, even though her "homeland" and its civilian population had remained safe. Such actions become "unthinkable" in the discourse of international security even though they may be strategically beneficial and consistent with other value systems. In this way, aggression and "offense" in the international arena are legitimized through gendered discourses. Gender as a discourse defines the boundaries of acceptable options and serves as a "preemptive deterrent" to certain strategic options. Gender thus constitutes offense/defense by assigning values more value to the offensive posture than the defensive posture. This is one way in which feminists would attempt to explain the puzzle of why decision-makers have the propensity to overestimate the strategic advantages of the offensive; there is a heavy "gender deterrent" against the passive, weak, "defensive" position, even if, as military balance theorists allow, the defense usually has the objective advantage in war, and disasters like World War I can occur if the balance is misinterpreted. The militarization that is linked to offensive policies is closely connected to nationalism. The literature on offense-defense balance indicates that nationalism can affect the balance by making people more willing to fight. Nationalism is also a source of militarism and offensive strategies, as it usually entails perception by elites and military planners that conquest will be easier because of the superiority of their own soldiers. Van Evera lists nationalism as a mechanism through which the cult of the offensive can be developed, but does not explore how it is possible for nationalistic sentiment to be shaped in the direction of favoring the offensive. Though offense-defense theorists note that belligerents tend to attribute a more coherent, grand and evil scheme to their enemies than is often the case, to believe that their adversaries are more unified than is the case, and to assume that opponents' policy inconsistency is a result of duplicity or treachery rather than confusion, they do not provide a way for scholars to understand these consistent misperceptions as a matter of the gendered practices of identity and nationalism. Feminist analyses would argue that nationalism and militarism are constituted by gender discourses in both the processes of "othering" other nations as well as in the presentation of national identity and chauvinism that exist by promoting particular ideologies about gender roles.

### AT: “We talk about women”

#### Talking about women isn’t the same as confronting structural gender violence

Collins 00 (Patricia Hill, Charles PHelps Taft PRofessor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of African-American STudies at the University of Cincinnati, Gender, Black Feminism, and Black Political Economy,"Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 568, The Study of African American Problems: W. E. B. Du Bois's Agenda, Then and Now (Mar., 2000), pp. 41-53))

Despite this important contribu- tion, one might ask, What about gen- der? On the one hand, it can be argued that Du Bois's work contains an incipient gender analysis (Gilkes 1996). Du Bois actually talked of African American women during a time when Black women were treated as objects of knowledge (Col- lins 1998a, 95-123). Some of his work does center on African American women and indicates his awareness of the distinctive experiences that characterized Black women's lives. For Du Bois, Black women carried a special burden-not only were they Black, poor, and second-class citi- zens, but they were female as well. Du Bois identified Black women's suffering as a "social fact that pro- vided an important and distinct angle of vision," and for Du Bois, three great revolutions were at work: those involving "women, labor, and black folk. In various writings, he observed that black women embod- ied all three of these revolutions in their historical roles in the family, the community, and the labor force" (Gilkes 1996, 112). Du Bois may have acknowledged African American women's central- ity within these three revolutions, but this does not mean that he afforded gender the same analytical importance as race and class in explaining them. For Du Bois, race and class constituted important sys- tems of power that explained Black political economy, yet gender far too often remained a personal identity category that described Black women's special circumstances in dealing with the more fundamental (and thereby more important) oppressions of race, class, and nation. As a result, Du Bois could be simultaneously progressive yet paternalistic-his intersectional analyses of race, class, and nation coupled with his recognition of Black women's special situation distanced him from avowedly sexist approaches yet did little to challenge masculine authority. His stance on gender was better than most but not as good as it could have been. This raises the question of whether interpretations of gender were available to Du Bois that afforded gender theoretical sig- nificance comparable to that afforded to race, class, and nation. Joy James (1996) argues that not only did such perspectives exist but that Du Bois ignored them. Thus, one can argue that Du Bois did have access to what we now call Black feminist analyses that view Black women's experiences as honed at the intersection of race, class, nation, and gender but that he rejected them. James suggests, for example, that Du Bois was familiar with the ideas of both Anna Julia Cooper and Ida B. Wells-Barnett, two prominent turn- of-the-century Black feminist think- ers. Both women used gendered analyses to explain important social issues. For example, Cooper'sA Voice from the South contends that only when Black women got their rights would African Americans as a collec- tivity be empowered (Cooper 1892). Similarly, Ida B. Wells-Barnett's analysis of lynching and institution- alized rape points to the significance of gender in explaining patterns of sexual violence confronting U.S. Black men and women (Wells- Barnett 1995). Neither Cooper nor Wells-Barnett elevated gender above other factors, but both clearly identi- fied its importance both for Black women and as a fundamental princi- ple of African American social organization. Why Du Bois failed to make use of these paradigms is a matter of specu- lation, but that he did not grant gen- der the same theoretical weight as that placed on race, class, and nation seems fairly straightforward. This has been a loss, because Du Bois did not incorporate into the corpus of his work two distinctive and important elements of U.S. Black feminism drawn upon by Gilkes and James, respectively, in their analyses of Du Bois. When read together, Gilkes and James identify two dimensions of Black feminist standpoint epistemol- ogy that might inform a gendered analysis of Black political economy.1

# IMPACTS

### 2NC/1NR Impact Ext – Protection Racket

#### Protection Racket outweighs and turns the Aff: Their framework of employing NATO and the USFG to secure against existential threats ensures catastrophic impacts and ongoing structural violence. Extend Peet and Sjoberg 2020 – Masculine protection requires the constant evolution of militarization. The impact outweighs on magnitude because militarism accounts for so much structural violence it constitutes ongoing war. Wars become self-fulfilling because capabilities are built to fight wars, turning the case. And these discourses and policies lock in gendered hierarchies that make gender violence impossible to solve.

#### **Structural Patriarchy and the Protection Racket**

#### **Impact – Structural Patriarchy guarantees war – we must refuse to buy into Hegemonic Masculinity and the Protection Racket, because it will always find a threat to justify enlarging and improving the military industrial complex**

Padmi, 2021 (Made Fitri Maya Padmi, IR Scholar, Lecturer at University Jakarta, Master of Science focused in International Security Studies from University of Bristol. “Redifining Gender Role During Wartime: Power Relations, Disparities and Impacts,” *Global Insight Journal* v. 6 no. 1, <http://journal.uta45jakarta.ac.id/index.php/GIJ/article/view/4438>; spp)

War and conflict have been the main features of international relations study. History is full of heroic stories of men fighting for their nations’ security and dignity. In Ancient Greek mythology, for example, Homer through his poems told of the Trojan War, which was triggered by the abduction of Helen from Greece by the Trojan prince Paris. Helen’s enraged husband Agamemnon, King of Sparta, commanded the greatest warriors in Greece to wage war against Troy in the name of the nation’s pride. Thus, almost immediately, the aims of the war expanded well beyond Helen’s return. Its justifications became about restoring the honour of a nation and illustrating the bravery of his soldiers and his military power. Realism and neorealism approaches have dominated international security studies for decades. The core assumption of these approaches is states’ relations in anarchic realm. As a critique to these perspectives feminism has emerged to question the realist/neorealist concepts of power, rationality, and patriotism which are used often in security studies. Thus, both state and international systems are inclined to the characteristics of masculinity. Feminists have criticised the approach taken by Realist and Neo-Realist about state and international system which they consider gender-biased or tending to privilege one particular gender only. Feminists have tried to provide wider perspective in international security studies by adding gender characteristics into security phenomena, including war. This approach is not only about advocating women or adding women into a male-construction, but giving multiple gender-based perspectives to international security studies. Understanding gender is not simply based on the biological sex attached to every single human being. Gender is a socially constructed symbol given to describe the social characteristics of ‘male’ or ‘female’. While masculinity emphasises rationality, bravery, toughness, aggressiveness, and independence, femininity is associated with being irrational, interdependent, emotional, nurturing, vulnerable, and gentle. Elsthain (1987) described this polarisation between the sexes in the following terms: ‘Women are excluded from war talk and men excluded from baby talk’. Many approaches are used to explain the cause, conduct, and consequence of war; one of them is a gender approach. Considering again the Trojan War, a gender perspective allows for wider analysis of how masculinity and femininity play significant roles in the war. The abduction of a wife could be seen as a disgrace to the values of manhood. Using military capability to show the power of nation is the identic notion to prove masculinity which is thought to be tough, aggressive and confrontational. Meanwhile Helen, the woman caught in this war, was left and is seen as either the cause of war or the victim of war. Across time and culture, war and military attributes have been associated with masculinity. In social and political life, men are in the top position of the social hierarchy, and their position grants them the authority to become political decision makers. As stated by Dawson (1996, cited in Kennedy, 2007, p.119) in ancient Greece, some form of military training was regarded as a prerequisite to manhood. In the other words, if a man did not attend or even failed in military training, he would be classified as a ‘woman’ to highlight his weakness. Regarding the assumption of women’s weaknesses and vulnerability, women are usually made the victims of war; even when there is involvement of women soldiers, their participation remains invisible. Throughout history during wartime, women often experience sexual violence in the forms of rape, prostitution, and forced marriage. This paper argues that war is not a ‘gender-neutral’ phenomenon. Gender perspective plays a significant role not only in shaping and executing warfare, but also in giving the specific impact of war. Whitworth (2008) argued that ‘gender-neutral’ analyses of armed conflict regularly do not focus on people at all—conflict is conducted between states or armed groups, the specific impact on people’s lives is a marginal concern and instead the focus of analysis is on territory and resource gained (or lost) and the outcome (in terms of winners and losers) of battles and war. Through gender lenses, this paper tries to make correlation between war and people and endeavours to analyse the role of gender perspectives during wartime. The first part of paper describes how masculinity shapes state behaviour regarding the use of violence and war, as well as masculinity’s role in militarisation. Second, it describes the evolution of women’s involvement in conflicts, such as women as victims of war, as combatants, and peace-makers. Third, this paper discusses the use of gender categorisation in international humanitarian law which attempts to give more protection to women during times of conflict. Masculinity, Militarism and War In many cultures in the world, people determine social roles based on gender disparities. In social constructions, gender is used to differentiate roles, responsibilities, rights, abilities and limitations between men and women. Patriarchal systems can be seen as sets of social rules or norms based on maleness, where man is placed at the head of the family and is a property owner, protector, and decision maker. As Lauren Wilcox (2007, cited in Sjoberg. 2010, p.3) explains, ‘Gender symbolism describes the way in which masculine/feminine are assigned to various dichotomies that organize Western thought’ where ‘both men and women tend to place a higher value on the term which is associated with masculinity’. This vertical power relation creates a social hierarchy based on masculine and feminine characteristics, and many feminists refer to this as Hegemonic Masculinity. Women are portrayed as caring, nurturing, emotional, interdependent, and vulnerable; therefore, they are assigned to roles in domestic labour, nurturing children, and are considered objects of protection. On the other hand, men are seen as and expected to be rational, independent, tough, physically strong, and aggressive figures. The assumed roles of men are those of leaders, decision makers, and protectors of families and society.

#### Chivalric IR makes competitive militarism inevitable – they cannot reduce the probability of great power war within their framework

Sjoberg, 2010. (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 93-95 - spp)

International system patriarchy, great state equality, and the risk of war: PTT has found empirical support for the prediction that war is more likely surrounding a power transition between two great states, and most likely when their capabilities are equally distributed. 110 A feminist approach suggests that states' resistance to equality comes from the patriarchal nature of the international system. In such a forum, the dominant masculinity wins by exposing the latent femininity in subordinate masculinities. In a system that values superiority and patriarchy, or a "war system," 111 violence is the norm and not the exception. The argument that international system patriarchy is a permissive and instigative cause of great power war is difficult to test because the international system has always been patriarchal. The hypothesis predicts the same result as power transition analysis. Still, the two theories' predictions can be distinguished in times when the challenger does not start a war with the hegemon. The feminist hypothesis places primary emphasis on states' jockeying for position in a hierarchical system. Since jockeying for position can occur without military conflict, the feminist hypothesis expects gendered competition between great powers even when they do not go to war. 112 The Cold War gives a good example of the distinction made above. It has been said that PTT could not predict the occurrence of the Cold War.113 PTT would have expected the Soviet Union, approaching equality with the US in the 1950s or 1960s, to start a war in order to reorganize the international system in its interests. The feminist reformulation (R3) suggests that the US and the Soviet Union would compete for the coveted position of apparent (masculine) dominance regardless of the organization of the international system or whether a war occurs. Anecdotal evidence for such a supposition can be found in Carol Cohn’s reports that a “well-known academic security adviser was quoted as saying that ‘under Jimmy Carter the United States is spreading its legs for the Soviet Union’” or in John F. Kennedy’s campaigns for office “promising to halt America’s decline into flabbiness and impotence against the threat of a ‘ruthless’ and expanding Soviet empire.” Cynthia Enloe links this competition not to immediate dissatisfaction with the international system, but instead to “the inherent nature of states… [and] the masculine character of the state elite” competing in a patriarchal international system. Additional evidence that the feminist explanations are more likely comes from how great states come into conflict when they do. The PTT scenario is one where the challenger’s dissatisfaction come from the international system being shaped by the hegemon against the interest of the challenger. The challenger, then, starts a conflict rationally in order to reshape the international system. A war caused by challenger dissatisfaction, then, should be anticipated, started rationally, and fought for goals stated in terms of advancement of national interests in the international system. The scenario that (R3) suggests, however, pictures very different genesis of conflict. The conflict brought about by position-jockeying in a patriarchal system could begin with a series of mistakes of miscommunications. It could be triggered by some insult to the nation’s status, capabilities, or masculinity. An example of such a scenario can be found in the genesis of World War I, which has been described as an accidental war which resulted from competitive national pride and (individual and state) jockeying for position in a hierarchy defined by hegemonic masculinity. Feminist scholars have also noted the relationship between the competition in the Spanish-American War and “US and European male codes of honour” including state “competitiveness, independence, and persistence.” These examples suggest the plausibility of the feminist supposition that the patriarchal atmosphere of the international system could have something to do with why states fight wars when the reach relative power parity. If (R3) is correct, then it is possible to envision great state equality without war in a non-patriarchal international system. In a system that values care and empathy, actors would be interested in the collective security of the world’s citizens. Such a system would prioritize understanding, communication, and community. A feminist perspective might imagine challenging great powers to engage in empathetic cooperation, and suggest that major powers take unilateral steps to transgress the cycle of violence in international politics. Each power would engage in purposive compromise of values and interests in order to create peace between them. In PTT's scenario of potential conflict between the US and China, then, the US should not fear a dissatisfied China or attempt co-option. Instead, it should attempt to understand the interests, values, and needs of those challengers. If challengers took a similar approach, they would not have to choose between unattainable satisfaction and perpetual dissatisfaction. Along these lines, feminists suggest that the US should include China in deliberative dialogues, treat the Chinese government and people with empathy and understanding, and show China and other potential challengers by example that the strong can defy international system patriarchy unilaterally and stop the cycle of violence. Feminists have argued that inclusive understanding is key to peaceful coexistence. Spike Peterson clarifies that "feminists argue that the domination of women, nature, and all who are constructed as 'other' is not a matter of 'essential,' atemporal qualities but of socially constructed, historically contingent." 122 In other words, the voices of marginalization could serve as a bridge between hostile and masculinized states. In these terms, a dialogue which promoted understanding between the US and China (and their differentiated citizens) would go a long way towards decreasing the potential for conflict between the two great states.

### Turns Case - China War

#### Gendered posturing is a stronger internal link to US/China war than the plan

Sjoberg, 2010. (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 95-97 - spp)

Analyzing the Chinese “overtaking” through gendered lenses: These feminist reformulations of PTT’s key hypotheses provide both alternative understandings of the potential for conflict between the US and China and alternative futures. PTT suggests that the question of whether or not that rising will cause conflict between the two states depends on China's satisfaction or dissatisfaction as it approaches parity with the US. A feminist approach suggests that a good deal of the possibility for conflict between the US and China might be explained by gender-related variables. The patriarchal nature of the international system provides an incentive for the US to attempt to maintain dominance. Such a system also gives China a motivation to seek not parity but supremacy. In addition, the cultural salience of masculinity in each society is manifested in each state's desire to compete with the other. This alternative explanation for the potential competition between the US and China suggests alternative solutions. Realists like Mearsheimer suggest a combined strategy of economic containment and military presence, and power transition theorists suggest attempts to co-opt China into satisfaction with the existing order. Some International Relations scholars outside of the realist paradigm have suggested strategies like GRIT (graduated reciprocation of tension reduction) in order to establish trust between the US and China. If gendered competition and international system patriarchy underlie the competition between the two states, however, none of these strategies will be successful. Mearsheimer's containment strategy will incite more competition; power transition theorists' co-optation strategy is misdirected since dissatisfaction is endemic and would not be China's main motive for making war; and trust-building solutions without the deconstruction of the masculine competition for superiority would just be read as weakness. Seeing gender-as-power both helps explain the potential for conflict between the US and China and provides a theoretical and practical alternative to that competition in recasting the genderings of the state and the international system. Some feminists prescribe the strong need to unilaterally deconstruct the cycle of violence and masculinized competition between great powers in the international arena. States would need to recognize conflict’s basis in competition, posturing, and subordination under patriarchy and deconstruct *that* in order to head off violence. Feminist theorists suggest that the US and China could come to terms with the gendered nature of their competition by dealing with each other in empathy and in dialogue to try to find a deeper sense of understanding if not common ground. The path to an empathetic reconstruction of the relationship between the US and China could begin with the rejection of PTT's claim that hegemonic domination is empirically and normatively valuable. Domination and the resulting subordination, at the international level as well as at the personal level, are normatively problematic. Therefore, even if hegemonic dominance did decrease great power warfare, a feminist approach asks if that would be a sort of peace that the international arena would truly thrive under. Feminist work has consistently read more content into "peace" than the cessation of great power hot wars. As discussed above, a feminist approach to the rise of China recognizes the contingencies of the entities of the US and China and the limits of focusing on those two states where "others" outnumber them several times over and where their competition makes people within their borders insecure even as the state becomes more secure. A feminist perspective therefore suggests that the US and China (along with. other actors traditionally marginalized in global politics) engage in dialogue about what a peaceful and just international system might be, and that the US begin to reshape the international arena not to co-opt China but to decrease the pressure of consolidated power in the international arena on those least powerful against it. In doing so, the US and China would need to come to understand themselves and each other as imperfect, non-omnipotent, gendered actors in an imperfect, gendered world-without more right to decide than anyone else simply because they have more power-over. If the gendered concept of power-over was replaced both in theory and in practice with a more inclusive understanding of power including power-to and power-with, different resources could be drawn upon both in the comparative measuring of state power and in redressing the consequences of international hierarchy and subordination at the political margins. A feminist engagement with PTT suggests that great states, small states, and non-states look for places in the complicated scaffolding of international power where non-zero sum, anti-systemic, and even emancipatory uses of power could benefit those at the margins of global politics. Employing a feminist understanding of security could lead the way to creative solutions of resistance and empowerment in the face of a competitive and hierarchical international system. Feminist complex and multilayered understandings of power could not only provide explanatory leverage for great power conflicts, but also for conflicts that defy the logic of PTT. Conclusion: Feminist theory critiques of PTT's concept of power, its focus on great states, and its omission of gender-based variables inspire reformulations of the hypotheses of the power transition research program which provide alternative accounts of the empirical phenomena that that power transition theorists observe and normative critiques of the exclusionary nature of their original critiques. By suggesting alternative causal mechanisms and constitutive factors, a feminist reinterpretation of PTT presents a unique explanation of great power conflict alongside a convincing case that these conflicts should not be the exclusive focus of international security analyses. With its alternative explanatory framework, a feminist approach suggests both that conflict between the US and China is not inevitable and that, if it comes, it will be on different terms and for different reasons than suggested by PTT. As such, a feminist approach to the Chinese “overtaking” of the US both produces a new set of policy recommendations and envisions alternative futures – making a distinct contribution not only to the power transition research program but to international security theory as a whole.

### Turns Case - Security

#### Hegemonic IR makes the aff impact self-fulfilling prophecy – its try or die for the alt

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 77-78 (SPP).

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] **erases the distinction between** **security and expansion**," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes. Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

### Turns Case- Nuclear War

#### The AFFs utilitarian justifications for expanding international protection apparatuses like the US military and NATO make them complicit with mass gendered violence in the name of harm reduction – and makes the aff impact inevitable

Acheson, 2018 ("Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will. She provides analysis, research, and advocacy across a range of disarmament and arms control issues. Ray leads WILPF’s work on stigmatising war and violence, including by campaigning for a nuclear weapon ban treaty and challenging the arms trade and the use of explosive weapons and armed drones. Ray is also on the Board of Directors of the Los Alamos Study Group and represents WILPF on several coalition steering groups, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). She has an Honours BA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Toronto and an MA in Politics from The New School for Social Research. A feminist critique of the atomic bomb," Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, October 2018, <https://www.boell.de/en/2018/10/12/feminist-critique-atomic-bomb> //EH)

Feminist scholar Carol Cohn wrote a story about her experience working with nuclear war strategists in the 1980s. In this story, a white male physicist, working on modelling nuclear counterforce attacks, exclaims to a group of other white male physicists about the cavalier way they are talking about civilian casualties. “Only thirty million!” he bursts out. “Only thirty million human beings killed instantly?” The room went silent. He felt ashamed. This is an important story about nuclear weapons—or rather, about the ways in which those who think they benefit from nuclear weapons maintain their dominance over how we think and talk about these weapons. We are supposed to think about nuclear weapons as “deterrents”. Their advocates argue that the mere possession of nuclear weapons deters and prevents conflict. In the right hands, they are good for humanity, the argument goes. Nuclear weapons are to be talked about in the abstract, as magical tools that keep us safe and main stability in the world. “War is peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength.” So goes the slogan of The Party in George Orwell’s novel 1984. Weapons prevent war. So goes the “realist” discourse about nuclear weapons. But, when it comes to nuclear weapons, who is really being unrealistic? Those who assume that we can exist in this world, with all its tensions and conflicts and fears and instabilities, and not see the use of nuclear weapons? Those who believe that a theory called “nuclear deterrence,” cooked up by nuclear war strategists, is infallible? Or is it those of us who are see the inherent dangers in the atomic bomb and seek its abolition? Who believe that security cannot credibly be based on threatening to commit genocide, or to destroy the entire world? If we are willing to admit there may be some flaws in the discourse of deterrence, we should ask how has it survived and thrived? How has it usurped and held onto the mantle of “realism” for so long? A feminist analysis is very useful to answer this question. It can help us understand how nuclear weapons are a patriarchal tool, and how it benefits the patriarchy to advocate for their continued existence in the arsenals of a select few governments. The patriarchy is a social order dominated by men—in particular, men performing a certain brand of militarised masculinity that associates weapons and war with power. This form of masculinity influences the possession, proliferation, and use of everything from nuclear weapons to small arms. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”. This type of violent, militarised masculinity harms everyone. It harms everyone who does not perform that gender norm—women, LGBTQIA-identified people, non-normative men. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It results in domestic violence. It results in violence against women. It results in violence against gay and trans people. But this kind of masculinity also means violence against other men performing violent masculinities. Men mostly kill each other, inside and outside of conflict. Violent masculinities make male bodies more expendable. Women and children, obnoxiously lumped together in countless UN resolutions and media reports, are more likely be deemed “innocent civilians,” while men are more likely be to be considered militants or combatants. Often, in conflict, civilian men are targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age. But militarised masculinity is not just about death. It is also a major impediment to disarmament, peace, and gender equality. It makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd. The concept of nuclear deterrence is a product of the patriarchy**.** It is designed to justify outrageous behaviour by those with power and privilege—the behaviour of spending billions of dollars on weapons that risk the world’s total destruction—in order to maintain that power and privilege. And those espousing this theory have managed to maintain their dominance over the nuclear weapon debate by employing the tools of the patriarchy, such as gaslighting and victim blaming. The term gaslighting comes from a play written in 1938, in which a woman’s husband slowly manipulates her into believing she is going insane. We can see the technique employed broadly in politics, particularly right now in the United States over issues of economic injustice, racism, and sexual violence. It is the denial of the lived reality of marginalised populations; the assertion that, “there is nothing to see here, everything is fine.” “MY BUTTON IS BIGGER THAN YOURS” A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE NUCLEAR BOMB Gaslighting in the realm of nuclear weapons has been practiced since the beginning of the atomic age. The discourse of deterrence denies the lived reality of those who have experienced the intergenerational harms of nuclear weapons use and testing. It makes it a thoughtcrime, à la 1984, to consider the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. One of the ways it does this is to “feminise” anyone who tries to raise these issues. That physicist in Carol Cohn’s story confessed to her, after his outburst to the room of other male physicists, “Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.” The association of caring about the murder of thirty million people with “being a woman” is all about seeing women as being weak. Being a woman means caring about wrong things; letting your “emotions” get the better of you; focusing on human beings when you should be focused on “strategy”. This means that caring about the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons is feminine. It is not relevant to the job that “real men” have to do to “protect” their countries. It not only suggests that caring about the use of nuclear weapons is spineless and silly, but also makes the pursuit of disarmament seem to be an unrealistic, irrational objective. This is not just an issue of the 1980s. This happens now.

### Impact – Nuclear War

#### Masculine posturing makes nuclear war more likely

**Betty A. Reardon**, **Director of the** Peace Education Program at **Teacher’s College** Columbia **University,** 19**93, Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security, p. 30-2**

In an article entitled “Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us toward War” (1983), Charlene Spretnak focused on some of the fundamental cultural factors that deeply influence ways of thinking about security. She argues that patriarchy encourages militarist tendencies. Since a major war now could easily bring on massive annihilation of almost unthinkable proportions, why are discussions in our national forums addressing the madness of the nuclear arms race limited to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive analysis is badly needed . . . A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay—all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are *also* a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used. (Spretnak 1983) These cultural tendencies have produced our current crisis of a highly militarized, violent world that in spite of the decline of the cold war and the slowing of the military race between the superpowers is still staring into the abyss of nuclear disaster, as described by a leading feminist in an address to the Community Aid Abroad State Convention, Melbourne, Australia: These then are the outward signs of militarism across the world today: weapons-building and trading in them; spheres of influence derived from their supply; intervention—both overt and covert; torture; training of military personnel, and supply of hardware to, and training of police; the positioning of military bases on foreign soil; the despoilation of the planet; ‘intelligence’ networks; the rise in the number of national security states; more and more countries coming under direct military rule; 13 the militarization of diplomacy, and the interlocking and the international nature of the military order which even defines the major rifts in world politics. (Shelly 1983)

### Impact – Interstate War

#### **Hegemonic masculinity makes interstate conflict inevitable**

Sjoberg 13 (Laura, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), online book, CMR)

Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

### Impact – Militarism/Ongoing War

#### Gendered discourses create militarism and ongoing wars

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 77-78, SPP)

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modem great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] **erases the distinction between** **security and expansion**," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes. Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

### Impact – Gendered Hierarchies

Protection Racket locks in hierarchies that keep women subordinated – leads to serial policy failure and exclusion from society and politics

Acheson, 2015 (Ray, Director of “Reaching Critical Will,” an organization that provides analysis, research, and advocacy across a range of disarmament issues from an antimilitarist feminist perspective, and has testified at international forums including UN assemblies. “Women, weapons, and war”, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Publication_Women-weapons-and-war.pdf> E.G.

Upholding ideas of women only as weak and in need of protection is an efficient way to enable their continued exclusion from authoritative social and political roles, which also weakens the potential effectiveness of those processes. The constant reproduction of these norms have concrete effects on how women are positioned in society, and as such undermine the promotion of women’s “full and effective” participation advanced in the BMS5 outcome document. BMS5 commits states to promote the role of women in preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in SALW, including through access to training, as well as through their meaningful participation and representation in policymaking, planning, and implementation processes related to SALW. In contradiction to this commitment, the participation of women is not included in either the ATT or the UNPoA. In both instruments, women are treated as victims and grouped with children. States and civil society groups alike sometimes seem to alternate their framing of women as agents and subjects depending on forum, audience, or political change being sought. This has serious implications for actual policy design and implementation. It also affects the quality of women’s participation in various situations. The idea of what is effective participation has not been publicly raised in the development of these instruments. But it is evident that the framing of women as weak and vulnerable is often used to construct “a feminized and devalued notion of peace as unattainable, unrealistic, passive, and (it might be said) undesirable.”12 Ideas about gender shape, limit, and distort political discourse and political processes through which decisions are made— especially when it comes to armed conflict. The devaluation of certain perspectives, ideas, and, interests because they are marked as “feminine,” coupled with the equation of masculinity with violence gives war positive value as a show of masculine power. At the same time the perception that not going to war is weak makes it more difficult for political leaders to take decisions not to embark on military action. Similarly, such constructions make it more difficult to cut military spending or engage in disarmament.13 This means that even if women do participate in negotiations or discussions on matters related to peace and security, their positions or ideas are often forced to conform to the dominant perspective—underpinned by notions of violent masculinity—in order to be taken seriously. This is not to say that women bring one perspective to a conversation and men bring another. It rather highlights the gendered understandings of war and peace, disarmament and armament, strength and weakness, which dictate what is considered “acceptable” by the dominant perspective in such conversations.

### Impact - Queer Necropolitics

#### Structural patriarchy is a form of necropolitical management which is genocidal of queer, feminine, and minority bodies

Lamble 13 (Dr. Sara –Senior Lecturer in Law at University of London at Birkbeck, 8-4-13, “Queer Necropolitics and the Expanding Carceral State: Interrogating Sexual Investments in Punishment”, https://www.academia.edu/4438801/Queer\_Necropolitics\_and\_the\_Expanding\_Carceral\_State\_Interrogating\_Sexual\_Investments\_in\_Punishment)

Necropolitics of Imprisonment Each of the above examples involves the direct or indirect mobilisation of discursive, financial or labour-related resources towards state practices of imprisonment and punishment. Given the ongoing colonial legacies of the carceral state, the disproportionate number of people of colour in prison and the widespread abuses within carceral institutions, these queer investments in punishment are, by their very nature, investments in state racism and violence. In this way, such investments are symptomatic of what Jasbir Puar, drawing from Achilles Mbembe’s work, describes as queer necropolitics. Necropolitics can be understood as technologies of power that (re)produce social relations of living and dying, such that some populations are ushered into the worlds of life and vitality, while others are funnelled into what Mbembe calls death-worlds—worlds of slow living death, and dead living (Mbembe 2003). Death here includes literal physical death, but also social, political and civil death—the social relations of death, decay and dying that emerge from prolonged exposure to violence, neglect, deprivation and suffering. Offering a corrective to Michel Foucault’s work on biopolitics, Mbembe puts forward the notion of necropolitics and necropower to account for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of the maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring up on them the status of living dead (2003, p. 40). In other words, while biopolitical powers work to manage, order and foster life for citizens worthy of protection, such powers work in tandem with necropolitical powers that produce death for those destined to abandonment, violence and neglect. Taking up this concept within contemporary queer politics, Puar draws attention to the ways in which the folding into life of some queers is predicated on the folding out of life of others (Puar 2007, p. 36). On one level, as Braidotti (2007) notes, ‘Bio-power and necro-politics are two sides of the same coin’; the relationship between the governance of life and death cannot be separated. Indeed, Foucault notes the inherent tension within the classical theory of sovereignty in the right of power over life and death. Because the sovereign has no capacity to create life, the ‘right of life and death is always exercised in an unbalanced way: the balance is always tipped in favour of death’ (Foucault 1976/2003, p. 240). Hence the ‘very essence of the right of life and death is actually the right to kill; it is at the moment when the sovereign can kill that he exercises his right over life’ (Foucault 1976/2003, p. 240). Yet the emergence of biopower, argues Foucault, marks a shift in this balance, from the right to take life or let live, to the power to make live and let die. Biopower intervenes in the conditions of life at the level of populations to improve, prolong, extend living; it is a technique of governance aimed at maximising, optimising and fostering life.25 Yet the tension between the exercise of power over life and death remains. For if biopower seeks to maximise life, what justifies its continued exercise of death? It is here, Foucault argues, that racism intervenes, as ‘the precondition that makes killing acceptable’ (1976/2003, p. 256). For the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race…Once the State functions in biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State (Foucault 1976/2003, p. 256). Racism is therefore not an aberration within the exercise of biopower, but a key premise in determining which populations will be made to live and left to die. Taking this analysis further, Mbembe asks whether biopolitics can fully account for specific conditions, processes and techniques in which contemporary forms of life are subjugated by the power of death: Is the notion of biopower sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political, under the guise of war, of resistance, or of the fight against terror, makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute objective?… What place is given to life, death and the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)? How are they inscribed in the order of power?’ (Mbembe 2003, p. 12). Mapping out the ways in which the politics of death are central to contemporary modes of governance and warfare, Mbembe suggests the creation of deathwords is not merely a by-product of biopower, but a primary aim of its counterpart, necropower. Indeed, the administering of life is increasingly contingent upon, and supplemented by, new forms of sovereign power that are deployed in the administration of mass death and destruction.While Mbembe’s analysis focuses primarily on situations of military occupation, colonialism and war, the modern prison arguably constitutes another key instantiation of necropower. For the prison is a site that produces the conditions of living death; it is a place where bodies are subject to regimes of slow death and dying. Not only are deprivation, abuse and neglect regular features of incarceration but the monotonous regime of caged life—the experience of ‘doing time’—involves the slow wearing away of human vitality and the reduction of human experience to a bleak existence (Scraton and McQulloch 2009; Taylor 2000). This is especially true within regimes of solitary confinement, particularly in ‘supermax’ or ‘special housing units’ in the USA where prisoners are locked up for 23 hours a day, only permitted an hour of exercise in pens the size of dog cages, subjected to windowless cells and deprived of virtually any human contact—not only for days, but for years—with devastating mental health consequences (Haney 2003). In these ways, the prison serves as a site of mass warehousing of bodies in conditions that often resemble the death-worlds that Mbembe describes. While the modern prison was designed as an institution which aimed in part to train prisoners as productive workers, obedient citizens and docile subjects—a strategy that used disciplinary power in the broader service of biopolitical power (Foucault 1978/1995)—contemporary prisons are little more than mass warehouses for poor, racialised and otherwise disenfranchised populations (Gilmore 2007). As prison populations continue to grow to unprecedented levels, many states are abandoning even the pretence of rehabilitation, by dramatically reducing the hours that prisoners spend out of their cells, slashing funding for educational and other programmes and increasingly leaving prisoners to spend their days in monotonous isolation. These conditions, coupled with overcrowding, lack of adequate medical care and disconnection from family and friends, mean that prisoners experience high risks of self-harm, psychological abuse, trauma and suicide, both during imprisonment and post-release (Collins 2008; Taylor 2000; Kupers 2006). A criminal record also means that employment and housing are difficult to secure postrelease, family and community relationships are difficult to re-establish, and problems of poverty, mental illness and addiction persist—such that the consequences of imprisonment extend well beyond the duration of one’s sentence. The added combination of intensive surveillance and disciplinary probation regimes on the one hand, and limited post-release supports on the other, also mean that a high portion of prisoners experience repeated cycles of capture and release in the ‘revolving door’ of imprisonment. The prison thus plays a significant role in altering the ‘distribution of life chances’ or what Gilmore (2007, p. 247) describes as ‘group differentiated vulnerability to premature death’. In one sense, the after-effects of imprisonment can be understood as unfortunate but inevitable ‘challenges’ that prisoners face in recuperating from their sentences. But on another level, these ‘collateral consequences’ constitute a form of legally sanctioned social abandonment. Because ex-prisoners can be legally discriminated against with respect to housing, employment, education, jury duty, volunteer service and social assistance access, a criminal conviction becomes a ‘negative credential’ that functions as a ‘unique mechanism of state-sponsored stratification’ (Alexander 2010, p. 148). Voting restrictions—including the disenfranchisement of prisoners while serving sentences in Britain, and the permanent disenfranchisement of felons in some US states—marks another mode of exclusion from the polis (Manza and Uggen 2006). But perhaps more importantly, the social stigma and shame of a criminal conviction casts a long shadow on the future prospects of the (ex)prisoner. Marked as permanently failed, perpetually dangerous, and always suspicious, prisoners do not simply serve their time and move on; they pay the debt over and over in the form of stigma, shame and exclusion. A prison sentence thus becomes one of the most powerful ways that working class, black, migrant, disabled and other over-criminalised populations, are legally subjected to social, civil, and political death. To argue that the prison is an institution of necropolitical power and that prisoners are resigned to slow death, is not to deny the resilience and agency of those who survive prison on a daily basis. It is instead to underscore how the conditions of captivity govern life in ways that are akin to slow and prolonged death, thus severely restricting the possibilities for resistance and survival. Ironically, and perhaps most devastatingly, it is through the act of potentially reclaiming death that prisoners exercise a desperate form of agency. As Mbembe argues, in the realms of the living dead, death offers a brutal moment of power. ‘For death is precisely that from and over which I have power. But it is also that space where freedom and negation operate’ (Mbembe 2003, p. 39). Hence it should be no surprise that the hunger strike—the exercise of threat of the living to authorise their own death—persists as a last resort of collective power in prison. As the recent prisoner hunger strikes in California, Italy, England, Palestine, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere have demonstrated—alongside other less visible forms of collective organising inside—there is persistent resilience among prisoners to resist and survive the brutal conditions of their captivity.26 Arguably, what makes the prison an example of necropolitics, and not just an instance of ruthless state brutality, is that the imposition of death and suffering on some populations is explicitly legitimised and authorised in the name of fostering and protecting the life of others. In other words, the enhancement and protection of life for some is predicated on the violent sequestering of others. There are parallels here to what Nikolas Rose (2000) describes as circuits of security and circuits of insecurity—contemporary forms of governance that work by moving some subjects into modes of security and others into abandonment—as well as to what Judith Butler (2004) describes as the politics of ‘precarious life’ or what Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) refers to ‘economies of abandonment’. Necropolitics, however, draws more explicit attention to the deathly logic of these modes of governance, foregrounding the exercise of sovereign power (both within and beyond the state) to authorise and legitimate the politics of death and killing in the name of vitality and living. Examining these queer investments in punishment and necropolitics, we can identify several recurring patterns.

### AT: Gender not the root cause of war

#### Our K is about how discursive constructions of the male power fantasy are utilized by policy makers in order to justify imperial violence. We don’t deny there are other factors that legitimate wars, but we will win a big impact to the K

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 78 (SPP).

Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

# ALTERNATIVE

### 2NC/1NR Alt Ext – Vulnerability

#### **Our alternative is to embrace vulnerability. Extend Väyrynen, 2019** **– it is preferable to accept the vulnerability that is ontological to our existence, instead of hyperbolizing and securitizing against every potential threat. Our link and impacts prove that empirically, securitization against threats backfires and accelerates the probability and magnitude of those threats: countries with lax gun laws have more gun violence; countries that race for nuclear weapons are the only countries who have used them… and in the case of the AFF, countries that join NATO sign onto a specific security agenda based in Western Deterrence vs. Eastern Aggression and continued Northern Control of Southern Others. The aff does not passively fit into this scheme – it suggests NATO and USFG military-industrial evolution to adapt to international threats. Instead of committing to that paternalistic ordering scheme, the neg asks you to align yourself with a mutually exclusive feminist peace theory, which rejects the protection racket and its hierarchies. When the AFF framework does not reduce vulnerability and magnifies risk – it is try or die for a new model of achieving peace.**

#### **Embrace the 1% risk – vulnerability is an inevitable component of life – securitizing against it doesn’t solve and backfires**

Enloe 2004 - Cynthia Enloe, Professor of Women’s Studies at Clark University, *The Curious Feminist*, 2004, pp. 265-266 (SPP).

CC: But I think the problem is more than the sense of being vulnerable. It is the refusal to acknowledge the inevitability of our vulnerability. After all, vulnerability is a fact of human and political life. The attempt to deny its inevitability is what has led to the development of weapons of mass destruction "as deterrents," to massive investments in "national missile defense" and other baroque weapons technology, while we refuse to make serious investments in dealing with the worldwide HIV epidemic, or starvation, or poverty around the world. It has led to U.S. partnerships with oppressive regimes and multiple military attacks on other nations - Iraq, Iran, North Korea - even as we speak! And all of these, of course, are part of what creates the desperation and anger that are the seeds of terrorism. My fantasy is that if we acknowledged the impossibility of making ourselves invulnerable, of constructing Reagan's Plexiglas shield, we would have to have policies that fostered and strengthened goodwill and interdependence, that invested in making the planet a livable place for people in all countries, that aimed at disarmament instead of weapons "advancement" and proliferation. And my fear is that we won't acknowledge it, because these assumptions about strength and weakness, and vulnerability, are simultaneously engaged at the very personal, identity level but also built right into beliefs about national security and into national security doctrine - as though they reflected "objective reality" and in no way stemmed from deeply felt and held identities. So stopping to try to disentangle emotions and assumptions about violence and its efficacy was the starting place for me. Ultimately, I want to ask what it will take to change the discourse, to alter the meanings of strength and justice in the international political arena.

#### **Guarding against vulnerability makes it impossible to achieve positive peace; whereas encountering vulnerability is essential for a politics of nonviolence to emerge**

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” *Peacebuilding*, 7:2, 146-159 - spp)

Conclusions

In this article, I have advocated for the value of bringing the body, everydayness and ordinary people to the study of peace. The research agenda I have suggested offers a heightened sensitivity to the fleshy realities of the human body. Taking the body seriously introduces phenomenological registers that prioritise the relational and vulnerable elements of human existence and thereby prioritise mundane practices, including mundane practices of peace. My research agenda and its ontological commitment to corporeality and vulnerability do not precede or escape politics, but rather have a politics of their own: a politics of the reality that takes shape when bodies are rendered vulnerable or invulnerable. The ontology of being vulnerable and connected guides the suggested research agenda towards new ways of thinking about community and practices of peace. Encountering vulnerability creates moments of accountability, recognition and acknowledgement in which the peace ethos of the community is created. Being wounded and being susceptible to vulnerability constitute a rupture in the smooth ordering of political space and hence is of vital importance for the peace ethos. The commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others and a susceptibility to being wounded is in this research agenda the litmus test of peace. In short, I have sought to demonstrate that feminist and post-colonial theorising on the body offers a new bodily ontology that bears relevance for peace. This is an ontology and politics that is attuned to the nonviolent realisation of mutual dependence and exposure, as it is from those instances that mundane practices of peace emerge.58 My understanding of peace hence bears some resemblance to the theorising of the local turn. Yet it differs greatly in the sense that this alternative agenda is based on embodied data, diffractive methodology and a corporeal analysis that brings together affect, emotions and the somatic and provides an understanding of the body as both the subject and object of discourses, materialities and practices and policies of peace.

#### The inward confrontation of vulnerability is essential to cut off the violent outward expression of chivalric masculinity

Zolkos, 2011 (Magdalena Zolkos, Research Fellow in Political Theory in the Centre for Citizenship and Public Policy at the University of Western Sydney, “Can there be Costless War? Violent Exposures and (In)Vulnerable Selves in Benjamin Percy’s ‘Refresh, Refresh’” Critical Horizons 12.2 2011 251-269 (mjb).

For Butler, operative in post-9/11 American war is the “denial of vulnerability”, which is being institutionalized in various “fantasies of mastery”.18 In turn, Jabri writes about the distinctively late-modern elimination of the demand for self-sacrifice in warfare as an “aspiration for war in the absence of injury to the self”, so that “the infliction of injury [on the other] may take place in the near absence of harm to those perpetrating the act”, also known as “risk-transfer warfare”, or, in different political discourses, “humanitarian warfare”.19 The problematic of war has been closely linked with questions of political violence. Elaine Scarry has famously argued that war bridges two domains of human experience: the domain of contest and the domain of harm-doing to the bodies and properties of others.20 Jabri has argued for an understanding of war as “injurious”, both in corporeal and societal terms.21 For Jabri, the violence of war cannot be seen as consisting of “extra-social elements”, but, on the contrary, as “located in a society”, a “product of that society”, and a significant factor in the “formation and transformation of that society”. War is thus “constitutively social” and its violence is manifest in areas of public and private life that far exceed the military domains, including “the everyday, […] the routine, [and] the mundane order of things”. The violence of war, therefore, is political not only in (a) being motivated by politically contingent aims of invasion, conquest, and expansion, and (b) in its dependence on the development of different techniques and strategies of “injurious impingement”,22 but also (c) in so far as it preys on the social and psycho-somatic vulnerability of human body. In its emphasis on the intersubjective dimension of violence, the feminist critique of war has recognized that the subject herself/himself becomes affected and permeated, or, to but in Butler’s terms, that the subject comes “undone”, by/in the violent act against the other. Drawing on the critical theorizing of war in the writings of Butler and Jabri, I turn to the unsettling literary depictions of violence by Benjamin Percy in his collection Refresh, Refresh (and in particular to the opening story under the same title). I trace how the allegedly “removed”, “sterile” or “costless” acts of injury in war that are undertaken away from home and in the name of the protection of home, return and haunt the subject at home. As a contribution to the critique of war violence, my reading points at the auto-immunitary logic, which has been at work in the costless war fantasy, specifically, but not exclusively, in the context of America’s invasion on Iraq. Within the parameters of the auto-immunitary logic, the US government, which seeks to pre-empt and eradicate specific modality of (“terrorist”) violence through invasive military action, paradoxically, regenerates violence through radicalization and militarization of those whom it targets. I argue that auto-immunity operated also in Percy’s story (though in less causally obvious or direct way) insofar as America’s war engenders violence also among those whom it claims to protect, and whose identification and loyalty it demands. In “Refresh, Refresh” it is a generation of young male adolescents who have been “abandoned” by their working-class fathers in the military. They are “abandoned” not only in the sense that they live without parental supervision and with the unfulfilled acute desire for the father’s presence, but also in the sense of being the “invisible subjects” (until the moment when they are recognized as ready for military conscription) – in other words, they are “larval subjects”,23 unfolding from their juvenile and incubated forms into a state of “readiness”. At the background of the critical discussions that point out how the figure of the Iraqi, Afghani or the Arab Other becomes subject to de-humanizing tactics, my reading might appear not only provisional, but also precarious, as it risks re-investing in the category of the already all-too-visible American subject. The intention is not to distract from the cataclysmic consequences of the US post-9/11 wars for the Iraqi and Afghani people. The aim is not to re-invest in the privileged subjective categories, but to re-figure the (alleged) subjects of invulnerable politics, which moves away from the fantasies of mastery and towards ethical consideration of war violence through the prism of relational and inter-subjective vulnerability. From the perspective of Levinasian ethics of alterity, Dave Lightener’s face interpellates the Tumalo boys both to violence and to non-violence. It at once invokes the “temptation to kill and an interdiction against killing”, locating Josh and Gordon in that “mixed and conflicted position of a subject who is injured, rageful, disposed to violent retribution”.44 Butler, drawing on Levinas, locates the emergence of subjectivity in the tension between the “fear of undergoing violence and the fear of inflicting violence”.45 Importantly, the tension of that position is not located in the subject since she/ he [they]cannot, in both chronological and constitutive sense, pre-exist that primary tension of being both the agent and an object of violence. Rather, it is located in that prior inability to “move away and break from” (the address of) the Other, which operates in the text of “Refresh, Refresh” as the shameful affect that renders the subject “naked” (uncovered, unguarded, vulnerable) in the face of the Other. In the quoted final part of the story it is crucial that Lightener never declares the father dead. Lightener’s only verbalization in that passage is a plea for mercy – an expression of unconditional capitulation vis-à-vis the uncontrolled eruption of violence. The spontaneous act of overpowering and silencing Lightener is the boys’ desperate attempt to stage resistance to the formulaic utterance of condolences, which postulates grief as a patriotic response and seeks to contain and transform it into a platform of further military-masculine mobilization. The shared vulnerabilities that Dave Lightener and Josh embody in that concluding scene mean that, momentarily, they are constituted vis-à-vis one another through, on the one hand, their capacity for violence (the capacity to injure the other) and, on the other hand, also through their susceptibility to violence and the injurious action of the other. The representations of the physical precariousness of the body form in Percy’s story intricate connections with socio-political modes of “injury” – dispossession, exploitation, and privation. While in “Refresh, Refresh” the synergic capacity to inflict harm and to remain susceptible to harm is depicted with a narrative specificity characteristic of literary representations, I suggest that it demonstrates a larger point about human vulnerability and the reciprocal workings of violence. It precisely that “truth” about violence and vulnerability, which is being obliterated in the imageries of the costless war, and in the politics of invulnerability that they animate. The reciprocities and returns of violence leave no one in the story unharmed; neither those exposed to it, nor those complicit with it. In arguing that war violence is irreducible to the situations of the battlefield or to the military domain more generally (be it remote and “virtual” or proximate and “real”), I have sought to use Percy’s striking short-story to illuminate the location of violence at the cross-roads of inter-subjectivity, politics and ethics. Benjamin Percy’s depiction of the “abandoned” Tumalo boys as larval subjects shows how violence permeates across socio-political boundaries and across human bodies, and how it strikes at the heart of what (in the official military discourses) one has sought to protect through war: the peaceful, i.e. non-violent, American home. In contrast, the mastery discourses of the costless war fantasy build on the normative assumption that war violence can be compartmentalized, controlled and unidirectional (always working away from the subject). Perhaps, what is at stake in these repudiations of vulnerability is nothing short of a question of what it means to be human if, within these literary representations and the critical theoretical voices about war, different modes of humanity are so tightly linked to the recognition of the reciprocal workings of violence. It remains to be asked how, within that conjunction of violence and vulnerability, one could think non-violence – not as the demarcation of the domain of invulnerable self, but, rather, as an inquiry into the significance of the singular moment when one refrains from violence. In this alternative imaginary setting, non-violence is not the inactive or passive binary opposite of violence, but an ethical, and possibly political, action. Could sparing Dave Lightener’s life by the Tumalo boys be thought of as an act of non-violence? Perhaps not, since its significance is subsequently obliterated by their submission to the military masculine subject positions, into which they have been interpellated. Their own conscription into the military shares common grammar with their earlier self-injurious and self-destructive actions. However, the narrative also suggests that any act of political non-violence must emerge from within the recognition of vulnerability as affirmation of the violent exposure of the self to the Other. I conclude with a passage quotation from a final story in the collection Refresh, Refresh, “When the Bear Came”, where in my opinion Percy comes closest to imagining such violent encounter between the self and Other.46 My suggestion is that “When the Bear Came” gestures towards the ethics of relational and communicative potentialities that arise from shared vulnerability. Notably, it is a story about an encounter between a human and a non-human Other – a bear whom the narrator (also an adolescent man from Tumalo) obsessively seeks to find, catch and violently pacify. When the encounter finally occurs, and the desire to kill the bear becomes a real possibility, the man facing the bear finds himself affected and “undone” by the encounter, beyond his control and calculation: I was just out of its reach, but not so far that I couldn’t feel the air move, displaced by its claws. It wrestled with the rope a moment, like a dog bothered by a leash, then returned its attention to me. A low growl rumbled from deep its throat. I could feel its eyes, like two heavy weights, on me. It was hungry. And I imagined what its jaws would feel like working around my skull, or through my belly, my flesh sinking into the dark oblivion of its stomach. We stayed like this for a time, looking at each other, each afraid and hateful. Minutes passed and the stars wheeled above us and I slowly brought my shotgun down from my shoulder and held it before me. ‘I should kill you’, I said, a gentle sort of loathing in my voice, ‘You son of a bitch, I should kill you dead’. I could feel the blood pounding through my heart and I could hear the air filling and emptying its lungs. I tried to breathe with the bear and soon our breathing fell into a rhythm where our lungs worked in perfect time with the wind, with the shifting of the branches and shadows. It was as if a rhythm had been beating all along, the rhythm of the land, and finally I had found it, here in the peace of the dark woods, with only one slug and twenty feet of rope between me and absolution.47

### Alt = Prereq to ethical IR

#### **Epistemological and ontological revisionism essential to disrupting toxic masculinity in IR – the alternative is a prerequisite to any ethical FIAT in the international arena**

Youngs 04 (Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

### Alt = Prereq to Reform Agendas

#### Only our deconstructive critique can broaden the scope of analysis sufficiently to support activism outside the narrow confines of liberal reform projects

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Through the concept-metaphor of queer necropolitics, the contributors to this book broaden our perception of life, death, violence and survival by attending to different sites, such as the borderzone, the warzone, the prison and the gentrifying area. These Mbembian ‘topographies of cruelty’ are by no means an exclusive map of necropolitical spatialities. More work is needed in order to make sense of the queer vitalities that have proliferated across various sites – including institutions of punishment alongside institutions of ‘care’, such as schools, psychiatric units and youth work, as well as the informal spaces and connectivities – the queer ‘scene’, the queer ‘neighbourhood’, the globalizing LGBT movement – that increasingly follow similar punitive and pathologizing logics. While queer necropolitics is not the only tool through which such work is possible, we have offered it up as an insurgent vocabulary that can help us make sense of the many forms of death that accompany and condition queer claims to life, visibility and protection. Its attraction lies precisely in its ability to capture seemingly unrelated phenomena simultaneously, and to bring back into a shared plane of intelligibility struggles that we are often told are mutually exclusive. It may help us, for example, to understand figures such as the ‘welfare queen’ (Cohen 1997; Roberts 1997), the ‘monster-terrorist-fag’ (Puar and Rai 2002), the ‘drunk Indian’ (Razack 2012), the ‘black rioter’ (Breggin 1995) and the ‘hateful Muslim youth’ (Haritaworn 2013), as related not only to one another but also to the figure of the ‘queer lover’, whose ascendancy from degeneracy occurs in shared environments shaped by the same murderous processes. What would it mean to enter into kinship with these pathologized figures? How might we – from our various positionalities – explore gender and sexuality beyond these necropolitical moulds? One way to think crucially and responsibly about queer politics in these times is to refuse the call to become what we call ‘happy queers’ (or, indeed, nostalgic queers) whose recruitment for sexual celebration serves to euphemize and accelerate the death of Others – who for some of us indeed include our own. Instead, we must attend to the forces that prepare queer and indeed non-queer bodies for premature death (see also Cohen 2011). Yet our motivation must be to go much further, to foster the survival of those who were ‘meant to perish’ but are not disposable, to repeat Che Gossett’s moving words (2011: n.p.). What would a politics, queer or otherwise, that is serious about such a resistant and allied task look like? How can we engage in unalienated politics, where safer spaces are not won by reproducing cannibalistic, criminalizing and pathologizing regimes or by inserting ourselves into militarizing and security logics, and where the violence of the most powerful (such as the racist and neo/colonial state, the market, the prison and the hospital) is scandalized at least as loudly as the acts of those thus subjugated? We see the necropolitical as one in a range of possible tools to explore the possibilities of such a politics, since it helps us make sense of the symbiotic copresence of life and death, manifested ever more clearly in the cleavages between rich and poor, citizens and non-citizens (and those who can be stripped of citizenship at any moment); the culturally, morally, economically valuable and the pathological; queer subjects invited into life and queerly abjected populations marked for death. Yet this book is in conversation not just with those interested in testing the promises and limits of a specifically necropolitical framework, but also with other trajectories of decolonizing gender and sexuality. More generally, it responds to the new hunger for queerly theorizing about structural violence and injustice, from tightening borders, mass incarceration, and the wars without end, to the everyday, banal workings of the market. On an activist level, this is reflected in the growth of feminist, queer and trans movements that radically refigure that which counts as a ‘queer and trans issue’, by moving away from narrow liberal and identitarian notions of protection, tolerance, victimhood and visibility and towards careful mappings of the bigger picture (Bassichis, Lee and Spade 2011). We are especially encouraged to witness, through international collaborations such as this, the growth of a radical queer and trans activism which, stepping into the footsteps of a re-radicalized anti-racist feminism, seeks to fight oppression in all its intersections and manifestations, including the normalized, the banal, and the systemic (Decolonize Queer 2011; Gender Just 2011; Incite! – Critical Resistance 2001; Incite! 2006; Khalass We’re Vex 2013; SUSPECT 2010; Sylvia Rivera Law Project et al. 2009). If this has so far largely remained parochial to the North American context, we hope that projects such as Queer Necropolitics will help us catch up with the moves of capital and ideology, so that resistant knowledges, too, may begin to cross borders and ‘unmap’ (Razack 2002) the geopolitics of violence, abandonment, and death. We hope that this book will be a stepping stone for forging a transnational lens that is adequate to this task.

### Alt Solves Environment

#### The AFF embrace of paternalistic societal structural must be rejected in favor of a gender-focused perspective

Detraz, 2010. (Nicole, Assistant Professor in political science at U Memphis, “the genders of environmental security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 108-111; spp)

Towards a feminist environmental security perspective: The above discussion has demonstrated that there remains a high degree of debate over the best way to conceptualize the link between the environment and security, and that all three perspectives securitizing the environment have uneasy relationships with feminist approaches to security. The addition of gender to the environmental conflict perspective would be a transformative force. The environmental security perspective is more compatible with feminist scholars' understandings of the referents of and threats to security, but still neglects gender. While the ecological security approach has an overlap with various feminisms, it is ecocentric where feminists are fundamentally concerned with gender subordination. This chapter argues that a feminist approach is an appropriate alternative discourse. Based on the analysis of the intersections between the current approaches to security and the environment and various feminisms, I assert that environmental security perspectives that incorporate gender analysis and build on elements of the existing debate will be a fruitful addition to international environmental politics and International Relations in general. Perspectives securitizing the environment might be the right entry vehicle for feminist approaches, and feminist approaches might clarify debates between perspectives about the environment and security. As there are multiple approaches to the environment and security, there are also multiple feminisms, each of which would have different contributions to perspectives of the environment and security.26 Here, rather than setting up a debate between different feminisms, I offer some suggestions about how some of the various feminist traditions can be used to inform the environmental security debate and what a gender-focused environmental security perspective might look like. The gender-focused environmental security approach that I envision will in some respects look similar to current approaches to security and the environment, particularly the environmental security approach and the ecological security approach, however, there will be important differences between the approaches as well . A gender-focused environmental security perspective will begin with a multi-level analysis of security and the environment, paying particular attention to individuals and groups in society who face insecurities. These insecurities can take various forms and are best conceptualized as incidents that increase one's likelihood of experiencing danger, injury, or a decline in personal well-being. Examining these insecurities will involve valuing the contributions of local knowledge as well as other forms of knowledge such as scientific ones. Likewise, the notion of the environment that this approach uses is one that includes human and non-human nature as well as attention to the places where people live. To think of the environment as some distant external entity masks the close relationships that exist between humans and non-human nature as well as the severity that many environmental issues have for the livelihoods of much of the world's population, including both women and men. Conflict stemming from environmental change must be examined from a gender-focused environmental security perspective, but with specific attention paid to contextual and historic factors that contribute to violence and the impacts that violence has for members of the population in question. Rather than assume that scarcity is an unproblematic notion, it must be examined in order to determine how assessments of scarcity and plenty are arrived at, and for the benefit of whom. Power dynamics must be assessed if one is to fully understand the potential for conflict as well as all of the implications involved. Additionally, scarcity must not be thought of only in terms of a lack of access to a resource for human consumption. The needs of the environment to function productively must also be taken into account in order to determine scarcity in a given case. This reflects the fact that humans and nonhuman nature are inextricably linked and the insecurity of one has implications for the insecurity of the other. A detailed examination of scarcity will also bring to light the dominant relationship that humans most often claim over nature, which has links to other dominant relationships in society: North/South, elite/non-elite, and most importantly for this analysis. men/women. This can provoke the questioning of the "normalcy" of these relationships and hopefully invite alternative understandings of the relationships. This brings us to the issue of the potential causes of environmental insecurity. It must be acknowledged that by pointing to a factor as causing environmental insecurity, that factor also becomes the subject of proposed solutions. These factors must therefore be examined with specific attention being given to the gender differences embedded within them. Issues of increased consumption often associated with accelerating globalization, growing population, and migrating populations are all cited as phenomena contributing to environmental degradation by scholars concerned with the environment. What must be realized is that while these factors might in fact produce environmental insecurities, they must not be taken as straightforward targets for solutions if these solutions do not examine any potential imbalanced impacts that they may have for segments of the population-women in particular. Thus far, none of the perspectives on security and the environment have engaged in determining the particular impacts that solutions targeting the above-mentioned issues may have on women. This is a necessary task for gender-focused environmental security perspectives. An environmental security perspective that includes gender will also be amenable to solutions that reject the dominant institutional or societal structures. While sustainable development and environmental peacemaking may provide increased security for both the environment and some individuals in society, they do nothing to challenge the patriarchal structures that allow for the continuation of valuing male-ness over female-ness, thus they cannot be the final solution to insecurity. Through the analysis of environmental issues that directly impact people's lives, feminist environmental security scholars can both determine particular gender-differentiated impacts, responses and contributions to environmental degradation as well as call attention to the gendered assumptions in society through which these issues are typically understood. In sum, some of the issues that are brought to light when gender is included as a fundamental aspect of environmental security are as follows: • Multilevel analysis of security and the environment are essential. • Broad and critical conceptualizations or' security, environment, and scarcity are necessary. • Particular attention must be paid to the unique security situations of women. • A close relationship between humans and non-human nature must be acknowledged. • What happens during times of conflict as well as their causes must be examined. • The impacts of militarization on both the environment and human beings must be examined. • The causes of environmental insecurity must be critically assessed as well as their potential impacts for segments of the population. • Attention must be given to multiple sources of knowledge. • Potential solutions that reject the dominant institutional or societal structures must be entertained. An environmental security perspective with a gender focus can use these issues to build on the existing debate over security and the environment and to revise some aspects and add gender analysis.

## AT: PERM

#### If we win a link then they can’t access the alternative – the problem/solution framework afforded by patriarchal ordering schemes, and specifically chivalric masculinity, are mutually exclusive with the alternative’s embrace of vulnerability. Our alternative refuses both the narrative of the 1AC and the hypothetical FIATed outcome, because it feeds into and strengthens the protection racket. The alternative solves the terminal and root cause impacts better, so there is only a risk that including the 1AC will foreclose alt solvency.

#### The aff and the neg have mutually exclusive conceptions of peacemaking

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” *Peacebuilding*, 7:2, 146-159, spp)

In this article, I draw on critical feminist theorising of the body, relatedness, vulnerability and the everyday to offer an alternative framing of peace and suggest a new research agenda. Furthermore, I provide a novel construct of eventness by which I center peace in the lives of ordinary people. I also introduce the concept of choreography to grasp the richness and fluidity of the everyday techniques of interaction that are relevant for peace. Ultimately, I propose a critical research agenda whose ambition is to re-theorise peace by locating it within social and political contexts and examining the practices and eventness of mundane peace, thereby defying the dominant non-situated and abstract conceptions of peace. This proposal is a critical response to the abstract and ontologically solid nature of peace approaches in general, as well as to the limited way in which critical peace approaches seek to theorise the local as an antidote to abstractions. My aim is to demonstrate that the microsociology of corporeality, vulnerability and relatedness enables a renewed grasp of the study of peace. The research agenda I suggest departs radically company from the mainstream – in which peace is conceptualised as abstract, solid or the ‘opposite of violence’ – by locating the substantial and situated nature of peace within social and political life. Ultimately, the agenda seeks to cultivate – in the spirit of non-representational theory, which goes beyond representation and focuses on embodied experience – an affinity for the analysis of ‘events, practices, assemblages, structures of feeling, and the backgrounds of everyday life against which relations unfold in their myriad potentials’.1 To accomplish this, I introduce a phenomenological register that moves away from totalising perspectives towards microsociological approaches and an examination of the mundane practices where lived experience offers a rich fabric of corporeal presence, relationality and affect. I argue that the radical and transformative aspects of everyday life can be examined by exposing the extraordinary in the seemingly ordinary and there with the transformative potential embedded in the everyday.

#### Must completely eschew the logic of securitization – means the perm can’t solve OR it severs the aff – voting issue for stable negative ground

**Neocleous 8** [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the **fetish**, is perhaps to **eschew the logic of security altogether** – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encom passing that it **marginalises all else**, most notably the constructive conﬂicts, **debates and discussions that animate political life**. The con stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – **constitutes a rejection of politics** in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conﬂicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efﬁcient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore **need to get beyond security politics,** **not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it** in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be ﬁlled with a new vision or **revision of security** in which it is **re-mapped or civilised** or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of **these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary,** and consequently end up **re afﬁrm**ing **the state as the terrain of modern politics**, the grounds of security. The real task is not to ﬁll the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to ﬁght for an **alternative political language** which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as signiﬁcant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justiﬁes the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to **forge another kind of politics** centred on a different con ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politicaly, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

#### Their crisis-driven performance of the permutation proves that their perm devolves to just doing the aff as a sufficient framing to check their own impacts

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in *feminist review* 109: 49-72, spp)

The widespread failure to engage with global finance as ‘everyday’ and the proliferation of conventional accounts of crisis, with their abstracted and dehumanised representations of global finance, have been significant in contributing to a ‘business as usual’ approach for neo-liberal actors and institutions with regard to financial reform. Such an approach has enabled not only an ongoing failure to reform key institutions, practices and mechanisms, but also the reification of global finance as the preserve of a privileged, neo-liberal and masculine elite. In understanding how ‘crisis’ has been harnessed and exploited to sediment power in the hands of an existent (male) neo-liberal elite, it is worth asking what the current state of the global financial industry is and whether anything has changed in financial services ‘after’ the crisis. As a 2009 report from the UN on international monetary and financial reform notes, little reform of the global financial architecture was undertaken at the time of the Asian financial crisis, then described by the IMF as ‘one of the worst financial crises in the postwar period’ (IMF, 1998). Nothing was done to reform international economic institutions, to ensure ‘greater transparency and accountability’, to assess ‘distributive impacts’, to avoid an increase in global imbalances and asymmetries or to ensure ‘intellectual diversity’ (UN, 2009). As for the current era, and despite the longevity of the global financial crisis, money from central banks continues to be extended at relatively cheap and easy levels and banking systems have succeeded in getting ‘risky assets off balance sheets’ and improving ‘tier-one capital ratios’ by simply moving assets around (Ryan, 2013). There is ‘little evidence of chastened behaviour on the part of financial institutions’, with ‘little repentance’ shown by the leaders of financial investment companies when called to testify and women ‘no more visible in finance than they were before the crisis’ (Prügl, 2012: 31). While the IMF claims that it is has become ‘more attuned to the social impact of its programs’, with, since the Asian financial crisis, ‘many of the economies that suffered from the crisis’ performing ‘remarkably well’ (IMF, 2013), it fails to note that economic crisis in Asia had a profound and enduring impact ‘on labour markets, household incomes, social services, work burden and human development’ across the region (Floro et al., 2009: 3). Women in South Korea lost their jobs at seven times the rate of men (Seguino, 2009: 3), while a global recession hit export- oriented sectors such as textiles and apparel in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean particularly badly, each of these being sectors that ‘have a highly feminised labour force’ (Floro et al., 2009: 16). Women’s position in the agricultural sector (as farmers and workers) remains vulnerable without the reduction or elimination of agricultural subsidies in industrialised countries and the presence of government services ‘to help increase output and productivity’ and ‘the impact of trade on the costs of inputs’ continues to be volatile (ibid.). Reading the global financial crisis and governance responses to it through a (feminist) discourse analysis involves examining how ‘crisis’ has been reproduced, and governance enabled, by ideas, assumptions and values that depend both on the positioning of bodies in certain gendered ways and the reproduction of gendered techniques of governance. This includes the prevalence, for example, of governance responses that centralise women’s ‘essential’ domesticity or fiscal prudence, prevailing representations of men as public figures of authority and responsibility, and techniques of governance that exploit these (such as gender quota systems, for example, that presume that the presence of women’s bodies balances out hypermasculine behaviour, or austerity measures that are instituted on the foundational assumption of women’s reproductive work as inferred but unpaid). For many feminists, this author included, the focus in crisis governance discourse on behavioural (human) flaws and institutional weaknesses has erased attention to the broader and fundamental structures of discrimination and elite privilege on which global finance has been built, while further entrenching the hierarchical gender and racial stereotypes of governance discourses. While it is possible for agents in the economy to behave autonomously, the social settings of economic discourse (i.e., the ways in which economic ‘units’ sustain and interact with each other) make it unlikely that agents will consistently do so, particularly in an industry as dependent on group confidence as the global financial industry. Financial services are dominated not just by men but by dominant models of behaviour that have become, over centuries of concentrating historical privilege in the hands of white men, associated with masculine subjectivities. Despite the introduction of quotas and active recruitment strategies aimed specifically at women, global finance remains ‘one of the few bastions of virtually uncontested masculine privilege remaining in the aftermath of feminism’ (Prügl, 2012: 22). A recent survey, for example, conducted by recruitment company eFinancialCareers found that ‘almost two thirds of Australian finance professionals believed gender discrimination was still apparent in the finance industry’, with 84 per cent of women sure that gender discrimination exists in financial services (Pokrajac and Moore, 2013). Women occupy less than 20 per cent of executive or senior level positions in the finance, insurance, securities and investment sectors and less than 30 per cent of senior-level positions in commercial banking. Australian men in finance earn 21 per cent more than women, British men 24 per cent.1 Women may be allowed into the game for as long as they accede to the mechanisms by which the structures of economic power generate capital, profit and expansion, mechanisms that have not changed in any meaningful way since the beginnings of the current crisis.

### Ext – Mutually Exclusive

#### Bottom Up Feminist Peace Strategies are inconsistent with Top-Down Approaches to Security

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” *Peacebuilding*, 7:2, 146-159, spp)

Subaltern views of peace are important for local turn scholarship since subaltern actors possess everyday agency in either promoting peace or resisting top-down neoliberal peacebuilding attempts. The everyday is fundamental for this branch of thinking, as the ‘pursuit of everyday tasks may allow individuals and communities in villages, valleys and city neighborhoods to develop common bonds with members of other ethnic or religious groups, to demystify “the other” and to reconstruct contextual legitimacy’.16 Given the agency that the subaltern exercises, the local turn responds by focusing on everyday life and the forms of transversal solidarity and grassroots mobilisation that enable peacebuilding. In other words, the assumption is that a vibrant civil society and an everyday solidarity cutting across ethnic and religious affiliations is the guarantee of peace. The local turn argues that the promoters of liberal peace fail to recognise this type of agency and solidarity in their focus on elite-lead and top-down approaches to peacebuilding and thereby miss the opportunity for sustainable and local peace.17 Although the local turn functions as an important critique of neoliberal governance and peace, for my research agenda, where the aim is to capture the corporeality and eventness of mundane peace, the discussion and understanding of the everyday offered by local turn scholarship is limited. The everyday implies for me more than the resilience and resistant potential of the ‘local’ and of ‘ordinary people’ in the face of neo-liberal peacebuilding, as it is largely understood within local turn scholarship. From my perspective, the local turn’s interest in the everyday is too narrow, as it has not been translated into a sustained consideration of the productiveness of mundane practices. Where I most radically depart company from local turn scholarship is in its tendency to define the everyday with reference to the subaltern’s spatiality – namely, through the spatial location where the subaltern is assumed to reside and through the forms of everyday life that are thought to characterise her.18 In the local turn, the subaltern and her everyday life are projected to be somewhere ‘out there’: in a distant location of violent political conflict or far-away post-conflict zone. This is, in my view, a traditional Orientalist projection, in which the spatially projected ‘local’ world and its everyday are conceived of as radically different from our own.19 In this projection, the local and the subaltern are constructed as distant ‘others’, whose emancipatory potential the Western and male local turn scholar is concerned with. This is a reminder of the colonial condition, in which white men seek to save ‘brown women from brown men’.20 To avoid this, it is important to recognise that the everyday and the ordinary are constituted through enactments – that is, they are corporeal rather than spatial and not necessarily the ‘subaltern’ in the Orientalist sense, with its implication of non-Western populations. The focus on embodied enactments enables us to retain the local whilst distancing ourselves from the spatial hegemony of the distant ‘other’. Feminist peace and conflict studies As noted earlier, feminist theorising has a strong commitment to corporeality and the everyday (in a non-territorial sense) and therefore functions as a starting point for my agenda. Furthermore, this corpus of thinking establishes a strong connection between corporeal ontology and peace epistemology. Radical feminist scholarship is instrumental, in my view, when investigating the body, the ordinary and the everyday.21 There are multiple ontologies in feminist peace theory, but the concern for marginalization and the understanding of the corporeal and relational nature of human existence are the key contributions that enable a new take on the corporeality of peace.22

### AT: Reform Net Benefit

#### Reformism leads to cooption by the elite – must refuse to enter their arena

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza*. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 21-24, SPP)

Behind the present use of the term 'lesser evil' is a rich history and various intellectual trajectories. What may otherwise seem to be a perennial problem, endemic to ethics and political practice, a dilemma that recurs in different moments in time in the same shape and form, might in fact reveal something peculiar about each moment and situation. The various political, theological and philosophical uses of the lesser evil idiom may suggest that it meant different things to different people in different periods and situations. Every political tradition and form of political practice developed its own ways of engaging with the lesser evil argument - and much has subsequently been lost in translation. For example, unlike the tradition of liberal ethics that would invoke him centuries later, Augustine was never content with lesser evils. Indeed, a significant aspect of the idea of the lesser evil has been lost in its process of secularization from early Christian theology into the utilitarian foundations of liberal ethics. For the original Christian toleration of the lesser evil was understood in relation to the telos of redemption that is ultimately in excess of all calculations. For Augustine, the name for this state beyond calculations was 'the kingdom of heaven'. In contrast to the teachings of the Christian theologians that they invoked, and locked within a perpetual economy of immanence, liberal ethics can be interpreted as a drive for the 'optimization' of a system of government. But what is the sense in optimizing those regimes when they perpetuate intolerable injustice? Even those of us without much use for a 'kingdom of heaven' and without much patience for the systems of pastoral government that should guide us to it, can still see in Augustine's argument an important challenge: how to engage in political practice within the complex existing force-fields of the present in a way that also aims to break away from them? This challenge is particularly acute for those who operate within or in relation to situations they deem intolerable and want to fundamentally change rather than reform. The practices of human rights could be used as effective tools against close societies and tyrannies, and were indeed often used in struggles that ended up replacing those regimes, they lend themselves easily for manipulation in the context of liberal democracies. At different times, Marx, Lenin, Kautski, Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci grappled with the problem of the lesser evil in fighting for gains here and now, while also fighting for a different and better world on the other. At various points they advocated struggles for immediate gains - for example, proposing trade unions, whose function was to win a better deal for workers in an exploitative system. None of them, however, thought that trade unions were all that was possible, and none was satisfied with simply winning a better deal within an existing system. Unlike the revolutionary and militant communists who protested the drift towards a timid, reformist politics of choosing the lesser evil and of making compromises with capital, Marx thought that winning a ten-hour day was a considerable victory for the English proletariat. Marx's argument shifted the attention from the ten hours of work to the fourteen hours of non-work time. These he thought provided the opportunity to build an organizational platform, as well as the consciousness and experience needed to take over the means of production. To show that it is futile to object to all lesser evil compromises on principle, we could even enlist Lenin himself. In his attempt to explain the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that lead to Soviet Russia's exit from World War I in 1918 after making an agreement with the western powers, Lenin returned to a scene of a road robbery described by Augustine. 'To reject compromises "on principle", to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind', said Lenin, 'is childishness ... One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and firearms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and firearms to bandits so as to share in the loot.'34 The deliberation of a political thought-practice must indeed insist on uncovering the force-field within which each of the dilemmas of the lesser evil exists, seeking to identify more extended and intricate political connections; looking further into the future, it should insist on political goals and the means of their achievement. At one end of the spectrum, in which the lesser evil argument occupies the middle ground, stand those who believe that every possible gain at present is insignificant in light of the essentially compromised state of the world. Part of the structure of this argument is found the principle of the politique du pire- the politics of making things worse. This line of thought believes in the redemptive potential of misery- or in its theological-political incarnation as dolorism: pain as a spiritual experience that allows people to see more clearly. Every form of improvement is necessarily seen as the normalization of exploitation or the pacification of injustice. Opting for the worst is, therefore, an attempt to undermine the field of alternatives of a pre-given choice and overcome its terms. But are the horrific spectacles of greater evils preferable to the incremental damage of lesser ones? Is the choice only between squabbling with power about the correct measure of its violence, helping to calibrate it and tend to its wounded, or on the other hand a call for its amplification in order to 'expose its contradictions' (contradictions seem only to sustain power's march) to shock a complacent population into rising up? Between refusal and tactical embrace the difficulty of the dilemma of the lesser evil is equally in practising and in avoiding it. The Greeks thought of the dilemma as one of the elements of tragedy. Each of the options that a tragic hero faces necessarily leads to different forms of horrific suffering: the dilemma was presented as a choice between the two horns of an angry bull. But the options must not only be about which of the horns to choose. Robert Pirsig has suggested several ways to subvert this complicity of the opposites: one can 'refuse to enter the arena', 'throw sand in the bull's eyes', or 'sing the bull to sleep' .35 The contemporary forms of power unpacked in this book are no longer so singular and unified. Rather than a bull, they may appear to take on the shape of a multiplicity, a diffuse field of forces simultaneously aggressive and benign. It is a form of power that not only charges forward; it surrounds, immerses and embeds. Political activists must constantly invent new forms of struggle that are recognisant of this paradigm of power, but which also evade and subvert its embrace, attempt to rewire its webs in order to escape its calculation. The characters that inhabit the chapters of this book have stepped right into the thick of this web of forces: their movement through them offer valuable examples and lessons. Some paths must be avoided at all costs; others illuminate possible courses of action within the intricate workings of the humanitarian present.

### AT: Perm Double Bind

#### They misunderstand the K – the alt doesn’t overcome all vulnerability. It accepts insecurity and vulnerability as inevitable facets of our life to some extent. But then it points out how your method justifies the type of geopolitics that generates ongoing military violence, and also makes your aff impacts more likely. We suggest a mutually exclusive mode of politics and argue that our alternative is net beneficial

#### The permutation footnotes and crowds out feminism – only rejecting the aff for its “residual links” and voting for the alternative alone can solve the K

Sjoberg, 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi).

We argue that (American, mainstream) IR can be understood as an imperium that by its constitution excludes feminist work. This IR is a world that polices its boundaries, whatever they are. Each “debate” excludes its other as much as it constructs a conflict between its in-crowd**.** From a feminist perspective, its hard to see feminist work as within those boundaries. In fact, twenty five years after the establishment of a field of feminist IR, and fifteen years after Ann Tickner’s (1997) “You Just Don’t Understand,” there’s a sense that, maybe, the “mainstream” of IR just will never understand. In conversations with colleagues, there is no longer a consensus that trying to “mainstream” feminist IR is a worthwhile project. In fact, the project has become quite controversial. Should “we” talk to/with the 19 mainstream? If so, how? How do we do so while both getting “them” to listen and keep “our” intellectual integrity? Ann Tickner tells us that “the effect [of feminist IR] on the mainstream discipline, particularly in the United States, continues to be marginal**”** (1997, 611). It must be, then, something about the content of feminist IR compared to the content of “mainstream” IR that inhibits exchanges and leads to “awkward silences and miscommunications” (Tickner 1997, 612). Feminist IR and mainstream IR live in and constitute different worlds**.5** Mainstream IR did not know the world of feminist IR – a world of contingency, subjectivity, emancipation, and empathy.As the two approaches got to know each other (and, by relating, themselves) in the late 1980s, it became clear that the place that feminist IR would like to have in IR was incompatible with the ways that mainstream IR saw (and valued) itself and feminism. Mainstream IR would like to compartmentalize feminist IR in the world that it created and has become accustomed to, while feminist IR would like to mainstream gender into IR scholarship, making gender-based analysis a crucial and core part of disciplinary inquiry. Early conversations about feminist IR expressed hope for this sort of relationship on both sides. Robert Keohane proclaimed that “feminist standpoint theory provides a particularly promising starting-point for the development of feminist international relations theory” (1989, 245). Fred Halliday noted that “the international relations can and should adjust to a set of issues that have, to date, received scant attention” (1988, 20 426). From the feminist side, Sandra Whitworth declared that “the next stage of international relations theory will not be one that is merely critical, but one which is critical and feminist” (1989, 270). Ann Tickner set upon a project to “de-gender” International Relations as a field (1992). Much early feminist IR work held the clear understanding that, though IR as a discipline and global politics as a field are deeply gendered, that gendering is correctable and can/will be corrected by feminist scholarship. The mainstream would read feminist scholarship, see the gendering of IR, and pursue their research programs with the knowledge of that gendering. Though women’s position in the field and the world was poor, it could be fixed with the mainstream’s recognition and acceptance. That acceptance**, however,** was not forthcoming, and was piecemeal when it happened. Instead, feminist IR demands to be taken seriously as a world-transforming force and treated with respect and dignity. As Ann Tickner explains, the limitations that the mainstream places on the role of feminist scholarship are “asking feminists to do more of the moving” and “give up epistemological positions which they believe are better suited to uncovering oppressive gender hierarchies” (Tickner 1998, 209). While mainstream IR demands that feminist IR have a static and defined identity that fits into the “condo across town” that it has provided feminist IR, feminist scholarship cannot and will not accept either a narrow and strict definition or a marginal role. As Marysia Zalewski notes, “the suggekstion that feminism is controversially undecidable sits uneasily with unremitting requests to confirm its attendant status. Yet, questions calculated to reify an inhibiting structural position hinge on a certain precision regarding 21 the character of contemporary feminism. Failure to secure this position occasions a tendency to impose it (2003, 291). Because feminist IR cannot and will not accept the space or definition that it has been allocated, feminist IR cannot be kept in its proper place in the predefined world of mainstream IR – it must inhabit a space outside IR rather than as inside it as a constitutive other. Even as feminist theorists try to look and act as if they fit in with the mainstream, as Ann Tickner laments, “feminist theorists have rarely achieved the serious engagement with other IR scholars for which they have frequently called. When they have occurred, conversations have often led to misunderstandings and other kinds of miscommunication” (1997, 628). She attributes these miscommunications of “lack of understanding and judgments” (Tickner 1997, 629). As Marysia Zalewski notes, “it is not uncommon to assume that theorizing about women lacks the depth and strength of other kinds of scholarly analyses, especially those favored by the mainstream” (2003, 292). In other words, some theorizing about women acts as a constitutive other to the mainstream IR orthodoxy. That theorizing appears to be close to feminist theorizing in IR, but it really serves as the constitutive other (inside) the mainstream of the discipline that serves as a condition of the possibility of outside-ness of feminist research. This makes feminist research (one of) IR’s uninhabitable space(s). Seeing IR as this sort of imperium vis a vis feminist theorizing brings up the question of what it would look like to “occupy” IR. What would it look like to physically inhabit the discipline of IR? To be an embodied disruption of the social order which makes inhabitation impossible? To occupy a space of protest? A space of otherness? A 22 space of liminality? What would it look to reside in but remain outside of the possible political space of IR? To use biopower to resist the orthoroxy and operationality of IR? Certainly, the question of the relationship between feminist IR and mainstream IR has been explored in the discipline in a number of ways (e.g., Sjoberg 2009). But the question of the materiality of occupation, we argue, might be a good way to think about feminisms and IR. Several ways of thinking about this might bear fruit. The first is the physical inhabitation of the discipline of IR. This is more complicated than it first appears, given that the discipline of IR is a political economy, where if one is able to be sustainably present, it is because one is in some sense included by/with the discipline as a paid member of a faculty, allowing one the time and resources to both eat and write. At the same time, the intersection of that political economy of being a faculty member and the political economy of knowledge production is not zero-sum, where tokenist inclusion in the political economy of being a faculty member can actually signify the creation of a constitutive other in the political economy of knowledge production. It is when it reaches this point that we argue that feminist IR might usefully benefit from thinking about and acting on occupying the discipline of IR. So far, such a strategy has not (explicitly or implicitly) been a part of how feminisms have dealt with IR. While some look to stand outside of IR (Brown 1988) or actively reconstruct IR without reference to the mainstream of the discipline (Squires and Weldes 2007), still others engage the discipline (Tickner 1992). These strategies, though, might be enhanced by applying some of the unique methods of occupation when we think about how to interact with the discipline. For feminist IR, physically inhabiting the discipline of 23 IR might be accomplished by going to the spaces that IR feels safe in its exclusion of feminisms – conference spaces, panel spaces, journal spaces, book spaces, university spaces – and occupying them – reading, writing, talking, interrupting. It might be accomplished by establishing a physical presence places where feminists and feminist work/ideas are usually not welcome – infiltrating social space to infiltrate intellectual space, coming uninvited, asking feminist questions of non-feminist work, and the like. An embodied disruption of the social order may be that sort of physical presence in unwelcome spaces or disruption of existing physical space – whether by speaking, attire, physical location, or engagement in/with/at the international relations imperium. It might be something as simple as wearing ‘marriage equality’ or ‘this is what a feminist looks like’ tshirts in the place of business suits at conferences, or something as complicated as a large-scale feminist presence intervening in a conference panel that ignores or surpreses gender concerns. Embodied disruptions can be in physical presence itself or in the ways in which physical presences react to, narrative, involve, or implicate a particular critique of the way that IR works. Occupying a space of protest, in “Occupy” movement terms, is to refuse to keep protest confined to the allowed spaces (feminist journals, feminist theory and gender studies panels, allocated chapter space in textbooks and syllabi) and instead to engage in interventionary protests in uninhabitable spaces**.** Spaces of protest can be as straightforward as full Gender/IR textbooks (e.g., Shepherd 2009) and as sideways as presenting a paper different than that announced in an impermissible space for feminisms/feminist research. Occupying a space of otherness requires transcending the 24 confined space of IR’s constitutive other (inclusiveness that allows and produces exclusiveness), to act simultaneously physically present in but conceptually outside of, against, and contrary to the orthodoxy and perfect operationality of IR. Finally, occupying a space of liminality for feminist IR might mean embracing both intellectual instability (there is not one feminist IR but many) and disciplinary instability (feminist IR is not homed in IR). Certainly, feminist IR must (and should) continue to live its life in the absence of the mainstream’s realization of the place that gender analysis should hold in the world of IR. Feminist IR should continue to live its life with its head held high, proud of what we do and how we do it, and careful, as Sarah Brown notes, to maintain our identity in terms of epistemology, ontology, and methodology. Still, a call to move beyond being marginal seems to call for ignoring the very forces that we critique in global politics as they are manifested in our own professional lives. If feminist work in IR pays attention to the gendered power disparities in the social and political arenas, feminists who do that work cannot ignore the gendered power disparities within our own discipline. If we critique the compartmentalization of women in global politics, we need to do so while understanding (not accepting, but understanding) the boundaries our discipline has given our work. In this context, liminality means embracing uncertainty and change, in the world, in the discipline, and in the research of the discipline. It is not marginality or mainstream, engagement or ignoring, occupying or complicity – it is both sides of each of those dichotomies at once. The occupation of liminal space is embracing the by nature unstable identity and practice of feminisms in IR. 25 Would an occupied IR look any different than a non-occupied IR? Perhaps, perhaps not. Would the intellectual relationship between feminist IR and mainstream IR look different for the occupation? Almost certainly. For our purposes now, it is the intellectual relationship that we are interested in – the idea that a feminist occupation of IR makes IR’s uninhabitable space inhabitable – fundamentally changing the borders/boundaries of the discipline and their functioning, in ways similar to the (intellectual) impacts of making the uninhabitable space of the other to the neoliberal imperium inhabitable fundamentally rippled the tenability of the neoliberal imperium. This is all the more true given the “Occupy” understanding of knowledge(/its political relations and interactions) as inherently non-hierarchical, coincident with the feminist/poststructuralist interest in critically reevaluating/deconstructing hierarchies in IR knowledges. Occupying Research All of that said, limiting the methodology of occupation to understanding disciplinary politics seems both unnecessarily limiting and a waste. The real questions that we are interested in asking are about what it would mean to use “Occupy” as a research method for IR, particularly in correspondence with feminist ontologies and epistemologies in the discipline. Thinking of what it might mean to “occupy” as a method of research requires a brief discussion of feminist research methods. Ann Tickner suggests four perspectives which guide much of the methodology of feminist research: “a deep concern with which research questions get asked and why; the goal of designing research that is 26 useful for women; a preoccupation with questions of reflexivity and the subjectivity of the researcher; and the commitment to knowledge as emancipation” (2005, 4). Feminist scholarship is at once research and politics; this dualism forces feminist consideration of what it means to know and how we construct knowledge. In this consideration, feminists in IR have constructed a strong critique of the hegemony of positivist science in the analysis of global political and social relations. ‘Objective’ is no more than the subjective knowledge of privileged voices disguised as neutral (Harding 1998; Keller 1985; Goetz 1991). Privileged voices’ knowledges, though, are incomplete – representing only their unrepresentative experience (Scheman 1993, 211-2; Harding 1998). Yet this unrepresentativeness hides behind culturally assumed objectivity, where the privileged are licensed to think for everyone so long as they do so objectively**.** Feminisms critique this purported objectivity, recognizing instead that knowledge is always in part about the relationship between the knower and the known (Scheman 1993, 214). As Cynthia Enloe observed**,** “the personal is international and the international is personal”(**1**990, 195). Therefore, feminists understand knowledge is necessarily both contingent and interested. Contingency, interest, perspective, and politics are dimensions that the traditional “scientific method” is ill-equipped to consider. Feminism is “fundamentally a political act of commitment to understanding the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated” (Brown 1988, 472). As such, feminisms’ research goals and the “Occupy” methodology might have common interests and goals in terms of the politics of knowledge production and knowledge consumption. 27 We particularly find two ways where we think the method of “Occupation” might dovetail with the work of (feminist) IR, which we briefly sketch here. The first idea is that researchers occupy the uninhabitable space of liminality, particularly, the liminality of our research “subjects.” Recently, feminists have been thinking about what it means for the researcher’s body to be at risk and experience trauma in the research process, particularly in field research.6 We argue that this could be pushed further, towards thinking of occupation of/experience of liminal/uninhabitable space inhabited by IR’s traditional “research subjects” as itself a research method, where sense and emotion are the product and producer of research experiences. Living the liminality that we often ignore even when we write about the situation is a research experience – a way to reside in but outside of the dominant narrative of history/politics, a way to transgress the boundaries between research subject/object and researcher, and a way to understand the fundamental interdependence of the occupier and the occupied in research terms. The combined uncertainty of the observer (what is that?) and uncertainty in the consumption of the observed (how is that experienced?) of living liminality potentially provides the ability to inhabit the uninhabitable space of researcher-positioned-as-researched, breaking down the researcher/subject divide and providing space for the use of biopower to break down IR’s (disciplinary and research) sovereignties. This could be leveraged in support of feminisms’ interests in critical political knowledge production, anti-hierarchical transgression, and the creation of space for both research and political practice outside of the IR/neoliberal imperium(s).

# FRAMEWORK

## IMPACT FRAMING

### AT: Short TF/High Magnitude Impact Calc

#### **Both the aff and the perm rely on the creation of a crisis which requires a masculine hero to urgently address the impact – reject the fantasy of 1AC solvency, as it pushes feminist criticism to the periphery**

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in *feminist review* 109: 49-72, spp)

While globally it seems that ‘we are more or less permanently suspended in states of crisis’ (Otto, 2011: 76), crucially for feminist analyses, accounts that abstract moments of crisis as ‘exceptional’ events dislocate crisis from the nuanced thinking that would challenge the extreme measures that distort human rights and welfare (such as austerity measures and welfare cuts). Crises embody the power to shape our conceptions of world politics but also, crucially, have the capacity to construct and govern our most intimate and everyday practices. They are significant mechanisms of everyday, contemporary governance because they generate discourses of ‘emergency’, ‘speedy diagnosis’ and ‘robust response’, authorising ‘the operation of a more hegemonic legal order’ and reducing (but not eliminating) ‘the space for political contestation and critique’ (ibid.: 80). An alternative way of reading ‘crisis’ (and not something governance mechanisms and actors are likely to countenance) is, however, to concentrate on its fictive content, with ‘the crisis’ understood as a fictive imagining of everyday events that serves particular discursive purposes. Found in media and official portrayals that have represented the crisis in terms of shock, devastation, anxiety, fear, anger and shame (see, e.g., Widmaier, 2010), the neo-liberal governance of crisis has relied intensively on the language of trauma to generate ‘urgent’, wide-ranging but surreptitious social reforms, including the rewriting of institutional power arrangements and the dismantling of protective welfare systems. The reproduction of tropes of urgency, immediacy and muscularity (what we might call neo-liberalism’s ‘conventional’ responses to crisis), mobilised through metaphors of catastrophe and disaster, has, in particular, allowed for ‘a set of otherwise controversial “responses” to receive widespread legitimation’ (Brassett and Clarke, 2012: 5). The extent to which financial risk management has been cast over the course of the twentieth century as ‘a domain of technical expertise’, removed from public debate and placed firmly in the hands of an elite cadre of fiscal ‘experts’ (De Goede, 2004: 200–207), has rendered such decisive interventions yet more realisable. Despite interesting, and critical, engagements with the use of visuality and metaphor in dominant representations of the crisis, how the use of visual and narrative metaphors of enormity, shock and devastation, and the ensuing repetition of the need for robust, or ‘muscular’, interventions, has been gendered has been little discussed. Key financial publications, including, for example, The Financial Times, The Economist and Time magazine, have regularly deployed representational practices that discriminate actively and often between identifi- able and sexed bodies as symbolic of economic success, regulation and recovery in the global political economy. Men appear across these publications in power, holding the power, bearing the burden of responsibility for crisis and resolving crisis, reaffirming the meaning of the global financial system and its practices as symbolic of white, masculine corporate power (Griffin, 2015). This is particularly important with regard to feminism’s attention to governance in its everyday forms and practices, since, by immersing the financial crisis in images of masculinity, popular and policy sources provide a subtle, but thoroughly gendered, grounding for the ideas, methods and practices instituted by instruments of governance in response to the crisis (such as the measures of austerity considered below). The below analysis thus considers how, as everyday practices of global governance, ‘crisis management’ techniques have reproduced the dismissal of ill-fitting feminist critique and co-opted more sympathetic feminist knowledges. This, the paper argues, simply confirms the longevity of neo-liberal, capitalist, imperatives in the global political economy, entrenching the power of existing economic orders and constraining the possibilities, and space, for contestation and critique based on the masculinised reproduction of financial privilege. crisis governance discourse (1): the dismissal of feminism and the social costs of austerity[:] One way to read feminism’s position vis-a`-vis crisis is to note the damaging blow that contemporary governance reactions to ‘crisis’ have dealt feminism. Crises everywhere ‘are a particularly dangerous time for feminism, and indeed for all progressive ways of thinking’ (Otto, 2011: 78). The ‘emergency’ measures initiated by the announcement of ‘crisis’ represent a shift in power away from inclusive law and policy-making towards so-called ‘expertise’ in ‘crisis management’, ‘muscular’ law-making and the entrenchment of executive power, all of which effectively push feminism ‘off the map’ (ibid.: 76–79). Governments in the developed and developing world have further entrenched the reactionary, ‘hard’ law politics of crisis management, using the rhetoric of urgency to adopt far-reaching and increasingly invasive crisis management measures. Under the guise of ‘austerity’, the IMF has even been recalibrated as an institution of worldly fiscal expertise, a notable departure from the derided figure of cookie-cutter policy-making it struck in the aftermath of the Asian and Argentinean financial crises.

### AT: Probability Impact Calc

#### The aff’s exaggeration of their probability is a tool used to justify militaristic domination of geopolitics – proven by every policy debate season and its never-ending forecasts of imminent extinction

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 77-78 (SPP).

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modem great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] **erases the distinction between** **security and expansion**," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes. Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

## UTIL

### Util Turn

#### Util permits unethical acts in the name of the lesser-evil. This political model creates a constant state of exception which justifies necropolitics (this is a DA to the perm as well)

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza*. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 6-10, SPP)

If, as a friend recently suggested, we ought to construct a monument to our present political culture as a homage to the principle of the 'lesser evil', it should be made in the form of the digits 6-6-5 built of concrete blocks, and installed like the Hollywood sign on hillsides or other high points overlooking city centres. This number, one less than the number of the beast -that of the devil and of total evil- might capture the essence of our humanitarian present obsessed -with the calculations and calibrations that seek to moderate, ever so slightly, the evils that it has largely caused itself. The principle of the lesser evil is often presented as a dilemma between two or more bad choices in situations where available options are, or seem to be, limited. The choice made justifies the pursuit of harmful actions that would be otherwise deemed unacceptable in the hope of averting even greater suffering. Sometimes the principle is presented as the optimal result of a general field of calculations that seeks to compare, measure and evaluate different bad consequences in relation to necessary acts, and then to minimize those consequences. Both aspects of the principle are understood as taking place within a dosed system in which those posing the dilemma, the options available for choice, the factors to be calculated and the very parameters of calculation are unchallenged. Each calculation is undertaken anew, as if the previous accumulation of events has not taken place, and the future implications are out of bounds. Those who seek to justify necessary evils as 'lesser' ones, especially when searching for a rationale to explain recent wars and military expeditions, like to appeal to the work of the fourth-century North African philosopher-theologian St Augustine. Augustine's rejection of the principle of Manichaeism- a world divided into equally powerful good and evil - meant that he no longer saw evil as the perfect mirror image of the good; rather, in platonic terms, as a measure of its absence. Since evil, unlike good, is not perfect and absolute, it is forever measured and calibrated on a differential scale of more and less, greater and lesser. Augustine taught that it is not permissible to practise lesser evils, because to do so violates the Pauline principle 'do no evil that good may come'. But- and here lies its appeal -lesser evils might be tolerated when they are deemed necessary and unavoidable, or when perpetrating an evil results in the reduction of the overall amount of evil in the world. One of the examples Augustine gives for such an economy of lesser and greater evils is a robbery on a crossroads. It is to this crossroads that other theologists, philosophers and political theorists will return, to this day, when discussing the dilemma. In Augustine's logic of pre-emption, it is better to kill the would-be assailant before he kills an innocent traveler. A millennium later and the armies of Western Christendom passed through this ethicotheological needle-eye-sized loophole on their way to the catalogue of pillage and destruction that constituted the crusades. More recently, Pope Benedict has appealed to the lesser evil principle in a decree permitting the use of condoms in places inflicted -with high rates of HIV. Similar to the latter logic of contraception, some in the Vatican thought that implicit support of the government of Silvio Berlusconi, albeit plagued by sin, ridicule and corruption, might after all be considered as the lesser evil in protecting Christian values. In cases such as these, the economy of the lesser ev-il is always cited as a justification for breaching rigid rules and entrenched dogma; indeed, it is often used by those in power as the primary justification for the very notion of 'exception'. In fact, Augustine's discourse of the lesser evil developed at a time when the church had started to participate in the political government of its subjects and had acquired considerable financial and military power. Through the ages, the Christian church increasingly saw its task as keeping human evil to its minimum level. It pastorally ruled over a vast and complex intrapersonal economy of merits and faults -of sin, vice and virtue- operating according to specific rules of circulation and transfer, with procedures, analyzes, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of a specific interplay between conflicting goods and degrees of evil. In his lectures on the origins of governmentality, Michel Foucault argued that, on the basis of this 'economical theology', the modern, secular form of governmental power has itself taken on the form of an economy.10 Lesser Evildoers The theological origins of the lesser evil argument still cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts - from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the 'war on terror' and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid- that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the term 'good'. Moreover, the very evocation of the 'good' seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the 'war on terror', the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada's Liberal Party Michael lgnatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil, Ignatieff suggested that in 'balancing liberty against security' liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajuridical violence - which he saw as lesser evils - in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states. If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. 'Exceptions', Ignatieff states, 'do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort. '12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatic compromise, a 'tolerated sin' that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greatest harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace. Niore recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by lgnatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves. Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture, to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even 'the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost’. In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucy of the 'banality of evil' as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an 'enlightened' manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatia-technological means of domination, and advertises them as 'humanitarian technology'. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation bringing together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the concept of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated - and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively.

#### Utilitarian calculations guarantee advocacy of violence

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza*. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 2-4, SPP)

Divine examination, evaluation, calculation and choice operate thus within a complex economy in which good and bad could be transferred and exchanged. Because in this economy all bad things necessarily appear at their minimum possible level, the world as lived is always necessarily the best of all possible worlds. 'If a lesser evil is relatively good,' Leibniz reasoned, 'so a lesser good is relatively evil ... to show that an architect could have done better is to find faults in his work. ' If this description of the economy of divine government is already reminiscent of the logic of contemporary wars, with its own scales of risk and proportionality used to evaluate the desired and undesired consequences of military acts, it is hardly surprising to find in it an early reflection on the concept of 'collateral damage'. Earlier Christian theology has indeed already described all bad things that take place as 'the collateral effects of the good'. In this immanent order of human and divine life, the destructive result of floods are nothing but the collateral effect of necessary rain. In both their theological and military contexts, as Giorgio Agamben observed, the collateral effects are structural rather than accidental. It is through the collateral - flood or blood - that a government -divine or human- can demonstrate, indeed exercise, its power. Unlike the calculations of a God, seen by the philosophers and the theologians of the eighteenth century as a perfect mathematician who could undertake instantaneous calculations and immediately arrive at a precise result, mere humans must of course guess, speculate and hedge their risks as they proceed towards the future as the blind leading the blind. It is for this reason that they ceaselessly seek to develop and perfect all sorts of technologies and techniques that might allow them to calculate the effects of violence and might harness its consequences. It is these techniques and technologies, apparatuses and spatial arrangements, that are at the heart of this book. Through them, Pangloss's Leibnizian scheme- or is it Leibniz's Panglossian scheme?-of the 'best of all possible worlds' re-emerges in the progressive tradition of liberalism. Here, in its secularized form, political rather than metaphysical, a similar structure of the argument sets up the sphere of morality as a set of calculations aimed to approximate the optimum proportion between common goods and necessary evils? But as the general outlook of liberalism shifted from Voltaire's and indeed Jeremy Bentham's later focus on the 'greater good' and the responsibility of government to increase happiness to the greatest number of people, to the liberal canards of 'just wars', and their increasingly sophisticated technologies for minimizing the number of 'necessary' corpses, the search for 'the best of all possible worlds' started giving ground to the present neo-Panglossian pessimism of the 'least of all possible evils'. This book engages with the problem of violence in its moderation and minimization, mostly with state violence that is managed according to a similar economy of calculations and justified as the least possible means. **The fundamental point** of this book **is that the moderation of violence is part of the very logic of violence.** Humanitarianism, human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), when abused by state, supra-state and military action, have become the crucial means by which the economy of violence is calculated and managed. A dose reading of a series of case studies will show how, at present, spatial organizations and physical instruments, technical standards, procedures and systems of monitoring - the complex humanitarian assemblage that philosopher Adi Ophir called ‘moral technologies' - have become the means for exercising contemporary violence and for governing the displaced, the enemy and the unwanted. The condition of collusion of these technologies of humanitarianism, human rights and humanitarian law with military and political powers is referred to in this book as 'the humanitarian present'. Within this present condition, all political oppositions are replaced by the elasticity of degrees, negotiations, proportions and balances

## REALISM

### AT: Realism

#### Realism presumes and reifies hegemonic masculinity

Jones 1996 (Adam, professor of international studies at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics in Mexico City, “Does ‘gender’ make the world go round? Feminist critiques of international relations,” *Review of International Studies*, Volume 22 / Issue 04 / October 1996, pp 405-429, Cambridge Journals Online)

The Realist assumption of the state: The classical paradigm places primary emphasis on the world system as a level of analysis. But the constituent actors in the Realist scenario are states—accepted as givens, 'abstract unitary actors whose actions are explained through laws that can be universalized across time and place and whose internal characteristics are irrelevant to the operation of these laws'.14 Tickner contends that this image of state action is fundamentally 'antihumanist' in its reification of the state. But it is also masculinist in its privileging of traditionally male-oriented values: Behind this reification of state practices hide social institutions that are made and remade by individual actions. In reality, the neorealist depiction of the state as a unitary actor is grounded in the historical practices of the Western state system: neorealist characterizations of state behavior, in terms of self-help, autonomy, and power seeking, privilege characteristics associated with the Western construction of masculinity.15 It is clear why feminists tend to place such emphasis on the Realist state-as-actor formulation. No political phenomenon has been subjected to such radical scrutiny and criticism in the past twenty years as the state, its composition, and its per- petuation in the spheres of production and reproduction. Feminism, as noted, rose to prominence alongside other radical critiques of the 1960s and '70s. It is hardly surprising, then, that the enduring radical-feminist tradition, best exemplified by Catharine MacKinnon, has been most insistent on a re-evaluation of the state from a gender perspective. Radical feminism charges the domestic political order with negating the female/feminine and sharply constraining the role and political power of women. When a class analysis is integrated with the gender variable, as it usually is, we have a picture of the state as compromised and conflictive, predicated on the structured inequality of women and the poor (two categories that intersect to a greater or lesser degree in much feminist analysis, as in the real world). MacKinnon writes: The state is male in the feminist sense ... The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender—through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive policies. . . Formally, the state is male in that objectivity is its norm ... It legitimates itself by reflecting its view of society, a society it helps make by so seeing it, and calling that view, and that relation, rationality. Since rationality is measured by point-of-viewlessness, what counts as reason is that which corresponds to the way things are.16 The analysis here stops at the boundaries of the nation-state, but the implications for feminists of an international system composed of such units are clear. So, too, is the important difference between such radical-feminist formulations and radical- Marxist critiques of the state. While Marxism has spent much of the past two decades exploring the state's potential to act with 'relative autonomy' from dominant social classes, MacKinnon and other radical feminists reject outright the possibility of the state ever acting against dominant male / masculine interests. 'How- ever autonomous of class the liberal state may appear, it is not autonomous of sex. Male power is systemic. Coercive, legitimated, and epistemic, it is the regime.'17

## POLICY MAKING

### AT: FIAT Good

#### Empirically there is no link between simulating FIAT and IRL change in DC

Gilens and Page 14 (Martin, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and Benjamin, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, American Political Science Association, Perspectives on Politics, September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3, p. 575-577)

Each of our four theoretical traditions (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Interest-Group Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism) emphasizes different sets of actors as critical in determining U.S. policy outcomes, and each tradition has engendered a large empirical literature that seems to show a particular set of actors to be highly influential. Yet nearly all the empirical evidence has been essentially bivariate. Until very recently it has not been possible to test these theories against each other in a systematic, quantitative fashion. By directly pitting the predictions of ideal-type theories against each other within a single statistical model (using a unique data set that includes imperfect but useful measures of the key independent variables for nearly two thousand policy issues), we have been able to produce some striking findings. One is the nearly total failure of “median voter” and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy. The failure of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy is all the more striking because it goes against the likely effects of the limitations of our data. The preferences of ordinary citizens were measured more directly than our other independent variables, yet they are estimated to have the least effect. Nor do organized interest groups substitute for direct citizen influence, by embodying citizens’ will and ensuring that their wishes prevail in the fashion postulated by theories of Majoritarian Pluralism. Interest groups do have substantial independent impacts on policy, and a few groups (particularly labor unions) represent average citizens’ views reasonably well. But the interest-group system as a whole does not. Overall, net interest-group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole. “Potential groups” do not take up the slack, either, since average citizens’ preferences have little or no independent impact on policy after existing groups’ stands are controlled for. Furthermore, the preferences of economic elites (as measured by our proxy, the preferences of “affluent” citizens) have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do. To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence. Of course our findings speak most directly to the “first face” of power: the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.) Our results speak less clearly to the “third face” of power: the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences.49 We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero. What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it.

# AT: STUFF

## AT: FEM IR TURNS

### AT: K = Essentialism

#### No link and turn – we don’t assume men are inherently more aggressive than women – the military creates this essentialism to serve its interests. We critique discourses that sustain notions of masculinity intrinsically tied to violence

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 69 (SPP).

Some scholars have argued that men are more likely to make war than women, because men are naturally aggressive. Wars break out because men are in positions of political and military power. Francis Fukuyama's 1998 Foreign Affairs article is an example of this type of reasoning. If this logic were true, it could be argued that men are likely to misinterpret the actual offense-defense balance because their aggressive tendencies inspire them to seek out conflict. The relationship between gender and aggression, however, is more complicated. Claims of "natural" aggression in men are politically suspect because they imply it is impossible for men to be otherwise, and therefore ignore the many men who do not behave aggressively. Joshua Goldstein finds little evidence that increased levels of testosterone in men fuel wars, or that biological factors explain the near-monopoly men have had on war-fighting throughout history. Instead of blaming men's biological composition for state aggressiveness, feminists in IR have identified military training and the installment of martial values in men as a source of aggressive policies. Cynthia Enloe draws attention to the myriad strategies associating nationalism and masculinity that military recruiters have used around the world and through time to encourage men to enlist, from promises of a fast-track to "first-class citizenship" for racial minorities, to presumptions of cultural superiority for groups already privileged. In the case of World War I, a "crisis of masculinity" in Britain was incited by the physical ineligibility of much of the working classes for military service, resulting in widespread government intervention to produce a nation of men more suited for the rigors of war deemed necessary to maintain Britain's colonial empire and place in the world. Anxieties over the ability of men to defend the nation prompted attempts to reshape gender relations throughout society to encourage the reinvigoration of traditional gender roles. This evidence indicates that rather than being inherently masculine, the military serves as an important site for the creation and maintenance of gender identities in society. As Enloe points out, "If maleness, masculinity, and militarism were inevitably bound together, militaries would always have all the soldiers they believed they required."42 Viewing gender as an identity, as "a socially imposed and internalized lens through which individuals perceive and respond to the world,"43 does a better job at explaining the underestimation of the costs of war than theories of men's innate aggression.

### AT: K = Gender Binaries

#### Our theory of hegemonic masculinity does not rely on binaries but recognizes that a constructed conception of masculinity is privileged over other masculinities and femininities

Wadley, 2010. (Jonathan, PhD in IR from Florida and currently professor of IR and sexual politics at San Diego. “Gendering the State: Performativity and Protection in International Security,” in *Gender and International Security* edited by Laura Sjoberg, pp. 49-50, SPP)

Often, the qualities of gender norms are structured as dichotomous pairs. As signifiers of identity, they establish hierarchy among the actors upon which they are "written." They include, among other things: rationality/irrationality, civilized/barbaric, autonomous/dependent, active/passive, and powerful/weak-all of which map onto the dominant signifier pair of masculine/feminine. The examination of gender dichotomies such as these has been helpful in accounting for how unequal, relational identities have been maintained and how they have privileged some actors and marginalized others. However, there are limits to this kind of analysis. By viewing relational gender identities in dichotomous terms, one risks neglecting the variation that exists within those categories. Simply put, there are different and unequal types of masculinity and femininity. Within the range of masculinities, there are dominant and subordinate types. A hegemonic masculinity is an idealized, relational, and historical model of masculinity-one to which other forms of masculinity are subordinate. Although the qualities associated with it characterize a small percentage of masculine actors, its idealization and cultural pervasiveness require other actors to position themselves in relation to it. And while it is continually evolving, incorporating other forms of masculinity even as it subordinates them, it remains identifiable. By performing in accordance with a dominant model of masculinity, states can constitute (and thus, position) themselves relationally as powerful subjects. For Connell, this kind of positioning is at the heart of the concept of masculinity, to such a degree that the term "represents not a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men position themselves through discursive practices." Cynthia Enloe argues similarly that patriarchy is perpetuated by “men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, for the sake of being more valued, more 'serious,' and 'the protectors of/and controllers of those people who are less masculine.” A comparable process occurs among states. As with men, the more that states are able to constitute themselves in alliance with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity the more they will improve their position and boost their credibility. Thus, states have constant incentives to perform in ways that not only are masculine but that constitute them as a certain form of masculine actor, one who embodies the elements of the hegemonic masculinity. Performances that masculinize states by positioning them closer to the ideal of the hegemonic masculinity are likely to be most effective in the realm of security. This is because security performances are central to the production of the state as a unitary subject and because, so often, security performances are rendered intelligible by highly pronounced ideas about masculinity and femininity. War, in particular, demonstrates this claim. Long ago, Kenneth Waltz observed that in times of war the state is united (and, therefore, a single entity) to a greater degree than at any other time. Tickner makes a similar observation but concludes that gender plays a big role in producing state unity: the state becomes a citizen-warrior in times of war. Jean Bethke Elshtain and Susan Jeffords go one step further, arguing that collective identities are constructed through the types of men and women that war creates or brings out. But absent war, security performances are still crucial for state production and reproduction. By taking dangers, threats, and other signs of insecurity to be there objects, security performances reproduce the boundaries between a secure self and a dangerous other. Boundary reproduction is central to processes of statecraft, and security performances occur where the integrity of the state's boundaries are discursively challenged, often in an explicit manner. Whether such threats are internal or external, the effect is the same. Indeed, the distinction often collapses. One effect of successful security performances, then, is the appearance of the state as a unitary, continuous actor, and one who can claim legitimacy over those "internal" to it. An additional effect of successful security performances is the constitution of the state as an actor who is hierarchically dominant to certain other international actors, frequently states. Both of these can be accomplished by performing security in accord with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity. The relational quality of gender ensures that any performances that gave the state the appearance of personhood will necessarily position its personhood in relation to other states. Any gendered construction of the state, even if it does not live up to masculine ideals, will be "socially defined contradistinction from some model (whether real or imaginary) of femininity; thus, the gender norms that make a state intelligible as a subject also situate it relationally to other actors.

#### Masculinity and femininity are culturally constructed – masculine doesn’t inherently dominate the feminine

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 5, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)

The gender critique of war provides a generalized account of wars and the way they are fought. The gender critique tells us why we have wars at all. While it is suggestive with respect to the frequency, character, and scope of war, it does not try to account for the timing and location of specific wars. It tells us why war is viewed widely as an acceptable practice or way to resolve human differences (although this acceptance invariably is accompanied with obligatory protestations of reluctance). The gender critique of war, for example, cannot account for the timing and location of the 1991 Gulf War, although it can provide an explanation of the warring proclivities of modern Western states, especially the inconsistency between the peaceful rhetoric of the US and its incessant warring practices. It can account for the spectre of war in the aftermath of Vietnam, with the end of the Cold War, and with the election of George Bush. It is less able to account for the appearance of war in the Middle East in January of 1991. The opening intellectual orientation of the gender critique of war rests upon a constructivist view of human understanding and practice, that is, a view that anchors practices, including war, within humankind's self-made historico-cultural matrix. This view is contrasted starkly with those that ground human practices psychologically or biologically or genetically. War is not viewed as a natural practice as if delivered by the Gods; it arises out of human-created understandings and ways-of- living that have evolved over the millennia. More specifically, the assumption that men (the nearly exclusive makers and doers of war) are biologically hard-wired for aggression and violence is resisted, as is the related notion that women are naturally passive and non-violent. The explanation for war will not be found in testosterone levels. It is not the essential or bio-social male that makes war. War is the product of the gendered understandings of life—understandings of the celebrated masculine and the subordinated feminine—that have been fashioned over vast tracts of cultural time. And since war arises from human-created understandings and practices it can be removed when these understandings change. War is not insuperable. Indeed, the rooting of war in human created phenomena is recognized as a response to the political incapacitation associated with biologically determinist arguments: "Attempts of genetic determinists to show a biological basis for individual aggression and to link this to social aggression, are not only unscientific, but they support the idea that wars of conquest between nations are inevitable."8

## AT: UNIQUENESS PRESSES

### AT: Women are in politics

#### Their women in politics example doesn’t disprove our argument that dominant politics operates via displays of hegemonic masculinity

Maruska, 2010. (Jennifer Heeg, PhD in IR from Georgetown, Lecturer in Political Science and Texas A&M in Qatar, “When are states hypermasculine?” In Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 248-251, SPP)

Conclusion: hypermasculine politics: State behavior (by foreign policy elites and within popular culture) reflects hegemonic masculinity, which is just one type of masculinity that occurs at the top of a hierarchy of power relations. As previously discussed, various forms of masculinities manifest on the international stage, including hegemonic masculinity (of Western elites) and other, subordinated masculinities (such as gay men, men of color; and non-Western men), as well as many forms of subordinate femininity. Hegemonic femininity is perfectly sound as a theoretical concept, but it is present only when "feminine" values dominate the social structure under analysis. But insofar as states are "manly," the field of international politics is dominated by states with differing hegemonic masculinities. American hegemonic masculinity's most recent turn towards hypermasculinity is in stark contrast to Germany's focus on economic primacy. But it does not matter whether Gerhard Schroeder or Angela Merkel is at the helm: like all other states, Germany must behave in a manly way in order to compete against other manly states-and to survive in a feminine anarchy.67 The point is well theorized by now that "when women enter politics, particularly in areas of foreign policy, they enter an already constructed masculine world where role expectations are defined in terms of adherence to preferred masculine attributes such as rationality, autonomy, and power. "68 This is adherence to a generalized description of hegemonic masculinity. What I propose as hypermasculinity goes further than this, and refers to aggressive and bellicose behavior. It is possible that female heads-of-state may be more likely to adhere to a hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity, in order to minimize their anatomical female-ness. Television pundits make this point: Andrew Sullivan refers to Queens Elizabeth and Victoria, Margaret Thatcher, and now Hillary Clinton as "Warrior Queens. "69 The concepts of hegemonic masculinity, and subordinate masculinities and femininities, give this punditry (based on intuition and a specific reading of history) real theoretical heft. The field of international politics in the US is dominated almost completely by straight white men-or women who "act like men" (as is frequently said about Hillary Clinton)--or by non-white men and women who conform (by choice or necessity) to the culture of Washington. Even the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, unprecedented as it was, does not fundamentally alter this reality. After all, current First Lady Michelle Obama's senior thesis at Princeton reflected on her experiences as a Black American at an Ivy League university, stating that "the path I have chosen to follow by attending Princeton will likely lead to my further integration and/or assimilation into a White cultural and social structure that will only allow me to remain on the periphery of society; never becoming a full participant." Furthermore, she continues in the next paragraph, "as I enter my final year at Princeton, I find myself striving for many of the same goals as my White classmates." It remains to be seen, but while some may hope that the Obama administration ushers in an era where the particular strand of hegemonic masculinity is less hypermasculine than it was immediately following 9/11, international politics remains as imbued with hegemonic masculinity as ever. Acceptable behavior in international politics transcends the individual’s race or gender; to get to a position of power, all participants (gay, straight, male, female, light or dark-skinned) must conform to the "cult of [hegemonic] masculinity." As Carol Cohn has showed us in the field of nuclear strategy, "learning the language is a transformative, not an additive, process." Heads of state must be perceived as strong on national security; national security relies on war or the threat of war. This is hegemonic masculinity in the extreme. Hegemonic masculinity is international politics, and international politics is hegemonic masculinity. In the words of two feminist theorists "international politics is a process which is always already gendered and which is maintained as gender-neutral only in reducing gender to 'women' and their particular concerns."73 If gender is not widely considered to be useful as a line of inquiry into politics, it is only because politics are dominated so completely by the mindset of hegemonic masculinity. As R. W. Connell wrote:

### AT: Women’s Participation Increasing = Progress

#### **Increasing representation of women defers structural change and abets the system**

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in *feminist review* 109: 49-72, spp)

Essentialism has been no obstacle to the rapid uptake of the ‘rise of gender harmony’ in governance discourse on finance. Frequently described and represented as more responsible, nurturing, financially cautious and intrinsically less corrupt (see, for instance, Stern, 2001; World Bank, 2001), women have found themselves positioned in recent discussions of financial crisis as a solution to the excesses of male-dominated finance, in a show of essentialism that governance feminism has run with in its agenda for getting more women in boardrooms and on trading floors. Economic observers have frequently attributed the seeds of the global financial crisis ‘to a combination of reckless risk-taking and outright corruption’ and, just as ‘risk-taking has been laid at the door of masculinity, so too has corruption’ (Fogg, 2013). Accordingly, women ‘are simply more honest’, more trustworthy and public-spirited and less corrupt than men (ibid.). They are also ‘naturally’ more prone to long-term thinking or empathic and prosocial behaviour than men (ibid.). Policy-oriented studies have emerged to demonstrate ‘that including women is good for business’ and evidence has been marshalled to show that firms that promote women into management are more profitable, better organised, accountable, motivated and innovative (Prügl, 2012: 29). Making ‘women’s difference productive for the solution of the crisis’, such accounts have centralised women’s supposed patience, their consistence and their attention to detail (ibid.: 30). Importantly, however (and in case men begin to feel threatened by all this attention on women’s gifts), these accounts have redeemed men in finance by extolling women’s contributions to profit in conjunction with men’s tendency towards extremes, painting women as ‘competent associate[s] in a common endeavor’ (ibid.: 31). Iceland’s efforts to ‘signal a new culture within the banking system’ (Wall Street Journal, 2008), appointing female chief executives to the newly nationalised Icelandic banks, serves as a good example of the extent to which essentialist, and behavioural, explanations have monopolised contemporary accounts of financial crisis. According to Salam, the ‘macho men of the heavily male-dominated global finance sector’ created the conditions for global economic collapse’, assisted by ‘their mostly male counterparts in government’ (Salam, 2009: 68). Women, on the other hand, are less inclined to ‘risky’ behaviour on financial markets (except when menstruating; see Lite, 2008). As Elias (2013: 161) notes, women’s perceived carefulness as consumers (according to Global Gender Gap reporting) also makes them better placed as managers of household finances. According to the WEF, they are ‘driving the post-financial-crisis-economic-recovery’ not only though their ‘retail power’ but by ‘engaging in acts of consumption that enable them to break with traditional gender stereotypes in favor of an empowered gender identity as consumer’ (ibid.: 161–162). Governance feminism’s embrace of the neo-liberal market guarantees that it firmly avoids questions that might challenge the shape of the economic system that has led to crisis. Governance feminism, and governance feminism’s response to financial crisis, has been extensively silent on the gendered underpinnings of global governance, and global finance in particular, focusing instead on a particular (and perhaps unsurprising) support for institutional measures to enhance women’s participation. The increasing prevalence of descriptions of gender that directly correlate low gender gaps with high economic competitiveness is, as Elias (2013: 159) notes, a powerful instrument of governance, feeding into states’ obsessions with their national economic competitiveness and ‘thus legitimating neoliberal competitiveness enhancing policy agendas’. While it may be, then, ‘no bad thing that an organisation such as the WEF has placed gender prominently on its issue agenda’, since this can legitimate ‘a focus on gender issues within state and nonstate arenas and within international organisations’, the ‘inevitability about the way in which gender issues are instrumentalised in order to link women’s empowerment and gender equality straightforwardly to economic growth and competitiveness’ is, Elias notes, troubling. ‘By disappearing feminism in favour of technical measurement and celebrity humanitarianism’, governance feminism simply reiterates problematic visions of gender ‘whereby gender equality and women’s empowerment’ can be understood only in relation to their ‘ability to serve the market economy’ (ibid.: 166–167).

### AT: Pinkner

#### Pinker’s “violence down” argument ignores military modernization, nuclear arsenals, and sanitizes interventionism

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Nuclear weapons pose a strong challenge to Pinker’s thesis of declining violence, one he never dealt with adequately. He argues in his books that the “long peace” since World War II was not the result of nuclear weapons, and argues that nukes are essentially “useless in winning wars and in keeping the peace” since no country would dare to use them: “Incinerating massive numbers of noncombatants would shred the principles of distinction and proportionality that govern the conduct of war and would constitute the worst war crimes in history. That can make even politicians squeamish, so a taboo grew up around the use of nuclear weapons, effectively turning them into bluffs.” Of course, this means the United States itself has committed the “worst war crimes in history” since it intentionally dropped nuclear weapons on two civilian populations. And while there is certainly a “taboo” on such behavior—Hiroshima horrified much of the world, though Americans tend to think it was fine—U.S. commanders contemplated using nuclear weapons in Vietnam, too. (Good thing Lyndon Johnson got a bit “squeamish,” although not so squeamish as to stop a war that killed two million Vietnamese people.) Realizing that the presence of thousands of weapons that can vaporize cities, and the giant U.S. war machine constantly researching terrifying swarms of autonomous flying death robots, rather undercuts the whole Most Peaceful Era Ever theory, Pinker points to the fact that “the United States has reduced its inventory by 85 percent from its 1976 peak.” He concedes, however, that “Cynics might be unimpressed by a form of progress that still leaves the world with 10,200 atomic warheads.” Indeed, cynics might! The big problem with Pinker’s violence thesis has always been that it declares victory prematurely. He is quite clear in saying he doesn’t think peace is necessarily here to stay, or that progress can’t unravel, and thinks this should silence critics who think he is overly optimistic. But the truth is that we’re just not far enough past the end of World War II to begin to comment on a general trend. The two global bloodbaths occurred within the lifetimes of people who are still alive. Over the course of human history, this is a nanosecond. It’s not a “long peace,” but a very short one. One should probably not be drawing any conclusions about what kind of era this is until we’ve seen a bit more of it, otherwise you might end up like the people who said World War One had been the war to “end all wars.” Others have pointed out that Pinker’s worldview requires him to minimize some pretty heinous violence, especially that perpetrated by the United States. (A good overview of this is found in the International Socialist Review.) He trumpets Democratic Peace Theory without much attention to the way the “democratic” U.S. has squelched popular uprisings abroad that threaten its interests. He even goes so far as to say: “Among respectable countries… conquest is no longer a thinkable option. A politician in a democracy today who suggested conquering another country would be met not with counterarguments but with puzzlement, embarrassment, or laughter.” Probably true, if they said “conquering.” If they said “liberating” or “spreading democracy to,” on the other hand, they’d be met with quite a different reaction! To avoid acknowledging U.S. aggression, he has to downplay the hideousness of the Vietnam War, and mostly blames “communists” for it, saying that “the three deadliest postwar conflicts were fueled by Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese communist regimes that had a fanatical dedication to outlasting their opponents” and “the American democracy was willing to sacrifice a tiny fraction of the lives that the North Vietnamese dictator was willing to forfeit.” This exoneration of the U.S. for the Vietnamese deaths is downright despicable, and Pinker needs to get himself much better acquainted with the reality of what we did. Naturally, Pinker is more critical of anti-nuclear activists than of the military industrial complex. “Stop telling everyone they’re doomed,” he warns. “The message that many antinuclear activists want to convey is ‘any day now we will all die horribly unless the world immediately takes steps which it has absolutely no chance of taking.” And after all, “the world has survived half-mad despots with nuclear weapons before, namely Stalin and Mao, who were deterred from using them, or, more likely, never felt the need.” Very reassuring. (He also points out that “war is illegal.”) Illustration by Mike Freiheit What’s maddening about Pinker’s body of recent work is that it attacks the very people who are doing the most to address the problems he says he cares about. Progress is made by progressives, as Jeremy Lent pointed out, and it’s yesterday’s “social justice warriors” that are responsible for the declines in racist language and corporal punishment that Pinker shows off as accomplishments of Our Great Liberal Democratic Capitalist Order. The Pinkers of times past were the one Martin Luther King was addressing in Letter From Birmingham Jail, who placed trust in the “benevolent forces of modernity” to make things better rather than actually taking part in a social movement. As my friend Sam Miller McDonald put it, “most of those good things that Steven Pinker likes to brag about came about because of the hard work and sacrifice of the kind of people Steven Pinker likes to complain about.” Indeed, Pinker is quite open that he doesn’t believe in “struggle.” He views political problems as “mistakes,” errors to be corrected through the application of rationality, rather than “conflicts” between values and interests. He wants to “depoliticize issues as much as possible” and “treat politics as science, engineering, or medicine.” This is why he refuses to see that certain kinds of power are zero-sum, that the interests of the boss does not coincide with the interests of the worker. That would mean that advancing the interests of the worker required a political fight, rather than simply the application of technology. This is the Obama worldview, and the Obama presidency proved why it doesn’t work. It turns out that interests do conflict, and that if you try to take actions that enrich working people and threaten corporate power, the people whose power is threatened will do everything they possibly can to destroy you. Steven Pinker’s works are worth examining for a few reason. For one thing, they show how deeply conservative a “liberal” worldview can be. Pinker is all for Equal Rights, Democracy, Sensible Regulation, Secularism, and the other great Liberal values. And yet like many liberals, he seems to detest the left more than the hard right. (He infamously praised the “highly literate, highly intelligent” alt-right. Then when he was criticized, he said: “A lot of people who are ignorant of the alt-right equate them with the skinheads and the Nazis carrying the tiki torches, I was referring to the alt-right strictly from its origins in internet discussion groups.” So, not Richard Spencer, but… Richard Spencer?) He simply accepts the right-wing narrative of various events. This often shows up in small framing comments. Bernhard Goetz was “a mild-mannered engineer” who “became a folk hero for shooting four young muggers,” not a vigilante who attacked four Black men after one of them asked him for money. (I’ve never looked up what Pinker thinks of James Damore, but I’m sure he thinks he was an intelligent young man fired for reporting the uncontroversial results of scientific studies.\*) He partly defends the Tuskegee syphilis study, calling it a “one-time failure to prevent harm to a few dozen people,” that “may even have been defensible by the standards of the day” (It was actually 400 people that the United States government allowed to believe they were being treated for syphilis when they weren’t, and it lasted 40 years.)